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Abstract 
Background 
Persecutory delusions are one of the most common and distressing symptoms of 
psychosis. Many studies indicate an association of persecutory delusions with 
depression. A direct role for depression-related cognitive factors in the 
maintenance of persecutory delusions has not been systematically examined, 
despite such processes being implicated in a cognitive model.  
Objectives 
To determine whether depression in people with persecutory delusions is 
associated with the same cognitive factors implicated in major depressive disorder, 
and to examine these factors as predictors of the persistence of persecutory 
delusions over time. 
Methods 
A systematic literature review formed the basis of two linked studies: one cross-
sectional and one longitudinal. In the first study, 60 participants with persecutory 
delusions and schizophrenia spectrum diagnoses were classified into two groups, 
according to whether or not they met ICD-10 criteria for major depression. 
Assessments were made of delusions, depression and key cognitive factors from 
the literature: schematic beliefs, avoidance, rumination, memory specificity and 
problem solving. The groups’ scores were compared, and the same comparisons 
were made between 30 participants with non-psychotic depression and 30 non-
clinical controls. For the second study, 54 participants with delusions were re-
assessed six months later, and predictors of symptom persistence were examined.  
Results 
50% of participants with persecutory delusions met diagnostic criteria for major 
depression. With baseline paranoia levels controlled, higher baseline depression 
predicted higher paranoia six months later. Negative schematic beliefs about the 
self and problem solving deficits predicted the persistence of both paranoia and 
depression over time.  
Conclusions 
Coexisting depression predicts the persistence of persecutory delusions, 
suggesting a causal association. Trials are warranted of depression-related 
therapeutic techniques for people with delusions, including those that target 
negative schematic beliefs about the self. An improved understanding of the 
mechanisms that maintain paranoid beliefs can enable the development of better 
treatments.    
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Chapter 1. Introduction: persecutory delusions 
 
The present thesis concerns the processes that can affect the persistence over time 
of persecutory delusions. A multifactorial approach is taken, with the specific goal of 
moving towards a greater understanding of cognitive and affective contributing 
factors. Given a theoretical account that proposes that problems of affect may act as 
important drivers of persisting psychosis (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & 
Bebbington, 2002), recent research has examined the role of anxiety and related 
processes in delusion formation and persistence (e.g. Freeman & Garety, 1999; 
Startup, Freeman, & Garety, 2007). The focus of the present investigation is the role 
of depression. The causal mechanisms involved will be approached at a cognitive-
behavioural level of explanation, so that the findings can guide developments in 
psychological therapy as well as refining theoretical models.  
 
In this first chapter, the phenomenon of persecutory delusions is defined, and its 
clinical relevance is established. Current treatment problems are noted, and several 
theoretical accounts are introduced that have sought to improve the understanding of 
relevant causal mechanisms. A rationale is traced for examining the complex set of 
maintenance processes that can perpetuate this highly problematic symptom. An 
overview of the existing strands of relevant research underpins a shift in focus to the 
role of depression, which will lead the next chapter.  
1.1 Definition 
An individual experiencing a persecutory delusion holds the unfounded or unrealistic 
belief that harm is occurring, or is going to occur, to him or her, and that the 
persecutor has the intention to cause harm (Freeman & Garety, 2000). The precise 
definition of a delusion has attracted much attention and debate (Garety & Hemsley, 
1994; Garety, 1985; Rodrigues & Banzato, 2010). A belief is increasingly likely to be 
classified as a delusion, in the sense of a clinical symptom, the more it is implausible, 
seemingly unfounded, strongly held, preoccupying, distressing and unshared by 
others (Oltmanns, 1988; Freeman, 2007). It is possible that persecutory delusions in 
particular are easier to diagnose and study than the other most common types - 
referential and grandiose delusions - because the distressing nature of the content of 
persecution tends to cause a high degree of preoccupation and distress, as well as 
help-seeking or safety-seeking behaviours that can come to the attention of mental 
health services. 
 Chapter 1 
  Page 14 
1.2 The context of schizophrenia 
Delusions of persecution can occur in the context of a number of psychiatric and 
neurological disorders, but the phenomenon is most commonly associated with the 
syndrome of schizophrenia. The term "schizophrenia" means “a splitting of the mind”. 
It was coined by Eugen Bleuler in 1908 to emphasise what he viewed as the essence 
of the disorder: the breaking of the connections between cognition and emotion 
(Bleuler, 1950). The modern definition is pragmatic: current diagnostic systems such 
as the ICD-10 and DSM-IV-TR comprise operational criteria for a range of symptoms 
as observed or described by the patient, of which a certain number must be present 
for a certain period of time in order for the diagnosis to be given (World Health 
Organization, 1992; American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  
 
Classification systems are based on clusters of problems, reflecting the clinical 
observation that psychiatric symptoms tend to co-occur. This observation may result 
in part from comorbidity bias: if each of a set of phenomena increases the chances of 
a person coming to the attention of clinical services, then the phenomena are likely to 
be perceived as clustered, potentially beyond their real underlying correlation (Maric 
et al., 2004; Bak, Drukker, Van Os, & Delespaul, 2005). No individual symptom is 
necessary or sufficient in itself to confer a diagnosis of schizophrenia, so people with 
the same diagnosis can have very different presentations: a state of affairs which has 
driven criticism of the construct validity of the diagnosis (Bentall, 1990). Problems of 
predictive validity (the diagnosis of schizophrenia does not indicate how individuals 
will respond to treatment, or what their prognosis might be) also contribute to doubts 
about the existence of a single underlying disease entity.  
 
It has been proposed that the current approach to classifying psychoses should be 
overhauled in its entirety on a dimensional basis, which could capture more faithfully 
the observable phenomenology, and would make explicit the connections between 
psychotic symptoms and the salient experiences of any healthy human being (Van 
Os, 2009; Bentall, 2006). The diagnostic category of schizophrenia is unlikely to 
disappear from the clinical classification systems of the near future, because a better 
alternative has yet to be agreed that would have sufficient clinical utility to justify such 
revolution (Tandon & Maj, 2008; Möller, 2009). However, for research purposes, 
closer specification of participants' symptoms can increase the sensitivity and 
specificity of findings beyond the levels afforded by a diagnostic category design. 
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1.3 Single symptom research 
Persons (1986) proposed that studying specific psychological phenomena (e.g. 
persecutory delusions) rather than diagnostic categories (e.g. schizophrenia) affords a 
number of advantages, including the avoidance of participant misclassification, the 
opportunity to study individual elements of experience in great detail, and the utility of 
findings for further theoretical development, "particularly the development of coherent, 
elaborate hypotheses linking clinical phenomena to underlying mechanisms" 
(Persons, 1986).  
 
A single symptom approach has illuminated the richness of delusional belief systems 
and the mechanisms of their effects on behaviour, which had not previously been 
captured by studies that focused on the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Delusions are 
complex, multi-faceted processes (Garety & Hemsley, 1994) which can vary widely in 
dimensions such as content, conviction, preoccupation, distress and functional 
impairment (Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999). Garety et al. (2005) 
found that in a sample of 100 deluded participants, delusional conviction was 
associated with reasoning biases and not with depression. Other studies (e.g. 
Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup et al., 2007) have shown delusional distress to be 
associated with affective disturbance. The different dimensions of psychotic 
experience have been found to respond differently to treatment: antipsychotic 
medication may reduce preoccupation with delusional beliefs without much impact on 
their conviction (Mizrahi et al., 2006).  
 
Furthermore, different delusion sub-types according to content (e.g. persecutory or 
grandiose) have been associated with different information processing biases, and 
these belief sub-types might accordingly respond to different treatment approaches. 
For example, Jolley et al. (2006) found, among a mixed group of people with different 
delusions, that only those with a combination of both persecutory and grandiose 
beliefs showed a self-serving attributional style (externalising the causes of negative 
events). Menon et al. (in press) found that a group of people with delusions of 
reference did not show the hasty data gathering bias that has consistently been found 
in people with persecutory delusions (e.g. Corcoran et al., 2008; Startup, Freeman, & 
Garety, 2008). Using experience sampling methodology to conduct a fine-grained 
analysis of the shifting occurrence of delusion-related thoughts in a group of people 
with psychosis over multiple points through 7 consecutive days, Ben-zeev et al. 
(2011) found that hallucinations predicted subsequent thoughts relating to delusions 
of control and of reference, but not grandiosity. These differential associations 
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suggest that investigating delusion sub-types individually may give more reliable 
results than studying the delusion category as a whole. Research interest in delusions 
of persecution is driven by their high prevalence and clinical prominence. 
1.4 The clinical significance of persecutory delusions 
Persecutory delusions are one of the most common and distressing symptoms of 
psychosis. The World Health Organisation conducted an international prospective 
study of 1379 individuals contacting psychiatric services for the first time with 
symptoms of schizophrenia (Sartorius, Jablensky, & Korten, 1986). Persecutory 
delusions were the second most common psychotic symptom found, occurring in 
almost 50% of respondents (delusions of reference were the most common 
symptom). Stompe et al. (1999) reported that persecution was the most common 
delusional belief type among 126 Austrian and 108 Pakistani people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. Persecutory delusions are associated with strong negative affect, and 
are the delusion type most likely to be acted upon (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 
1999; Wessely et al., 1993). The presence of persecutory delusions has been found 
to predict hospital admission on first contact with psychiatric services (Castle, Phelan, 
Wessely, & Murray, 1994).  
1.5 Treatment 
Neuroleptic medication is the conventional first line of treatment for schizophrenia, 
and the clinical guidelines report distinct improvements in positive symptoms 
associated with these drugs (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 
2009). However, it has been estimated that between a quarter and a half of people 
treated in this way continue to experience distressing hallucinations and/or delusions 
(Garety, Fowler, & Kuipers, 2000). One of the largest clinical trials found that 74% of 
schizophrenia patients chose to discontinue their medication within 18 months due to 
inefficacy or intolerable side effects (Lieberman et al., 2005). Furthermore, non-
compliance with medication regimes of 40%-50% has been reported (Lacro, Dunn, 
Dolder, Leckband, & Jeste, 2002).   
 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is an effective psychological treatment for 
psychosis (Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008; Zimmermann, Favrod, Trieu, & 
Pomini, 2005), as reflected in the guidelines published by the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2009). The symptom improvements achieved 
during therapy are accompanied by correlated attenuations in brain responses to 
threatening stimuli (Kumari et al., 2011). CBT is usually used in combination with 
antipsychotic medication, but recently has shown promising results even without 
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pharmacotherapy (Morrison et al., 2011). However, studies showed that 30-50% of 
individuals with persistent positive symptoms did not measurably benefit from ”first 
generation” CBT interventions for psychosis (Kuipers et al., 1998). The most recent 
meta-analysis reported that although positive symptoms show beneficial effects, 
results are inconsistent for specific effects on delusions (NICE, 2009). A recent 
literature review of the effectiveness of CBT for persecutory delusions specifically 
(Garety, Bentall, & Freeman, 2008) concluded that effects were of small to moderate 
size, and that the mechanisms of change have not yet been confirmed.  
 
Development of better treatments requires an improved understanding of the 
mechanisms which maintain paranoid beliefs. Freeman (2011) argued that specific 
theoretical advances regarding such causal mechanisms should be followed by 
adequately controlled intervention studies, in which each theoretically driven factor is 
manipulated, and corresponding improvements in delusions can be taken to indicate a 
causal effect. From an “interventionist-causal” perspective (Kendler & Campbell, 
2009), this is the optimal pragmatic research route to improving therapeutic 
interventions. 
1.6 Towards a psychological understanding of persecutory 
delusions 
“Madness is when other people choose to stop trying to understand you.”  
(Rufus May, 2000; quoted in Laurance, 2003) 
 
For Jaspers (1912), the defining hallmark of delusions was an irreducible 
quintessential incomprehensibility. Where neurosis may be seen as an exaggeration 
of ordinary emotional reactivity (Roth, 1963), psychosis implies a disconnection from 
reality: “madness proper” (Jaspers, 1912). For most of the twentieth century, mental 
health professionals were taught that talking to patients about their delusions would 
be a waste of time, and might even be harmful (Mayer-Gross, Slater, & Roth, 1954). A 
biomedical, neurochemical framework has been the dominant theoretical approach to 
the causes and treatment of psychosis, and from this point of view psychotic 
symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations can be viewed as quasi-epileptic 
phenomena, for which perhaps the causal lesion has yet to be discovered. 
 
“Delusions are...empty speech acts whose informational content refers neither to self 
nor world and are not a symbolic expression of anything.” 
(Berrios, 1991) 
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Freud (1911) proposed that persecutory delusions arose as a defence against attacks 
of homosexual desire, which in turn originated from conflicts with parental figures in 
infancy: unacceptable love towards an other of the same sex was transformed, 
through mechanisms of denial and projection, into hatred for the other, and then, as 
justification for such hatred, into hatred and persecution by the other towards the self. 
This once quite popular hypothesis (e.g. Nunberg, 1938; Knight, 1940), is no longer 
prominent in current psychological theories of psychosis, but Freud's influence can be 
traced in accounts that emphasise the role of traumatic early life experiences 
(Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003), conflicted family relations (Kavanagh, 1992) and 
defence mechanisms (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Trower & Chadwick, 
1995).  
 
While Freud's interest in the aetiology of delusional beliefs was fundamentally 
academic - he believed that psychoanalysis could not effectively be conducted with 
schizophrenic patients because they would be unable to form therapeutic 
relationships with the necessary transference - the contemporary cognitive theories 
that form the immediate background of the present thesis were developed in tandem 
with psychological therapies. These models were constructed with the explicit goal of 
guiding effective therapeutic techniques, and over time have been refined, with the 
help of insights from clinical trials and the findings of experimental research (e.g. 
Alford & Beck, 1994; Chadwick, Birchwood, & Trower, 1996; Turkington & Siddle, 
1998; Freeman, 2011). 
1.7 A dimensional view: the psychosis continuum 
The endeavour from the late 1980s onwards to develop cognitive behavioural 
therapies for psychosis led psychologists and psychiatrists to try to make sense of the 
beliefs and experiences of people with schizophrenia within a conceptual framework 
equivalent to psychological models of the beliefs and behaviour of “healthy” people 
and of those with neurotic conditions such as anxiety or depression. It was suggested 
that psychotic symptoms should be viewed on a continuum with the mental 
phenomena occurring in the general population, who experience various levels of sub-
psychotic events like perceptual anomalies and paranoid thoughts (Jones & Watson, 
1997; Chapman & Chapman, 1980; Van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000; Strauss, 
1969). Groups of people with psychosis and with non-clinical psychotic experiences 
were studied comparatively so that insights could be gained into the relationship 
between healthy variation and clinical pathology, so that specific pathogenic factors 
might be identified that lead to manifestations of distress and functional impairment. It 
was found that certain groups of non-clinical individuals, such as members of new 
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religious movements, reported very similar patterns of unusual experiences and 
delusional ideation observed in people with psychosis; the important difference was 
that they experienced significantly less distress and preoccupation with their beliefs 
(Smith, Riley, & Peters, 2009; Day & Peters, 1999; Peters, Day, McKenna, & Orbach, 
1999). Population surveys confirmed the prevalence rates of self-reported psychotic 
experiences as being significantly higher than those of clinical psychotic disorders 
(Johns et al., 2004; Freeman, 2006), showing that psychotic symptoms are not 
exclusive to people with diagnosable mental health problems.  
 
1.7.1 The paranoia continuum 
Based on a review of ten studies of persecutory ideation in non-clinical samples, 
Freeman (2007) estimated that 10-15% of the general population experience paranoid 
thoughts on a regular basis. In order to examine the phenomenology of this paranoia 
in greater detail than is feasible in epidemiological research, Freeman et al. (2010) 
used a virtual reality simulation which would present exactly the same environment to 
three sets of participants, whose reported paranoid thoughts could then be compared: 
a group with persecutory delusions as part of a schizophrenia spectrum disorder, a 
group with high non-clinical paranoia, and a non-clinical non-paranoid control group. A 
battery of questionnaires and tasks were also used, to assess cognitive and affective 
processes with hypothesised relevance. The authors found that increasing paranoia 
across the groups was accompanied by increasing levels of depression, anxiety, 
anomalous experiences and traumatic past life events. The only factor found to be 
specific to the clinical delusions group alone was a hasty data gathering style 
(“jumping to conclusions”). 
1.8 Reasoning bias: jumping to conclusions  
Garety and colleagues (Hemsley & Garety, 1986; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Garety, 
Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991) proposed that people with delusions have a tendency to 
“jump to conclusions” (JTC) in their reasoning style: to accept a particular explanation 
for experience after seeing fewer pieces of evidence than would groups without 
delusions. This data gathering bias has consistently been shown in people with 
delusions (Blackwood, Howard, Bentall, & Murray, 2001; Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, 
Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001; Garety & Freeman, 1999). Groups with specifically 
persecutory delusions have repeatedly shown the JTC bias, even those with 
diagnoses other than schizophrenia (Corcoran et al., 2008; Startup et al., 2008). Other 
delusion types may not demonstrate JTC so reliably (Menon, in press). Of course, 
such a reasoning bias could not be sufficient on its own to precipitate a persecutory 
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delusion, as hasty decision-making could not explain the unusual and 
characteristically threatening content of the belief. 
1.9 Attribution bias and the defence of self-esteem 
Bentall and colleagues (1994) proposed that persecutory delusions serve as an 
attempt to protect self-esteem: that externalising attributions are made for negative 
events (others are blamed), which decrease the likelihood of underlying negative 
views of the self reaching conscious awareness. Empirical studies consistently find 
that people with persecutory delusions are significantly more likely than controls to 
make external attributions, particularly personal ones (blaming other people rather 
than chance circumstances) for negative events (reviewed by Bentall et al., 2001; 
Garety & Freeman, 1999). The assertion that this attribution bias functions to defend 
self-esteem has been somewhat controversial; this will be discussed in the next 
chapter, with reference to the possible role of depression. 
1.10  Anomalous experiences 
“…the delusional belief is not being held “in the face of evidence normally sufficient to 
destroy it,” but is being held because of evidence powerful enough to support it. 
Where the patient may differ from a normal observer is not in the manner of drawing 
inference from evidence but in the kinds of perceptual experience that provide the 
evidence from which the inference is to be drawn.” 
(Maher, 1974) 
 
Maher’s highly influential account (1974) was based around the central premise that 
delusions are the result of an individual with primary perceptual anomalies (and no 
necessary cognitive impairment) making sense of unusual sensory experiences. Once 
the delusional belief system is established, it is reinforced by the anxiety reduction 
that results from finding an explanation for those puzzling experiences, and then 
persists in the same way as any other strongly held belief held by, for example, a 
scientist or a religious person. Maher’s proposal is consistent with findings that many 
people with delusions experience unusual sensory phenomena (e.g. Liddle & Barnes, 
1990), that the onset of hearing impairment in members of the general population 
predicts later psychotic experiences (Thewissen et al., 2005), and that experimentally-
induced hearing impairment by hypnosis can cause paranoia (Zimbardo, Andersen, & 
Kabat, 1981).  
 
A simple one-factor model of perceptual disturbance cannot explain all of the relevant 
available evidence. Delusions have been reported to occur without any accompanying 
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perceptual anomalies (Chapman & Chapman, 1988). Furthermore, a body of evidence 
has been presented, which suggests systematic bias in the reasoning processes and 
attributional style of participant groups with delusions (Bentall et al., 2001; Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). However, anomalous perceptual and interoceptive experiences have 
remained prominent in subsequent, more complex theories of delusion formation and 
maintenance (Morrison, 2001; Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 
2002; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001). One of the theoretical 
advantages of the “anomalous perception” factor is that it can provide a link between 
biological and psychological levels of explanation. It is widely accepted that 
neurochemical changes can affect perception, and thus the neurotransmitter 
abnormalities commonly reported in the biological literature about psychosis can be 
understood to manifest in the phenomenology of experience. 
1.11  Linking levels of explanation, and the theory of salience 
Advocates of a cognitive neuropsychiatric approach point out the potential for vivid 
insights and conceptual growth that can be achieved when findings are triangulated 
from different perspectives, and when paradigms from one research field are applied 
to another (David, 1993). It has been proposed that in order to move towards a full 
understanding of delusions, of how particular combinations of predisposing and 
precipitating factors might interact to cause certain experiences, we must connect 
social, psychological and neurobiological levels of explanation, assembling the chain 
from genotype to phenotype (Garety et al., 2001; Garety, Bebbington, Fowler, 
Freeman, & Kuipers, 2007). Several authors have drawn illuminating connections 
between different levels of analysis of delusions (Garety et al., 2007; Kapur, 2003; 
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Van Os, 2005). Perhaps the most widely cited of these, 
Kapur’s (2003) “aberrant salience” account, proposed that dopamine in all brains 
mediates the assignment of stimuli with motivational salience, and that in psychosis a 
neurochemical dysregulation of dopamine transmission disrupts the normal process of 
contextually driven salience attribution, causing aberrant assignment of significance to 
external objects and representations. The psychological process that makes sense of 
puzzlingly significant experiences produces delusional beliefs, which are shaped by 
the individual’s own cognitive, psychodynamic and cultural context.  
 
This account accommodates many interesting features of the empirical literature on 
delusions, including the phenomenon of “delusional perplexity”, which often 
accompanies the onset of psychosis, the wide variation in content of delusions and 
hallucinations, the effect of dopamine agonists on precipitating psychotic phenomena 
and the beneficial effect on many patients of antipsychotic drugs, which block 
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dopamine transmission and “provide the platform for a process of psychological 
resolution” by dampening the aberrant salience of stimuli, so that disturbing 
experiences are less compelling.  Van der Gaag (2006) extended the aberrant 
salience account to conceptualise how pharmacotherapy and psychological therapy 
can work together towards resolving psychotic symptoms: once experiences of 
aberrant salience have been dampened with antipsychotic drugs, cognitive and 
behavioural techniques can address the narrative that has been constructed to 
account for dopamine-induced psychotic experiences.  
 
Ultimately, the implication of Kapur’s account is that stopping antipsychotic medication 
leads to the return of chemical dysregulation, a reinvestment of aberrant salience in 
dormant ideas and experiences, and a relapse of psychosis. In its simplest form, this 
influential and highly compelling theory cannot account for the findings that some 
psychotic patients experience no benefit from dopamine-blocking medications 
(Lieberman et al., 2005; Hellewell, 1999), that some recover without ever taking them 
(Bola & Mosher, 2003), and that others discontinue medication without subsequent 
relapse. As already noted, there is clearly a very great deal of heterogeneity in the 
vulnerabilities, precipitators and subsequent recovery trajectories of different people 
with psychosis. Even when considering a single symptom such as persecutory 
delusions, there are likely to be many contributing factors, and each factor might be 
described as “an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient 
condition” for the causation of the symptom (Mackie, 1974; Freeman, 2011). No one 
causal factor can be invoked to explain the occurrence of the symptom in all cases.  
1.12  A multifactorial approach 
Garety and Freeman (1999) conducted a critical review of cognitive approaches to 
delusions and the evidence available to evaluate them, and found that the best 
supported model would be a multifactorial account encompassing biases of 
perception and of judgement as well as disturbances of affect.  Groups of people with 
delusions, when compared with non-clinical controls, make more externalising 
personal attributions for negative events, tend to gather less evidence before making 
task decisions (jumping to conclusions) and have low or unstable self-esteem. 
However, none of these features is robust enough to be found in every person who 
holds a delusion, and are likely to differ according to delusion sub-type (e.g. Jolley et 
al., 2006; Menon, Addington, & Remington,  in press). The picture is complicated 
further by the fact that people with delusions also typically have high levels of 
depression and anxiety, and that these are likely to interact with psychotic 
phenomena. As Max Birchwood argued (Birchwood, 1998): “What is clear is that co-
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morbidity in psychosis is not merely the co-occurrence of two or more disorders but 
rather they feed symbiotically off one another.” 
 
Freeman et al. (2002) built on the multifactorial framework outlined above to describe 
a model specific to delusions of persecution. Even with a particular focus on one sub-
type of delusion, a review of the evidence suggested a number of contributing factors 
acting in various combinations to precipitate this symptom in different individuals. The 
model is a vulnerability-stress model: both vulnerability and stress can be biological, 
psychological and/or social, and a distinction is made in the framework between 
factors that can contribute to the formation of threat beliefs in the first place, and 
factors that can perpetuate delusions once established. 
 
The model begins with a precipitator (e.g. a stressful life event, or drug misuse), which 
interacts with a pre-existing vulnerability to cause unusual experiences (e.g. 
experiencing internally generated thoughts as heard voices), which in turn trigger a 
search for meaning. The impact of these anomalous experiences might be further 
strengthened by the effects of pre-existing anxiety and depression (which could be 
exacerbated by the precipitant stressor), and by cognitive biases associated with 
psychosis. During the search for an explanation for puzzling experiences, underlying 
core beliefs about the self and the world are drawn upon, and a persecutory 
explanation is more likely to result if the individual already believes that they are 
vulnerable and/or that the world is a dangerous place (these are core beliefs also 
associated with depression and anxiety). The externalising attributional bias described 
by Bentall and colleagues (1994) would make it more likely that others are blamed for 
negative events, and a tendency to jump to conclusions could cause an explanation to 
be selected that others might have thought premature. 
 
Freeman et al.'s (2002) account conceptualised the maintenance of persecutory 
beliefs in a framework that would be both empirically testable and well-suited to the 
refinement of psychological therapies. Figure 1.1 replicates a model diagram of the 
mechanisms of delusional persistence. It was proposed that delusional beliefs could 
be maintained, once established, by the relief that comes from having found an 
explanation for unsettling events (and having established that something is wrong 
externally, rather than inside one's own mind) and by auxiliary processes that 
contribute to the gathering of confirmatory evidence for the threat belief and the 
avoidance or discarding of potentially disconfirmatory evidence. It was argued that 
anxiety would play a crucial role in the maintenance of threat beliefs, mediated in part 
by attentional biases (gathering confirmatory evidence) and safety behaviours 
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(avoiding disconfirmatory evidence), as described in the anxiety literature (Clark, 
1999; Salkovskis, 1991). Anxiety and persecutory delusions have a clearly significant 
common theme: the anticipation of threat. 
  
 
Figure 1.1. Freeman et al.’s (2002) cognitive model of the maintenance of persecutory 
delusions. 
 
The prominence of anxiety in this model encouraged empirical investigation of the 
roles of the hypothesised mediating processes, such as worry and safety behaviours 
(Freeman & Garety, 1999; Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001; Freeman et al., 2007; 
Startup et al., 2007). The positive results that were found, particularly regarding worry 
predicting delusion persistence (Startup et al., 2007), led to small-scale trials of worry 
interventions for people with persecutory delusions (Foster, Startup, Potts, & 
Freeman, 2010; Hepworth, Startup, & Freeman, 2011). It was found that both worry 
and delusion severity could be reduced using short-term CBT, targeting worry, even 
without directly challenging the content of persecutory beliefs. A larger-scale, more 
rigorous trial is now underway, in which these findings might be extended. 
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1.12.1 The role of depression in a multifactorial account of the 
persistence of persecutory delusions 
Alongside anxiety, and cognitive biases associated with psychosis, such as JTC, 
Freeman and colleagues' model of delusion maintenance also implicated depression. 
Depression was proposed to contribute to the gathering of biased evidence to support 
the problematic threat belief, by means of information processing biases (e.g. memory 
bias) and behavioural patterns (e.g. withdrawal, rumination) that can contribute to 
isolation and to selective engagement with stimuli. Depression is also closely 
associated with negative beliefs about the self, which are argued to contribute to an 
original vulnerability to formation of persecutory delusions.  
 
The association between persecutory delusions and depression is likely to be 
bidirectional. Both the content and the wider meaning of the psychotic experience (not 
only am I under threat from my persecutors, but everyone else thinks that I have lost 
my mind) can cause or worsen depressive states (Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick, & 
Trower, 2000; Birchwood, Iqbal, Jackson, & Hardy, 2004; Birchwood, Iqbal, & 
Upthegrove, 2005). 
 
Depression is known to be highly prevalent in people with psychosis (Buckley, Miller, 
Lehrer, & Castle, 2009), but the mechanisms of any effect on delusion persistence are 
unknown. The present thesis is concerned with testing this causal pathway, and 
examining in more detail the cognitive processes that might mediate it.  
1.13  Summary 
This first chapter presented a rationale for detailed investigation of the processes that 
contribute to the persistence of persecutory delusions over time. An overview of 
relevant empirical findings and theoretical models underpins a proposal that the role 
of depression deserves further attention. 
 
This approach is orientated towards the refinement of cognitive behavioural therapies, 
and the active processes have been conceptualised at a corresponding cognitive-
behavioural level of explanation. Nevertheless, maintaining the ultimate goal of an 
integrated bio-psycho-social understanding, it will be instructive to keep in mind the 
compatibility of such models with findings obtained in other fields. 
 
In the second chapter, the evidence for a connection between depression and the 
positive symptoms of psychosis will be reviewed, as relatively few existing papers 
have reported on persecutory delusions specifically. The case will be examined for an 
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effect of depressive processes on positive symptom persistence, and some attention 
will be given to specific reports concerning delusions and paranoia. The third chapter 
will introduce specific cognitive mechanisms that could mediate such an effect. New 
empirical work testing for the hypothesised effects will then be reported, and the 
implications of its results will be integrated with the surrounding body of work.  
 
In line with a multifactorial approach, it is not proposed here that depression is 
important in all cases of persecutory delusions, nor that its relationship to psychosis is 
consistent across all individuals. However, it will be seen that attention is justified to its 
causal and prognostic relevance in this context.  
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Chapter 2. Depression and positive symptom 
persistence 
In this chapter, the case is examined for researching in detail the mechanisms 
connecting depression with the persistence of psychotic symptoms. A rationale for 
supposing the existence of such a relationship is based on a summary of prevalence 
data and reported associations with outcome. Three contemporary theoretical 
approaches are brought to bear on the relationship between depression and positive 
symptoms. It is seen that the causal involvement of depression would have significant 
clinical implications, and specific hypotheses are generated for examining key 
questions. A systematic review of the literature is then reported that evaluates the 
existing evidence for such an effect.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Depression is very common among people with psychosis. Prevalence figures are 
usually found between 25% - 75%, varying with participant sample and diagnostic 
criteria used (Birchwood et al., 2005), and averaging around 50% (Buckley et al., 
2009). The aetiological status of depression in this setting has attracted attention and 
prompted several thorough and comprehensive reviews (Buckley et al., 2009; Siris & 
Bench, 2003; Hausmann & Fleischhacker, 2002) because it has important 
implications for both theory and treatment. Most twentieth century accounts saw 
depressive symptoms occurring in people with schizophrenia either as (1) part of the 
core disease process in some patients, who might have schizoaffective disorder, (2) 
side effects of antipsychotic medication or (3) demoralisation secondary to the 
experience of psychotic illness. Having explored the prevalence of depression in 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders, the relevant risk factors and various possible 
causes, all of the reviews agree on the negative prognostic significance of co-
occurring depression in this group. However, the causal pathways of this effect are 
not understood.  
 
As noted by Hausmann & Fleischhacker (2002), in line with a multifactorial approach, 
a depressive syndrome in the setting of psychosis can have many different causes, 
and its significance for treatment will not be the same in all cases. A focus on the 
aetiology of depression in this group may have diverted attention away from the 
potential significance of the depression’s consequences. Given the poor prognosis 
data (discussed in more detail below), combined with what is known of the effects 
depression can have in prolonging the symptoms of those with a range of other 
physical and mental health problems (Clarke, 1998), it seems likely that at least for 
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some people with psychosis, co-occurring depression could impede recovery by 
prolonging or exacerbating other symptoms. In the endeavour to improve existing 
treatment approaches to help people with psychosis, who often experience high levels 
of chronicity and impairment despite the recommended clinical care (Garety, Fowler, 
& Kuipers, 2000), it is important to find and to target the maintenance mechanisms 
that prevent symptoms from resolving.  
 
With the development of cognitive behavioural therapies for, and of cognitive 
psychological models of psychosis (e.g. Garety et al., 2001) came a reconsideration 
of the role of emotional processes in these patients' conditions. Analyses were 
undertaken in more detail of the factors that might precipitate or perpetuate particular 
symptoms. The factors that might cause depression to emerge in somebody with 
psychosis were examined from a psychological point of view. Birchwood, Iqbal and 
Upthegrove (2005) showed that appraisal of one’s psychotic experience as 
embodying greater loss, shame and/or entrapment is associated with higher levels of 
depression. Thus depression can be a natural psychological response to the content 
and meaning of the psychotic experience. But what of the consequences of this 
depression?  
 
2.1.1 Prognostic significance 
Depression occurring in people with psychosis is associated with poor functional 
outcomes, as agreed by existing reviews (Buckley et al., 2009; Siris & Bench, 2003; 
Hausmann & Fleischhacker, 2002). Among people with psychosis, those with 
concurrent depression respond less well to neuroleptic treatment (Gasquet et al., 
2005; Himmelhoch, Fuchs, May, Symons, & Neil, 1981; Lerner, Mintzer, & 
Schestatzky, 1988) and experience more relapses (Birchwood, Mason, MacMillan, & 
Healy, 1993; Mandel, Severe, & Schooler, 1982; Roy, Thompson, & Kennedy, 1983) 
and more functional impairment (Birchwood et al., 1993; Sands & Harrow, 1999; 
Conley, Ascher-Svanum, Zhu, Faries, & Kinon, 2007) than those who are not 
depressed. 
 
A handful of studies have reported a good prognosis for schizophrenia with 
depressive features (Emsley, Oosthuizen, Joubert, Roberts, & Stein, 1999; Mauri, 
Paletta, Moliterno, Colasanti, & Altamura, 2010; Taylor & Abrams, 1975; Vaillant, 
1964). However, these are in the minority, and methodological shortcomings 
compromise the robustness of the findings (none used a comprehensive measure of 
depression, and the severity of psychosis in the groups that they compared was not 
taken into account). It is likely that a lot of patients in the older studies’ groups with 
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“good prognosis schizophrenia” would with modern diagnostic systems be classified 
as having bipolar affective disorder (Taylor & Abrams, 1975).  
 
Depression has been linked to multiple domains of poor outcome in schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders, but there is no established causal pathway for these effects: the 
mechanisms by which emotional disturbance can influence negative outcomes are not 
understood. One feasible role for depression in affecting outcome is that it might 
perpetuate positive psychotic symptoms. This possibility has not been systematically 
investigated, despite being implicated in cognitive models (Freeman et al., 2002; 
Garety et al., 2001). 
 
2.1.2 Depression and positive symptoms 
Numerous cross-sectional studies in groups with psychosis have found significant 
associations between higher levels of depression and more severe positive symptoms 
(e.g. Baynes et al., 2000; Bentall et al., 2009; Kohler, Gur, Swanson, Petty, & Gur, 
1998; Lindenmayer, Grochowski, & Kay, 1991; Moller & von Zerssen, 1982). 
Depression is associated with the severity of both delusions and hallucinations 
(Lindenmayer et al., 1991). Birchwood and Chadwick (1997) reported that 
hallucinatory voices were believed to be more powerful and malevolent by those who 
were more depressed. A belief that hallucinatory voices are omnipotent and 
malevolent might meet criteria for classification as a persecutory delusion. 
 
The relationship of depression with delusions of persecution has received significant 
empirical attention. Freeman, Garety and Kuipers (2001) reported that 80% of a group 
of people with persecutory delusions showed significant levels of depression, with an 
overall mean BDI score of 23. Smith et al (2006) found that, among a sample of 100 
recently-relapsed people with a schizophrenia spectrum diagnosis, those who were 
more depressed experienced persecutory delusions of greater severity and were 
more preoccupied and distressed by them. Bentall et al.'s (2009) large transdiagnostic 
study used structural equation modelling with a mixed group of people with psychosis 
and/or depression to show that pessimistic thinking and negative emotion had a 
significant association with paranoia, even when executive functioning and reasoning 
styles were controlled for.  
 
2.2 Theories 
The relationship between depression and positive psychotic symptoms has been 
conceptualised in several psychological frameworks, which differ somewhat in 
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emphasis. Two of the theoretical approaches introduced below are concerned 
specifically with delusions of persecution; the first is broader. The main assertions of 
each theory are, respectively, (1) that psychosis causes depression, (2) that paranoia 
and depression are different manifestations of a common underlying problem and (3) 
that depression drives (or prolongs or exacerbates) psychotic symptoms.  
 
2.2.1 Social ranking theory and depression caused by psychosis 
Max Birchwood and colleagues emphasised that the experience of having a psychotic 
episode can cause depression, particularly when the illness is experienced as 
uncontrollable (Birchwood et al., 1993) and when the experience embodies loss, 
shame and/or entrapment (Birchwood et al., 2000). A prospective study following 102 
people with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders over 12 months found that the 
emergence of depression was preceded by appraisals of humiliation, loss and/or 
entrapment associated with illness (Iqbal, Birchwood, Chadwick, & Trower, 2000). 
Analysis of the patterns of depressive and psychotic symptoms over these 12 months 
indicated that some people had depression with onset and remission following the 
same trajectory as psychotic symptoms, while others developed depression later on 
independently of psychosis trajectory (Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick, & Trower, 2000). 
The authors concluded that post-psychotic depression developed as a result of the 
illness being appraised as having damaged the individual’s social identity and forced 
them into a subordinate role without the opportunity to escape. 
 
The evidence consistently supports a pathway to depression resulting from the 
experience of having schizophrenia and related disorders. However, this does not 
explain the experience of the significant proportion of people for whom depression 
precedes psychosis. Häfner and colleagues conducted thorough retrospective 
interviews with 232 people at admission for a first psychotic episode, and found that 
83% reported clinically significant depression in the preceding period (Häfner et al., 
2005). Furthermore, when the psychosis group was compared with 130 people’s 
illness course up to first admission for an episode of major depression, the trajectory 
of depressive symptoms showed no difference between the two groups.  The finding 
that 83% of first episode patients are already depressed and that depression is more 
common in this group than in relapsing patients (Addington, Addington, & Patten, 
1998; Emsley et al., 1999) highlights the prevalence of depression that cannot be 
explained as a secondary consequence of psychotic breakdown. Birchwood (2003) 
proposed that post-psychotic depression as a psychological response is one of three 
core pathways to depression in people with psychosis. The second route proposed 
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was emotional disorder intrinsic to the psychosis itself (as described above), and the 
third was affective disorder caused by early developmental trauma. 
 
2.2.2 Paranoia as a defence against negative self-evaluations 
Richard Bentall's theory specifically concerns delusions of persecution, one of the 
most clinically prominent (Appelbaum et al., 1999; Sartorius et al., 1986; Castle et al., 
1994) and best researched psychotic symptoms. He proposed that paranoia emerges 
as a form of camouflaged depression: a defence against negative emotional states or 
against low self esteem (Bentall et al., 1994; Bentall et al., 2001). The mechanism of 
the defence involves an externalising attributional bias for negative events: others are 
blamed rather than the self when bad things happen. This prevents underlying 
negative self-evaluations from entering consciousness. 
 
An externalising attributional bias in paranoia has been supported empirically: people 
with persecutory delusions tend to attribute negative events to external causes, and in 
particular to other people rather than chance circumstances (Bentall et al., 2001; 
Garety & Freeman, 1999). The proposal that this attributional style serves a defensive 
function, however, has been controversial. A defence account would be consistent 
with relatively high or normal levels of self esteem in paranoid patients, whereas low 
self esteem has frequently been reported, and the discrepancies between overt and 
covert self-concept that a defence theory would predict have not consistently been 
found (Garety & Freeman, 1999). It is possible that self esteem is particularly variable 
in paranoid individuals (Bentall et al., 2001).  
 
Trower and Chadwick (1995) put forward a distinction between two types of paranoia: 
a “Poor Me” defensive type, which rejects the perceived persecution as unfair and 
preserves self esteem, and a “Bad Me” low self esteem type, in which the 
mistreatment is seen as deserved. This deservedness dichotomy has been suggested 
as a helpful narrative distinction for clinical case conceptualisation and therapeutic 
work (Chadwick et al., 1996), but recent empirical findings are more consistent with a 
continuum of deservedness than with a categorical model (Bentall et al., 2008). In 
addition, each individual can fluctuate between the two paranoia types over time 
(Melo, Taylor, & Bentall, 2006).  
  
Self esteem may not be the most useful cognitive construct for understanding the link 
between depression and persecutory delusions (Freeman, 2007). Drake et al (2004) 
found that significant associations between depression and paranoia in a first episode 
psychosis sample would not fit a statistical model of mediation by self esteem. Other 
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investigators have emphasised, instead of the balance of self esteem, specific 
negative beliefs about the self and about others, such as “I am vulnerable” or “others 
are hostile” as strongly connected to paranoia (Fowler et al., 2006). Dysfunctional 
core beliefs like these have long been associated with depression (Beck, 1976), and it 
has been proposed that holding beliefs of these kinds might predispose the individual 
greatly both to low mood and to paranoid thoughts.  
 
2.2.3 Depression directly influences psychotic symptoms 
Philippa Garety, Daniel Freeman and colleagues argued, as part of a multifactorial 
model, that the content of psychotic symptoms can be driven directly by emotional 
concerns (Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman & Garety, 2003; Garety et al., 2001), and 
furthermore that the biases of attention and processing that accompany emotional 
disorder can contribute (along with continuing abnormal experiences, behavioural 
avoidance, and a hasty data gathering style characterised by a tendency to jump to 
conclusions) to delusion persistence.  
 
Compelling evidence for the causal role of depression in the development of psychotic 
symptoms comes from studies of transition to psychosis in high risk groups. High 
levels of depression in those with subclinical psychotic experiences predict 
subsequent precipitation of clinical psychotic symptoms (Yung, Phillips, Yuen, & 
McGorry, 2004; Escher, Romme, Buiks, Delespaul, & Van Os, 2002). The NEMESIS 
project, a three-year prospective study of a Dutch population sample of 7067 people, 
found that 34 out of 79 people with any psychotic symptoms at baseline assessment 
were also depressed (Hanssen, Bak, Bijl, Vollebergh, & van Os, 2005). These people 
were significantly more likely to have developed clinical psychosis by the two-year 
follow-up assessment than those with psychotic symptoms and no depression. 
Krabbendam et al. (2005) reported on the 4,670 people with three-year follow-up data. 
Here, given the presence of hallucinatory experiences at baseline, the likelihood of 
developing clinical psychosis by three-year follow-up was 28.1% for those with 
depressed mood at baseline, and just 11.1% for those without. It is possible that the 
relationship between depression and positive symptoms is specifically pronounced at 
this early stage of the disorder (Addington et al., 1998; Emsley et al., 1999). 
Depression is thought to be more prevalent in first-episode samples than in relapsing 
groups (Lancon, Auquier, Reine, Bernard, & Addington, 2001), and may have different 
interactions with other symptoms in these different phases of illness.   
 
Daniel Freeman's research has been concerned chiefly with delusions of persecution, 
and particularly with the role that anxiety plays in their development. A novel 
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technique was devised to identify paranoid responses in the laboratory, so that 
attempts at manipulating these could be made (Freeman, 2008). Participants with 
either low levels of paranoia, high levels of subclinical paranoia or clinical delusions of 
persecution each entered an identical virtual reality environment populated by avatars 
that were programmed to act neutrally, and each participant was asked afterwards 
about paranoid thoughts regarding the virtual characters’ intentions. Most participants 
interpreted the characters’ behaviour as neutral or friendly, but a significant minority 
found them malevolent or threatening (Freeman et al., 2008). Examining paranoia 
across the whole continuum of its occurrence like this, rather than recruiting only 
patient samples, can inform inferences of causality, because the secondary 
consequences of psychiatric illness have not confounded the experience of subclinical 
participants. These studies were looking primarily for associations of paranoia with 
anxiety, but also found significant effects of depression. High levels of depression in 
participants predicted paranoid responses to neutral environments (Freeman et al., 
2008). Furthermore, when groups with no paranoia, sub-clinically high paranoia and 
clinical delusions were compared, depression scores rose with paranoia across the 
three participant groups in a dose response manner (Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, 
Antley, & Slater, 2010). Those who were more depressed reported more paranoid 
thoughts, at all levels of severity and independently of clinical status. 
 
2.3 A critical summary of the three theoretical perspectives 
The three approaches summarised above are not mutually contradictory, and might 
best be thought of as each focusing on a subset of a large system of interlocking 
effects which gives rise to the complex and heterogeneous patterns of experience that 
characterise psychosis. Each theory might be most relevant to a particular subgroup 
of patients, to a particular stage of the illness and to a particular therapeutic strategy. 
Each of these three models has empirical support, with some limitations, and each 
can contribute its part to an understanding of the complex relationship between 
depression and psychosis.  Each conceptualisation of the causal pathways involved 
carries its own set of treatment implications. These have guided therapy trials, the 
results of which in turn can cast additional light on the utility of the conceptual models. 
 
Max Birchwood’s research group and others have marshalled substantial evidence to 
prove that depression can occur as a psychological response to the experience of 
having a psychotic episode, when the experience is appraised in certain ways. This 
model does not cover depression which precedes psychosis, and does not account 
for associations between depression and psychosis-like experiences at a subclinical 
level. Richard Bentall’s theory has attracted attention to the important common issues 
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that can be relevant in the genesis of both depression and paranoia, but the 
“delusions as defence” account has been undermined by inconsistent findings 
regarding self esteem in paranoid individuals. Daniel Freeman and colleagues’ model 
does make sense of these empirical findings unaccounted for by the other two 
theories, and achieves a high degree of explanatory flexibility by invoking a 
multifactorial approach. No one factor is claimed to have universal relevance for all 
individuals with delusions, thus the proposal that depression is a causal factor is not 
incompatible with the fact that some people with persecutory delusions are not 
depressed. The complexity of the model provides several avenues for process 
research, and some of these are already under investigation. The causal role of 
depression in this model is feasible, has not been systematically researched, and 
would have important clinical implications. 
 
2.4 The rationale for a systematic review of the empirical 
literature 
The possibility that depression plays a causal role in prolonging the positive 
symptoms of psychosis opens up a promising opportunity. Targeted interventions for 
the causal processes maintaining depression have already been developed, and 
show promising results in non-psychotic patients (Bell & D'Zurilla, 2009; Watkins et 
al., 2007; Raes, Williams, & Hermans, 2009). The use of these approaches could be 
indicated for people with psychosis too, and could facilitate reductions in positive 
symptoms as well as in mood disturbance. However, the causal relevance of 
depression in psychotic symptom persistence remains unconfirmed, and a systematic 
review of the literature is conducted here to address this. It is the aim of this review to 




If depressive processes contribute to the persistence of positive psychotic symptoms, 
it is hypothesised that: 
 
1. Among people with positive psychotic symptoms, those who are concurrently 
depressed will show less improvement in positive symptoms over time than 
those who are not depressed.  
 
2. Effective treatment of depression in people with positive psychotic symptoms 
will lead to a reduction in positive symptoms as well as in depression. 
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2.6 Methods 
2.6.1 Inclusion criteria 
Studies were sought with more than one observation point of people experiencing 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders (schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder or 
delusional disorder) that reported change over time in positive symptom severity and 
also included a measure of depression.  
 
2.6.2 Procedure 
A search was conducted of the SciVerse Scopus database (which includes the 
complete Medline database), for articles published in English before June 2011 whose 
title, abstract or keywords contained (schizophren* OR schizoaff* OR psychosis OR 
psychotic OR delusion*) AND (depression OR depressed) AND (longitudinal OR 
prospective OR follow*up OR trial). Studies not meeting the above criteria were 
excluded. Reference lists of selected papers were inspected, and further articles 
meeting criteria were included in the database. 
 
The studies reviewed comprise observational studies and treatment trials. Among 
treatment trials, only those were included where depression was reduced 




The initial search returned 7,570 results. After exclusion of irrelevant subject areas 
and types of publication, 3,226 citations were exported into a bibliographic software 
package and keyword searches were used to exclude further irrelevant material 
(keywords such as epilepsy, autism, dementia and others pertaining to studies 
obviously not relevant to this review). The remaining 294 papers were examined by 
hand to determine their match for the inclusion criteria. 46 articles were found to meet 
the search criteria. Of these, 19 were observational studies and 27 treatment trials: 12 
trials of pharmacological therapy and 15 trials of psychological therapy. The studies 
are summarised in tables 2.1 – 2.3. 
 
2.7.1 Methodological characteristics 
The methodological quality of the studies was judged on the basis of the sample sizes 
and inclusion criteria used, the instruments used to measure depression and positive 
symptoms, the length of the follow-up period and the reported drop-out rates. For 
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treatment trials, it was also of interest whether or not a control group was used and 
whether or not group assignment was randomised.  
 
The quality of the studies was varied, but on the whole adequate. Most of the 
observational studies had more than 100 participants, while most treatment trials had 
fewer than 100. Follow up periods used in observational studies ranged from eight 
weeks (Nakaya, Ohmori, Komahashi, & Suwa, 1997) up to five years (Koreen et al., 
1993). The exception to this was an experience sampling study (Thewissen et al., 
2011) that required participants to rate feelings of depression and paranoia ten times 
a day for six consecutive days. Reported drop out rates ranged from 3% to 49%. 
 
All of the medication trials lasted 12 weeks or less, with the exception of Siris et al.’s 
(1994) maintenance study, which followed participants for up to a year, or until a 
relapse occurred. Of the 12 pharmacotherapy trials, eight used a randomised 
controlled design. Reported drop-out rates ranged from 0% to 50%. 
 
The shortest follow-up period used among the psychological therapy trials was 12 
weeks (Myers, Startup, & Freeman, 2011), and the longest was 24 months (Garety et 
al., 2008). Of the 14 psychological treatment trials, nine used a randomised controlled 
design. All drop-out rates from therapy were below 30%, although two studies had lost 
more that this proportion of participants by the final follow-up assessment (Addington 
et al., 2011; Peters et al., 2010). 
 
Most studies used a widely recognised specific measure of depression: the clinician-
rated Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1967), or the self-
report Beck Depression Inventory BDI (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), Montgomery-Asperg Depression Rating 
Scale (MADRS; Montgomery & Asberg, 1979) or Calgary Depression Scale for 
Schizophrenia (CDSS; Addington, Addington, & Maticka-Tyndale, 1993). Some used 
instead a depression factor extracted from the Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale 
for schizophrenia (PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987), and a few less widespread 
instruments. No systematic differences were evident between patterns of results 
obtained with different depression instruments.  
 
Positive symptoms were measured using the PANSS positive symptom scale in most 
studies. A significant number - mostly pharmacotherapy trials - used instead the 
positive symptom scale of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Overall & 
Gorham, 1962), from which the PANSS is derived. Four studies chose the Scale for 
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the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984), and five used the 
Psychotic SYmptom RATing Scales (PSYRATS; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & 
Faragher, 1999), which comprise subscales relating specifically to hallucinations and 
to delusions. Here, as with depression measurements, no systematic differences were 
evident between the findings obtained by studies using different assessment 
measures. 
Syndromes and symptoms Trial design 
Schz = Schizophrenia NC =  Not Controlled 
SA = Schizoaffective disorder RCT = Randomised Controlled Trial 
SF = Schizophreniform disorder Treatment condition 






 CRT = 
Cognitive Remediation 
Therapy 
 +ve sympts = Positive symptoms CTCH = 
Cognitive Therapy for 
Command Hallucinations 
Neg sympts = Negative symptoms 
Sex 
 
FI = Family Intervention 
F = Female SE = Self Esteem  
M = Male TAU = Treatment As Usual 
Measures  
  
BCSS = Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et al., 2006)  
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961; 1996)  
BPRS = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (Overall & Gorham, 1962) 
CDSS = Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia (Addington et al., 1993) 
CGI = Clinical Global Impression scales (Guy, 1976)  
CPRS = Comprehensive Psychopathological Rating Scale (Åsberg, Montgomery, Perris, Schalling, & Sedvall, 1978) 
DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)  
GPTS = Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scales (Green et al., 2006)  
HRSD = Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (Hamilton, 1967) 
IRAOS = Interview for the Retrospective Assessment of the Onset of Schizophrenia (Häfner et al., 1992) 
MADRS = Montgomery-Asperg Depression Rating Scale (Montgomery & Asberg, 1979)  
MSCS = Montgomery Schizophrenia Change Scale (Montgomery, Taylor, & Montgomery, 1978) 
PANSS = Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987)  
PAS = Psychiatric Assessment Scale (Krawiecka, Goldberg, & Vaughan, 1977) 
PDI = Peters Delusions Inventory (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999)  
PSE = Present State Examination (Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974)  
PSYRATS = Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (Haddock et al., 1999) 
SADS = The Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (Endicott & Spitzer, 1978) 
SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (Andreasen, 1983)  
SAPS = Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (Andreasen, 1984)  
SCID = Structured Clinical Interview for DSM (Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1992) 
SIPS = Structured Interview for Prodromal Syndromes (Miller et al., 2002) 
 
Figure 2.1. Key to abbreviations used in Tables 2.1-2.3. 
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Solomon (2008) 48 Schz with delusions 35% BDI; PDI 
Crumlish et al. 
(2005) 101 Schz & SF FE 31% PANSS: Dep & +ve 
Dagenhardt et 
al. (2007) 101 Schz spectrum 31% CDSS; BPRS 
Drake et al. 
(2004) 257 Schz spectrum FE 28% 
PANSS & PSYRATS: Dep & 
paranoia factors 
Edwards et al. 
(1998) 
158 Schz spectrum FE; 69 
other psychosis FE 35% BDI; BPRS 
Fowler et al. 
(2011) 
301 Schz spectrum with 
+ve sympts 18% BDI; BCSS; SAPS; PANSS 
Häfner et al. 
(2005) 232 Schz FE 22% PSE, SANS, IRAOS 
Koreen et al. 
(1993) 70 Schz FE 24% 
SADS affective and 
psychotic scales 
Lancon et al. 
(2001) 27 Schz spectrum 33% CDSS; PANSS 
Nakaya et al. 
(1997) 89 Schz 3% HRSD; PANSS 
Norman & 
Malla (1994) 55 Schz 5% BDI; SAPS 
Rooke & 
Birchwood 
(1998) 49 Schz 4% BDI; PAS 
Siegel et al. 
(2006) 98 Schz (inc 45 FE) 6% HRSD; SAPS 
Tarrier et al. 
(2001) 87 Schz with +ve sympts 17% BDI; BPRS; SANS; PAS 
Thewissen et 
al. (2011) 
82 Schiz spectrum; 39 
high schizotypy; 37 non-
clinical 14% 
ESM: ten times per day rate 
Dep & paranoia 
No association 
Aguilar et al. 
(1997) 96 Schz spectrum FE 11% HRSD; SAPS 
Carroll et al. 





(1987) 37 young Schz 49% 
PANSS / BPRS D factor; 
+ve subscale 
Oosthuizen et 
al. (2002) 80 Schz or SF, FE 28% 
PANSS D factor; +ve 
subscale 
Schennach-
Wolff et al. 
(2011) 224 Schz 34% HRSD; PANSS +ve 
Table 2.1. Observational studies in functional psychosis. 
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Solomon (2008) 12 mo 
Dep associated with delusions within each of 3 time 
points. Initial Dep correlates with delusions a year later. 
Crumlish et al. 
(2005) 4 yr 
Dep associated with +ve sympts at both times. No 
longitudinal analysis. 
Dagenhardt et 
al. (2007) 10 mo 
Dep score at a given point predicts later +ve symptom 
score.  
Drake et al. 
(2004) 18 mo 
Dep and Paranoia factors associated at each time point 
and across time points, direction of effect ambiguous. 
Edwards et al. 
(1998) 12 mo 
Those with persistent +ve sympts at all three points (8.9% 
of Schz spectrum ppts) had higher Dep at 12mo than the 
people without +ve sympts at all points. 
Fowler et al. 
(2011) 12 mo 
Dep factor and negative cognition factor both predict 
paranoia factor, cross-sectionally and over time. negative 
cognition mediates the effect of Dep on paranoia. 




those with Dep in early course had higher +ve symptoms 
at admission than those who had not been depressed.  
Koreen et al. 
(1993) 
Biweekly / 
monthly up to 
5 yr 
of 808 psychotic ratings, 210 concurrently depressed. Of 
1754 nonpsychotic ratings, only 70 depressed. Co-
occurrence statistically significant. Dep & +ve sympts 
correlated within patients. No cross-lagged analyses. 





Dep and +ve sympts both decreased. Dep & +ve 
correlated at admission; no correlation at follow-up. 
Nakaya et al. 
(1997) 9 wk 
Dep and +ve symptom declines are correlated; no 
correlation at baseline. 
Norman & 
Malla (1994) 12 - 29 mo 




(1998) 30 mo 
At follow-up Dep associated with delusions, and trend with 
hallucinations. No longitudinal analysis. 
Siegel et al. 
(2006) up to 8 yr 
 +ve sympts at intake predict Dep at follow-up (not the 
other way around). 
Tarrier et al. 
(2001) 3 mo Dep change correlated with +ve symptom change. 
Thewissen et 
al. (2011) 
ESM 10x day 
6 days 
Dep associated with paranoia; initial Dep predicts longer 
duration of paranoia. 
No association 
Aguilar et al. 
(1997) 12 mo 
Dep & +ve symptoms uncorrelated at baseline, 
associations over time not reported. Hopelessness 
predicts poor functional outcome. 
Carroll et al. 
(1999) 12 wk 
Dep & +ve symptoms uncorrelated at baseline; change 





(1987) 2 yr 
nonsignificant trend towards a correlation between Dep at 
intake and more +ve symptom improvement 2yrs on. 
Oosthuizen et 
al. (2002) 6 mo Dep consistently assoc Neg sympts, not +ve. 
Schennach-




discharge Dep consistently assoc Neg sympts, not +ve. 
Table 2.1 continued. Observational studies in functional psychosis. 
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2.7.2 Observational Studies 
One of the studies included here relates to a treatment trial where no between-group 
treatment effects on depression were observed, and the data are presented 
observationally (Tarrier et al., 2001).  
 
Of the 20 studies listed in Table 2.1, 15 found an association between higher 
depression and more positive symptoms. Most consistently, relationships were found 
between measurements taken at the same time point, but ten of the 20 studies went 
on to examine whether depression at a given time point might predict the severity of 
subsequent positive symptoms. Six of these ten reported that depression scores at a 
given point in time were related to more severe positive symptoms at a later point 
(though one of these studies assessed symptoms retrospectively rather than 
prospectively). Four studies looked for but did not find this predictive effect, although 
one of these four did find the opposite: that initial positive symptom levels predicted 
subsequent depression (Siegel et al., 2006). Ten studies did not examine the 
predictive effect of depression on later positive symptoms. However, two of these ten 
did find that reductions in depression scores and positive symptoms over time were 
correlated with each other (Nakaya et al., 1997; Tarrier et al., 2001). Another selected 
a group of participants with persistent positive symptoms across all three of the 
study’s observation points, and found that this group were more depressed than those 
whose positive symptoms were less persistent (Edwards, Maude, McGorry, Harrigan, 
& Cocks, 1998). 
 
Among eight observational studies of first episode samples reviewed here, five found 
a relationship between higher depression scores and more severe positive symptoms: 
two found that depression levels predicted positive symptoms longitudinally; one 
found that those with the most persistent positive symptoms were most depressed; 
the other two did not look for a longitudinal relationship, but found cross-sectional 
associations.  
 
Notably, all four studies that measured persecutory or delusional ideation specifically 
found that depression at a given time point was related to more severe subsequent 
paranoia (Drake et al., 2004; Fowler et al., 2011; Thewissen et al., 2011) or delusions 
(Bergstein, Weizman, & Solomon, 2008). 
 
Two studies stood out as being particularly convincing (Drake et al., 2004; Fowler et 
al., 2011). These had the largest sample sizes of all in Table 2.1, included only people 
with schizophrenia spectrum diagnoses and used a prospective design with structural 
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equation modelling to disentangle the causal effects that might be at play between 
symptom dimensions. 
 
Drake et al. (2004) assessed 257 patients with a first psychotic episode up to four 
times over 18 months using the PANSS and the PSYRATS, which were used to 
derive a depression factor score and a paranoia factor score for each assessment 
point. They found that higher paranoia was associated with more depression at each 
time point. Cross-lagged associations were weak, but models with a causal pathway 
between depression and paranoia fit the pattern of data significantly better than those 
without. The direction of the effect between depression and paranoia was ambiguous. 
 
Fowler et al. (2011) used a similar modelling technique with a larger sample (N = 301) 
and more sensitive measures of depressive affect and cognition (the BDI-II and Brief 
Core Schema Scales) to compare models with either depression driving subsequent 
paranoia or vice versa. Cross-lagged effects were significant, and the most plausible 
models were those with pathways from depressive affect and cognition to paranoia, 
not the other way around.  
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Study Participants Dropout Measures Duration 
Yes parallel improvement +ve symptoms 
Hogarty et 
al. (1995) 38 Schz / SA + Dep 13% BDI; BPRS 12 wk 
Goff et al. 
(1990) 14 Schz 21% HRSD; BPRS 6 wk 
Mazeh et al. 
(2004) N = 19 Schz + Dep 36% HRSD; PANSS 6 wk 
Siris et al. 
(1994) 
24 Schz / SA + Dep or 
Neg sympts: had 
benefitted from imipramine 









5 Schz & 28 SA, all with 
HRSD > 12 6% 
SADS: Dep 
items; +ve 
items 6 wk 
Prusoff et al. 




(1978) 60 Schz + Dep unknown HRSD; BPRS 6 wk 
Bodkin et al. 
(1996) 
21 Schz / SA + Neg 
sympts 19% HRSD; BPRS 6 wk 
Englisch et 
al. (2009) 
20 Schz spectrum, no +ve 
sympts, mild Dep 5% 
CDSS; HRSD; 
PANSS 6 wk 
Zisook et al. 
(2009) 
198 Schz / SA + 
subsyndromal Dep 5% 
CDSS; HRSD; 
PANSS 12 wk 
Kasckow et 
al. (2001) 19 Schz + Dep 11% HRSD; PANSS 10 wk 
Spina et al. 
(2004) 
34 Schz + Neg sympts, no 
Dep 12% 
HRSD; BPRS; 
SAPS 12 wk 
Table 2.2. Antidepressant pharmacotherapy trials. 
 
2.7.3 Treatment trials: medication 
Table 2.2 summarises the methods and findings of 12 antidepressant medication 
trials. These include 11 trials that reported adding an antidepressant to participants’ 
existing antipsychotic treatment regimens and finding subsequent reductions in 
depressive symptoms. Three of these 11 also reported a parallel reduction in positive 
psychotic symptoms. These were no more rigorously conducted or highly powered on 
the whole than the eight trials that found no decrease in positive symptoms. If 
anything, the studies that found changes in positive symptoms used smaller sample 
sizes.
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Study Design Medication Results 
Yes parallel improvement +ve symptoms 
Hogarty et 
al. (1995) RCT desipramine F only: BDI & BPRS both improved. 
Goff et al. 
(1990) NC fluoxetine improved Dep & BPRS 
Mazeh et al. 
(2004) NC venlafaxine 
14 patients significant improvement HRSD; in 
most a parallel PANSS decrease 




or taper to 
placebo 
those tapered down to placebo had more 
depressive & psychotic relapses 




(1987) RCT imipramine 
improved Dep; +ve no diff. (23 of 33 were non-
psychotic at baseline.) 
Prusoff et al. 
(1979) RCT amitriptyline 
no diff HRSD total; change on one subscale at 




(1978) RCT trazadone  improved HRSD; no diff BPRS. 
Bodkin et al. 
(1996) NC selegiline improved HRSD; no diff BPRS. 
Englisch et 
al. (2009) NC duloxetine 
improved CDSS & HRSD; PANSS +ve stably 
absent. (Those with significant +ve sympts had 
been excluded from the study.) 
Zisook et al. 
(2009) RCT citalopram improved Dep; +ve no diff. 
Kasckow et 
al. (2001) RCT citalopram improved Dep; +ve no diff. 
Spina et al. 
(2004) RCT fluoxetine improved Dep; +ve no diff. 
Table 2.2 continued. Antidepressant pharmacotherapy trials. 
 
One further study (Siris, Bermanzohn, Mason, & Shuwall, 1994) reported a 
comparison of maintenance antidepressant therapy against tapering to placebo for 
people whose depression had responded to imipramine in an earlier trial (Siris, 
Morgan, & Fagerstrom, 1987). The authors found that those who were tapered to 
placebo experienced more psychotic relapses, as well as more depressive relapses, 
than those who were maintained on antidepressant medication.
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Authors Participants Dropout % Measures Duration 
Yes parallel improvement +ve symptoms 
Addington et al. 
(2011) 51 clinical high risk 25% 
CDSS; SCID; 
SIPS 18 mo 
French et al. 
(2007) 57 help seeking at risk 26% 
PANSS: Dep 
factor & +ve 1 yr 
Garety et al. 
(1994) 20 Schz / SA +ve sympts 10% BDI; BPRS 6 mo 
Hall & Tarrier 
(2003) 





PANSS +ve 5 mo 
Knight, Wykes & 
Hayward (2006) 21 Schz spectrum 10% 
BDI; PANSS 
+ve 12 wk 
Laithwaite et al. 
(2007) 15 Schz (forensic) none 
BDI; PANSS 
+ve; 
PSYRATS 6 mo 
Myers, Startup & 
Freeman (2011) 
15 Schz spectrum 
persistent PDs, insomnia none 
DASS; 
GPTS; 
PSYRATS 3 mo 
Peters et al. 
(2010) 





+ve 9 mo 
Sensky et al. 
(2000) 90 Schiz none 
MADRS; 
CPRS 
up to 18 
mo 
Trower et al. 
(2004) 
38 Schz spectrum 
command Hal 21% 
CDSS; 
PANSS; 
PSYRATS 12 mo 
Garety et al. 
(2008) 
301 Schz spectrum +ve 
sympts 20% 
BDI; PANSS; 
PSYRATS 24 mo 
No parallel improvement +ve symptoms 
Laithwaite et al. 
(2009) 
15 Schz spectrum; 3 
bipolar (forensic) 5% BDI; PANSS 4 mo 
Penades et al. 
(2006) 
40 Schz + Neg sympts, 
minimal +ve 18% 
PANSS: Dep 
factor & +ve 10 mo 
Turkington, 
Kingdon & Turner 
(2002) 422 Schz 16% 
MADRS; 
CPRS; 
MSCS 5 mo 
Table 2.3. Psychological therapy trials. 
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Authors Design Intervention Results 
Yes parallel improvement +ve symptoms 





Dep and +ve sympts improved both 
groups, but +ve sympt improvement more 
rapid in CBT group. 






Dep and +ve sympts correlated and 
reduced. In CBT group bigger effect for 
+ve sympts than control. Not so for Dep. 
Garety et al. 
(1994) 
wait list 
control CBT vs TAU Dep and BPRS reduced in CBT group. 
Hall & Tarrier 
(2003) RCT CBT for SE 
Post-treat CBT group sig more 
improvement in Dep and +ve sympts than 
control. Follow-up +ve gains maintained 







group for SE 
SE increased, Dep and +ve sympts 
decreased during therapy period, not in 
wait list control period. 
Laithwaite et al. 
(2007) 
not 
controlled CBT for SE 
Dep and PSYRATS Delusions improved, 







insomnia All measures decreased significantly. 




control CBT vs TAU 
BDI sig reduced at post and follow-up in 
combined group.. +ve sympts sig reduced 
only in the delayed therapy group not 
immediate. 




post treatment both groups improved 
CPRS and MADRS. 9 month followup 
CBT group further gains on both, 
befriending groups lost some (sig 
difference). 




Dep rose in TAU not CTCH. +ve sympts 
rose in TAU, dropped in CTCH: difference 
in Delusions not Hallucinations 
Garety et al. 
(2008) RCT 
CBT vs FI vs 
TAU 
CBT reduced Dep and reduced 
Delusional Distress in those with carers 
compared to TAU. No sig difference in 
+ve sympts total. 
No parallel improvement +ve symptoms 








sig reduction Dep but not PANSS +ve. 
Was low to begin with (mean = 9). 
Penades et al. 
(2006) RCT CBT vs CRT 




Turner (2002) RCT CBT vs TAU 
Dep and overall symptoms improved in 
CBT vs TAU, but "schizophrenia score" 
no difference in rates of change. No 
proper measure of +ve symptoms. 
Table 2.3 continued. Psychological therapy trials. 
 
2.7.4 Treatment trials: psychological therapy 
Table 2.3 summarises 14 psychological therapy trials that reported improvement of 
depressive symptoms in people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and also 
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measured positive symptoms. Eight of the 14 trials (including five out of nine 
randomised controlled trials) reporting improvement in depression also found a 
parallel improvement in positive psychotic symptoms. Garety et al. (1994), Sensky et 
al. (2000) and Turkington et al. (2002) did not report changes in positive symptoms 
specifically, but found a treatment effect, alongside depression, on global psychotic 
symptoms as measured by the CPRS/BPRS. Garety et al.’s (2008) large RCT found 
no treatment effect on PANSS positive scale total scores, but did find that those 
participants who had carers showed a treatment effect of CBT on delusional distress 
as measured by the PSYRATS. Similarly, Laithwaite et al.’s (2007) pilot study of CBT 
for self esteem in forensic inpatients with schizophrenia showed that PSYRATS 
Delusions subscale scores reduced significantly alongside depression scores, but that 
PSYRATS Auditory Hallucination subscale scores and PANSS positive scale total 
scores did not. Two studies achieving a treatment effect on depression examined but 
did not find any parallel changes in PANSS positive scale scores (Laithwaite et al., 
2009; Penadés et al., 2006). The participants in both of these studies had very low 
positive symptom scores to begin with (average PANSS Positive scale total = 9 in the 
Laithwaite et al. study, and 11 in the Penades et al. study, where scores can range 
from 7 to 49). 
 
2.7.5 Three excluded studies with some relevance 
Two reports were found that did not meet inclusion criteria for the systematic review, 
but referred to trials that targeted affective disturbance specifically in people with 
psychosis (White et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2009), which most of the psychological 
therapy trials above had not set out explicitly to achieve. One further paper (Lecomte 
et al., 1999) reported on a trial of a self esteem therapy intervention that was similar to 
the four reviewed above (Hall & Tarrier, 2003; Knight, Wykes, & Hayward, 2006; 
Laithwaite et al., 2007; Laithwaite et al., 2009). 
 
White et al. (2011) reported on a randomised controlled trial of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT) for emotional dysfunction following psychosis, which was 
published too late to be included in the above study pool. 27 people with psychosis 
were randomised to ACT or treatment as usual (TAU). Three months after baseline 
assessment, significantly more of those in the ACT group had ceased to be 
depressed than of those the TAU group. No differences were observed between 
positive symptom score changes in the two groups - neither group showed a change - 
although the ACT group had significantly fewer crisis contacts. However, as with 
Laithwaite et al.'s (2009) study and Penades et al.'s (2006) study, White et al.'s (2011) 
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participant group entered the trial with minimal positive symptoms (PANSS Positive 
scale total mean = 12). 
 
Jackson et al. (2009) conducted a randomised controlled trial of recovery-focused 
cognitive therapy to target depression and post-traumatic symptoms following in the 
wake of a psychotic episode. 66 first-episode psychosis patients were randomised to 
cognitive therapy or TAU. The main therapeutic targets were trauma processing and 
appraisals of psychotic illness embodying shame, loss and/or entrapment. Despite a 
beneficial effect of the intervention on traumatic symptom scores, the authors found 
no improvements in depression or self esteem scores in the therapy group over TAU. 
No measures were reported of participants' appraisals of psychotic illness, or of 
positive psychotic symptoms. 
 
Lecomte et al.'s (1999) study compared a 12-week self esteem coping module against 
TAU in a group of people with schizophrenia, measuring changes in coping and 
psychotic symptoms (but not depression, which is why the study did not meet the 
review criteria). The authors found significant improvements in the therapy group's 
positive symptom scores compared to the TAU group, specifically on items about 
delusions, perceptual disorganization and paranoia. This study's pattern of findings 
was similar to those of Hall and Tarrier's (2003), Knight et al.'s (2006) and Laithwaite 
et al.'s (2007) self esteem therapy trials. Of all the trials mentioned here that targeted 
self esteem in people with psychosis, only Laithwaite et al. (2009) failed to find an 
effect on positive symptom scores. 
 
2.8 Discussion 
2.8.1 Observational studies 
The first hypothesis of this review was that among people with positive psychotic 
symptoms, those who were concurrently depressed would show less improvement in 
positive symptoms over time than those who were not depressed.  
 
The results of the review indicated that high levels of depression were consistently 
associated with high levels of positive psychotic symptoms. As a cross-sectional 
pattern within one point in time, this was robust; longitudinal findings were mixed. Ten 
studies were found which tested specifically for a predictive effect of initial depression 
on the severity of positive psychotic symptoms at a later point in time. Six of these 
succeeded in finding such an effect, all in the predicted direction. The first hypothesis 
was thus supported by the majority of relevant studies: positive psychotic symptoms 
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tended to resolve more slowly in those with high levels of depression than in those 
without. The strongest findings came from studies that examined delusions or 
paranoia specifically. 
 
2.8.2 Treatment trials 
The second hypothesis of this review was that effective treatment of depression in 
people with positive psychotic symptoms would lead to a reduction in positive 
symptoms as well as in depression levels. 
 
2.8.2.1 Antidepressant medication trials 
The medication trials reviewed indicated that antidepressant medications added to 
antipsychotic regimens did not show beneficial effects on positive psychotic 
symptoms, at least not over periods of time up to 12 weeks. Most of the 
antidepressant trials achieving significant reductions in depression did not report 
parallel decreases in positive symptoms. The interactive dynamics of polypharmacy 
are beyond the scope of this discussion, but it can be noted that all of the trials 
reviewed were short (12 weeks or less) and most had relatively small samples, some 
of which were selected for an absence of positive symptoms. Many of the trials had 
only started to detect significant changes in depression at the end of the assessment 
period, and it is possible that subsequent improvements in positive symptoms might 
have occurred without being captured by these study protocols. The short follow-up 
periods used and the exclusion from some of the participant samples of those with 
significant positive symptoms might have limited the usefulness of the resulting data 
for the evaluation of the above hypothesis. 
 
2.8.2.2 Psychological therapy trials 
The reviewed psychological therapy trials indicated that effective reductions in 
depression by means of psychological therapy were often accompanied by reductions 
in positive symptoms, particularly delusions. Psychological therapy trials involved 
longer follow-up periods (up to two years) than pharmacological trials, and the 
majority found that reductions in depression achieved were paralleled with 
improvements in positive psychotic symptoms. Most of these had not sought to 
reduce depression specifically, although four did target self esteem (Hall & Tarrier, 
2003; Laithwaite et al., 2009; Laithwaite et al., 2007; Knight et al., 2006). Most of the 
trials set out explicitly to target positive symptoms. Where such trials observed 
reductions in both symptom dimensions, to conclude that the depression reduction 
caused the positive symptom reduction would be premature, but this possibility is not 
out of the question. Therapies such as CBT for psychosis have evolved from those 
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originally developed for depression, and many techniques were carried over, including 
those that target beliefs about the self, interpretations of events and responses to 
distress. It is plausible that these therapeutic approaches could exert part of their 
effect on psychotic symptoms via reductions in depressive features. A good test of 
this hypothesis would involve treating depression specifically in people who 
experience it alongside psychosis. Subsequent changes in positive symptoms could 
then be examined for significant effects.  
 
2.8.3 Targeting depression 
Only one of the psychological therapy trials included in the review set out specifically 
to target depression in people with psychosis (Laithwaite et al., 2009), although two 
more were found that targeted depression but did not meet review criteria (Jackson et 
al., 2009; White et al., 2011). Each of these three studies failed to provide information 
crucial to the testing of the review’s second hypothesis, due to methodological 
limitations. Laithwaite and colleagues used compassion focussed group therapy with 
forensic inpatients who had schizophrenia or bipolar diagnoses, and White and 
colleagues used ACT with a mixed group of people with psychotic disorders. Both 
interventions achieved significant reductions in depression compared to TAU. No 
effects were found on positive symptoms in either trial, but this is attributable in both 
cases to a floor effect. Most of the participants in these studies had no positive 
symptoms to begin with: average PANSS positive subscale scores were 9 and 12 
respectively, where scores can range from 7 to 49.  
 
Jackson et al.'s (2009) therapy trial sought to ameliorate depression by reducing 
participants' appraisals of their psychotic illness as embodying humiliation, loss or 
entrapment. This followed Max Birchwood’s social ranking model of post-psychotic 
depression (Birchwood, 2003), which carried the implication that by manipulating the 
meaning of the psychotic experience to the individual, reducing the degree of defeat 
and entrapment experienced, depression and its associated negative effects could be 
prevented. Depression showed no benefit from this intervention compared to TAU, 
and this was not attributable to a floor effect: baseline CDSS scores had indicated that 
67% of the participants were "significantly" depressed. No measure was reported of 
change in the illness appraisals that the intervention sought to target, so it is unclear 
whether therapy failed to change these or whether it did so without correspondingly 
reducing depression. The approach used by Jackson and colleagues in this study 
differed substantially from the techniques used in therapies recommended by NICE 
for people with major depressive disorder (National Institute for Health and Clinical 
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Excellence, 2009), which have not been comprehensively trialled in people who have 
depression co-occurring with functional psychosis. 
 
2.8.4 The role of self esteem 
All but one of the trials reviewed that achieved reductions in depression by targeting 
self esteem also reported corresponding reductions in positive psychotic symptoms 
(Hall & Tarrier, 2003; Laithwaite et al., 2007; Knight et al., 2006). The only trial 
targeting self esteem that didn’t find positive symptom reductions had started with a 
participant group with already minimal positive symptoms, as mentioned above 
(Laithwaite et al., 2009). Lecomte et al.'s (1999) study, though not meeting the 
present review criteria as it did not report depression changes, also found that a self 
esteem intervention led to positive symptom reductions, particularly on items relating 
to delusions, paranoia and perceptual disorganization. Laithwaite et al. (2007) also 
looked individually at different psychotic symptoms, and found that delusions reduced 
significantly in the treatment group while hallucinations did not. This evidence 
supporting the role of self esteem in positive symptom resolution (with a particular 
accent on delusions and paranoia) can be interpreted as supporting, to some extent, 
both Bentall et al.’s (1994; 2001) and Freeman et al.’s (2002) theoretical models. Both 
accounts proposed that negative evaluations of the self drive persecutory delusions.  
 
Bentall and colleagues’ (1994; 2001) defence model suggested that discrepancies 
between overt and covert self esteem are evident in people with persecutory 
delusions, and that a self-serving attributional bias functions to prevent the covert 
negative self-evaluations from entering consciousness. The finding that 
therapeutically targeting self esteem can cause reductions in positive symptoms, 
including delusions, does not provide direct support for a defence model; it can be 
difficult empirically to distinguish between overt and covert self-esteem, and such a 
distinction was not made in any of the studies reviewed here. It seems more likely that 
explicit self esteem was targeted and measured in these protocols. Nevertheless, 
evaluative beliefs about the self have strong support as a factor affecting psychotic 
symptoms. 
 
Freeman and colleagues’ (2002) model, following Garety et al. (2001), proposed that 
core beliefs about the self and the world are drawn upon when an individual tries to 
find an explanation for anomalous experiences (which are caused by interactions 
between bio-psycho-social vulnerabilities and stressors). Negative underlying beliefs 
thus make it more likely that a persecutory explanation is chosen: negative self-
evaluations in this framework have a direct rather than defensive effect on delusion 
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formation, and no discrepancies between overt and covert self-evaluations are 
involved. The findings of trials that targeted self esteem with resulting reductions in 
positive symptoms are consistent with Freeman and colleagues’ proposal that 
delusions of persecution are perpetuated by their consistency with underlying 
negative core beliefs. The model goes on also to implicate both depression and 
anxiety in the gathering of biased evidence to support persecutory beliefs. The role of 
anxiety has now received attention in a series of studies supporting the roles of 
attention to threat (Freeman, Garety, & Phillips, 2000), worry (Startup et al., 2007; 
Foster et al., 2010) and the use of safety behaviours (Freeman et al., 2007) (all 
features linked to anxiety) as potentially helpful therapeutic targets in breaking the 
cycle of delusion persistence. Most of the cognitive features associated with 
depression have not yet been systematically investigated in people with psychosis.  
 
2.8.5 Delusions and other positive symptoms 
Depression is more consistently predictive of the persistence of delusions and 
paranoia than of total positive symptom scores. Mixed findings have been reported 
regarding the prediction of positive scale totals, but every study in the present review 
that measured delusions or paranoia specifically found that depression predicted the 
persistence of such beliefs over time, or, in the case of therapy trials, that reductions 
in depression were accompanied by weakening of delusions. This pattern of findings 
is consistent with the cross-sectional observations summarised in the introductory 
section of this chapter: delusional or paranoid ideation has received the most 
empirical attention in relation to depression, and has demonstrated a robust 
relationship.  
 
Three of the reviewed psychotherapy trials examined relative changes in delusions 
and hallucinations specifically. Garety et al. (2008) individually measured changes in 
hallucination frequency and distress, delusional conviction and distress, and found 
that delusional distress was the only one of these four parameters to show treatment 
effects (along with depression) from CBT. Laithwaite et al.’s (2007) self esteem 
therapy trial measured symptom changes using both the Auditory Hallucinations 
subscale and the Delusions subscale of the PSYRATS, and found that participants’ 
Delusions scores reduced significantly with treatment, along with depression scores, 
while Hallucinations scores did not. Trower et al.’s (2004) trial involved an intervention 
specifically targeting command hallucinations. The treatment group here showed 
significant reductions compared to the TAU group in depression, distress, beliefs 
about the power of voices and the need to comply, and actual compliance behaviours. 
Meanwhile, the frequency, loudness and content of the voices did not change. PANSS 
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positive scale total scores also reduced significantly in the treatment group: within the 
PANSS, delusions scores showed a significant drop, but hallucinations scores did not. 
These findings suggest that the kinds of interventions that successfully reduce 
depression in people with psychosis might have quite different effects on individual 
psychotic symptoms.  
 
The major role played by depression and negative schematic beliefs in Garety et al.’s 
(2001) and Freeman et al.’s (2002) models is in the precipitation and maintenance of 
delusional beliefs. Anomalous experiences like hallucinations are proposed to result 
from interactions of environmental stressors with pre-existing cognitive and 
neurochemical vulnerabilities. Emotional states can exacerbate unusual perceptual 
phenomena, but the primary effect of depression and negative self-appraisals is in 
influencing the selection of an explanation for puzzling experiences. The possible 
differential associations of individual psychotic symptoms with depression have yet to 
be fully explored, but the findings of this review support the proposal that depression 
has a stronger connection with the persistence of delusions than hallucinations. 
Depression has, ever since Beck’s influential account, been associated with certain 
pathologies of belief: core negative beliefs about the self and other people (e.g. “I am 
unlovable”, “others are uncaring”) and conditional assumptions based on such core 
beliefs (e.g. “If I try to get close to people, they will reject me”). A person with 
depressive core beliefs (e.g. “I am defective”) might also be more susceptible to other 
kinds of compatible distressing beliefs (e.g. “people in the street are singling me out to 
harm me”) than somebody whose belief system is altogether more conventional.  
 
2.8.6 Methodological issues 
The wide variability in participant sample characteristics, follow-up periods and 
symptom measures used in these studies might have contributed to the heterogeneity 
in findings. The content and psychometric properties of different scales used to 
measure depression are a relevant example. The HRSD had long been seen as the 
“gold standard” for depression research, but more recently was shown to be less 
accurate and less internally consistent than the BDI and the MADRS, potentially not 
valid for use in outpatient samples (Uher et al., 2008). The PANSS depression factor 
is particularly open to criticism as a measure of depressive symptoms. It is composed 
of four items, each scored 1-7 by the assessor: Somatic Concern, Anxiety, Guilt 
Feelings and Depression. Thus only half of the items relate to symptoms of 
depression as defined by the DSM-IV or the ICD-10, and all have equal weighting. No 
systematic difference was evident however between the findings of studies that used 
adequate measures of depression and those that used more tenuous ones. With 
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regard to positive symptom measures, there were stronger and more consistent 
findings in studies where specific measures of delusions or paranoia were used than 
in studies which summed positive symptom scale totals. 
 
Individual psychotic symptoms could have quite different relationships with 
depression, and such differential associations have yet to be further explored. If it is 
the case that delusions are more closely related to depression than other positive 
symptoms, then the use of total summed positive symptom scores in analyses may 
have obscured these different relationships in some studies. The PANSS positive 
symptom scale, which was used by most of the studies reviewed here to measure 
positive symptoms, is calculated by summing scores 1-7 on each of 7 items: 
Delusions, Conceptual disorganization, Hallucinatory behaviour, Excitement, 
Grandiosity, Suspiciousness / Persecution and Hostility. The items all have equal 
weight. The way the instrument is summed means that qualitatively very different 
presentations can be numerically equivalent. For example, a manic affective 
presentation (elevated mood, grandiosity, flight of ideas, irritability) could produce the 
same score as a stereotypical paranoid schizophrenic one (hallucinations, 
persecutory delusions, thought disorder). One might expect that depression would 
have negative relationships with Excitement and with Grandiosity that could 
counteract a positive relationship with Suspiciousness / Persecution when scores are 
summed to a total. This could explain the non-significant findings of some of the 
studies reviewed here. 
 
2.8.7 Limitations and indications for future research 
The specific hypotheses that this review sought to examine were quite different from 
those that most of the reviewed studies set out to test. As a result, the nature of the 
data was not ideal for the present purpose. This was particularly pertinent with the 
antidepressant medication trials, where participant selection criteria and short follow-
up periods severely limited the relevance of the data to the review’s hypotheses. On 
the positive side, reviewing data from studies with different hypotheses can help to 
reduce the effect of publication bias on the overall picture. The findings that have 
been brought together indicate the potential utility of systematically investigating 
causal mechanisms that might connect depression with the persistence of positive 
psychotic symptoms.  
 
It was not deemed appropriate to attempt a quantitative synthesis of the findings of 
the present review, due to the great heterogeneity of the included studies. A 
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quantitative understanding of the relationships of interest could be aided by the 
inspection of effect sizes obtained by relevant studies, which were not reported here.  
 
As stated at the outset of this chapter, the practical aim of research such as that 
reviewed here is to guide the optimisation of therapies for people with psychosis. To 
this end, it will be necessary to understand further the specific causal processes that 
perpetuate symptoms. It is instructive that depression in people with psychosis often 
predicts the persistence of positive symptoms, but this may not be specific enough: 
what are the mechanisms of this association?  
 
A multifactorial account of depression (taking in genetic, biochemical, cognitive, 
affective and social aspects) was accepted much earlier and acknowledged more 
widely (e.g. Baillie et al., 2009) than a similar approach to psychosis. In line with this, 
it is commonly held that depression can have many different causes, and furthermore 
that the treatment of it can be approached in several quite different ways, each of 
which has been shown to work (NICE, 2009), depending on the supposed mechanism 
of pathological persistence. Each treatment approach has its own merits, but none 
has been found to reliably benefit every patient. A comprehensive assessment of the 
predisposing, precipitating and perpetuating factors in each case can guide the 
application of appropriate techniques. This multifactorial complexity is likely also to 
apply to depression when it accompanies psychosis, and some of the maintenance 
factors might interact with psychosis more than others.  
 
Some of the factors that prolong depression can be ameliorated with psychological 
therapy, and the main implication of this review is that these same mechanisms might 
have an effect on positive symptom persistence. Self esteem has received some 
attention as such a factor, and trials have reported that treatments targeting self 
esteem can have beneficial effects on positive symptoms. Appraisals of shame, loss 
and entrapment have not yet proved to be a beneficial therapeutic target for 
ameliorating depression (Jackson et al., 2009).  
 
The main common pathway for the therapeutic effect of CBT (and some other 
therapies) on depression is thought to be cognitive change, that is reduction in 
negative thoughts and dysfunctional beliefs or assumptions (Coleman et al., 2009). 
Empirically supported mechanisms proposed to maintain negative cognition in 
depression include a tendency to ruminate in response to distress (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991), systematic memory bias (Williams et al., 2007) and difficulties in solving 
interpersonal problems (Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992). As mentioned earlier in 
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this chapter, most of the cognitive processes associated with depression have not 
been systematically investigated in people with psychosis. It is very plausible that the 
same constellation of memory impairment, ruminative thinking style and problem 
solving difficulty that accompany depression (Williams et al., 2007) could make it very 
difficult for someone with delusions to engage with reality testing or even to effectively 
gather evidence to assess the validity of distressing beliefs. Given the promising 
results of trials targeting these features to treat depression, it would be of worth to find 
out whether the same processes can contribute to the persistence of positive 
symptoms, in which case treatment trials in psychosis would be indicated.  
 
A prognostic study of the power of specific depression-related processes in predicting 
the persistence over time of individual psychotic symptoms could clarify the nature of 
these causal pathways. Given that delusions and paranoia show most consistent 
associations with depression, and that delusions of persecution are the delusion type 
associated with most negative affect (Appelbaum et al., 1999), persecutory delusions 
would appear to be a good candidate symptom for such an investigation. If effects are 
found here, it is possible that they might generalise to other psychotic symptoms. 
 
2.9 Conclusions  
A review of the available evidence found support for the hypothesis that high levels of 
depression in people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders are predictive of positive 
symptom persistence over time. Some studies using summed positive symptom scale 
totals did not find this predictive effect, but specific associations with delusions and 
paranoia were repeatedly seen.  
 
The review’s second hypothesis - that the effective treatment of depression in people 
with positive psychotic symptoms would be followed by reductions in positive 
symptoms as well as in depression - was partially supported. The effect depended on 
the modality of treatment. The addition of antidepressant medications to antipsychotic 
regimens did not appear to improve positive symptoms, at least not over periods up to 
12 weeks. However, psychological therapies such as CBT that reduced depression in 
people with psychosis also often improved positive symptoms, and specific effects on 
delusions were found by every study that looked for them.  The mechanisms of these 
effects, however, are unclear. Further investigation of these specific processes is 
indicated. 
 
Garety, Freeman and colleagues’ (2001) model was supported: the reports reviewed 
here are consistent with a causal role for depression-related processes in 
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perpetuating positive psychotic symptoms, particularly delusions. This does not 
contradict Birchwood’s assertion that psychosis can be a cause of depression. The 
two types of problem are likely to mutually feed each other. The relatively consistent 
finding that self esteem interventions improved positive symptoms could be 
interpreted as supporting both Bentall et al.’s (2001) and Freeman et al.’s (2002) 
theories; the designs of the studies reviewed here did not provide a direct test of the 
contention regarding whether paranoia is a defensive or direct expression of 
underlying negative self-appraisals. Freeman et al.’s model may be considered the 
more parsimonious of the two. 
 
If specific depression-related factors – processes that can be targeted in therapy – are 
found to predict the persistence over time of positive symptoms such as persecutory 
delusions, then targeted interventions could be trialled to help people who experience 
psychosis to recover more quickly. The next two chapters will identify prominent 
candidate processes in the depression literature, and make a case for their relevance 
to the maintenance of belief pathology. 
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Chapter 3. Depression and cognitive processes 
that might contribute to persistence of symptoms 
 
In the preceding chapter, evidence was reviewed for a link between depression and 
the persistence of positive psychotic symptoms such as persecutory delusions. It was 
seen that an association has been found between depression and the persistence of 
such symptoms, and in particular of delusions and paranoia. In order to understand 
the meaning of this association and its implications for theory and clinical practice, it is 
important to examine the causal mechanisms of the relationship. This investigation 
can be informed by detailed psychological models of the persistence of depression, 
which have identified factors with probable causal significance. The same processes 
that perpetuate symptoms of depression might also contribute to the maintenance of 
psychotic belief pathologies. 
 
The present chapter introduces the cognitive literature on symptom persistence in 
depression. Early theories emphasised the negative content of thoughts as a cognitive 
vulnerability for persistent depression (Teasdale, 1988; Beck, 1976). Some accounts 
focused specifically on the form of depressive thought processes, for example, 
repetitiveness or specificity, and the roles of these cognitive processes as responses 
to distress (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Williams et al., 2007).  An overview of these 
theoretical approaches is given here, and key cognitive constructs are picked out 
whose relevance has attracted empirical support.  
 
3.1 Negative cognitive content: Beck and schematic beliefs 
Judgements that people make about themselves and others synthesize past 
experience to influence subsequent perceptions and responses. Such beliefs may 
mediate the individual’s adaptation to the social world (Fowler et al., 2006). Negative 
schematic beliefs are a central component of cognitive theories of depression (Beck, 
1976; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Beck’s original theory, in its simplest form, 
proposed that cognitive vulnerability to depression manifests as maladaptive 
schematic beliefs that drive a tendency to interpret certain life events in negative 
ways, causing low mood. Consistent with Beck’s theory, depressed patients endorse 
more negative evaluations of the self, and have more dysfunctional attitudes, more 
depressogenic attributional biases and report more negative thoughts than do non-
clinical controls (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Ruehlman, West, & Pasahow, 1985). 
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Beck’s early account proposed that cognitive vulnerability to depression is a stable, 
enduring anomaly of one's psychological system (Beck et al., 1979, p. 20). The 
depressed person was conceptualised as qualitatively different from most people in 
their faulty or "primitive" inferential thinking style, having undergone a "cognitive 
revolution... which produces a marked reversal in the way the patient construes 
reality." (Beck et al., 1979, p21). 
 
"According to this schematic representation, we observe that the depressed patient 
tends to view his experiences as total deprivations or defeats (nondimensional) and 
as irreversible (fixed). Concomitantly, he categorizes himself as a "loser" (categorical, 
judgmental) and doomed (irreversible character deficits)." (Beck et al., 1979, p15). 
 
This proposition of a relatively stable cognitive vulnerability, which should be 
observable in depression-prone individuals at any point in time, has not been 
consistently supported by empirical research: studies have typically found elevated 
depressive cognitive markers in people only during an episode of depression and not 
when they have recovered from such an episode (even when no psychological 
therapy was involved in their recovery), when the underlying cognitive vulnerability 
should presumably still be present (Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; Silverman, 
Silverman, & Eardley, 1984; Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984). Negative thinking is 
clearly not without causal relevance in the perpetuation of depression, but may not be 
a stable feature of depression-prone individuals. 
 
Another result of the relatively stable conceptualisation of vulnerability put forward by 
Beck in his early account is that the theory does not explain why most people who 
experience a depressed state soon return to normal mood even without treatment, 
while others get increasingly depressed and become trapped in a chronic cycle of 
disorder (Depue & Monroe, 1986). Limitations like these led investigators allied with 
the cognitive psychological approach to develop more elaborate, multifactorial and 
reactive perspectives on the mental processes involved in depression, which Beck 
would in turn incorporate into his later expanded model (Beck, 2008). 
 
3.2 The distinguishing features of persistent depression  
Targeting negative automatic thoughts and dysfunctional assumptions in cognitive 
therapy can be very effective, leading to improvements in mood and reductions in 
negative thinking (Teasdale & Fennell, 1982; Gloaguen, Cottraux, Cucherat, & Ivy-
Marie, 1998; Keith S., 1989). However, there is a substantial group of people who do 
not benefit from this therapeutic approach. The relatively more treatment resistant 
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conditions of such people might be complicated by some particular features that make 
the depression more severe or tenacious. Moore & Garland (2003) propose that 
persistent chronic depression can be distinguished from that which follows a short 
episodic course in several ways, each of which has relevance for theory and 
treatment.  
 
Firstly, persistent depression is characterised by avoidance: behavioural withdrawal, 
as well as mental avoidance of upsetting thoughts and of painful emotions. Avoidance 
strategies start off by enabling the individual to cope with extremely aversive 
circumstances and to limit acute distress on a day-to-day basis, but can be ultimately 
maladaptive when overused with the intention of eliminating unpleasant experience. 
Habitual avoidance can contribute to an intolerance of upsetting emotions, a lack of 
reinforcement from the environment and poor problem solving skills that have not 
developed due to non-engagement with difficult issues. Secondly, persistent 
depression is often characterised by an extreme categorical thinking style, where 
attitudes such as “I fail at every thing that I attempt” become abstracted from any 
specific memories and generalised beyond reason. This thinking style can interfere 
with flexible coping and with constructive problem solving. Third, Moore & Garland 
propose that the underlying beliefs of people with persistent depression are 
particularly extreme. Negative core beliefs, conditional assumptions and beliefs about 
depression can all contribute to the perpetuation of the low mood state. Finally, social 
factors at all stages of the disorder’s development can affect its trajectory: early 
experiences can predispose to more extreme pathology, stressful or traumatic events 
can trigger its manifestation, and ongoing features of the social setting of the 
depressed person, such as an unrewarding job or unsupportive relationships might 
maintain emotional difficulties. 
 
Cognitive accounts of the persistence of depression typically show a significant 
degree of overlap in the set of processes that they deem to be important in symptom 
maintenance. One of the earliest cognitive theories to tackle persistence specifically 
from an information processing point of view was Teasdale’s differential activation 
hypothesis. 
 
3.3 Teasdale’s differential activation hypothesis 
John Teasdale extended an account, based on Beck’s cognitive theory of depression 
(Beck et al., 1979), which dealt specifically with the maintenance of symptoms, rather 
than their aetiology (Teasdale, 1988). Teasdale proposed that the distinguishing 
feature of persistent depression, as opposed to mild or transient depressive states, is 
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that negative thoughts and low mood become coupled in a mutually exacerbating 
downward spiral. This same cognitive maintenance cycle had been noted in Beck's 
original account. The differential activation hypothesis sought to explain why some 
people and not others can become locked in such a vicious cycle.  
 
Teasdale proposed that cognitive vulnerability to the persistence of depression 
depends on the nature of thoughts that become accessible in a low mood state: these 
will determine whether or not a vicious cycle of lower mood and more negative 
cognition becomes established. The theory differs from Beck’s in that the vulnerability 
is reactive – it lies in the nature of the person’s response to a low mood state - and 
thus would not necessarily be observable when the person is in good spirits. 
Consistent with this proposal, those with a tendency towards depression respond to 
experimentally induced low mood with more self-devaluative thoughts and feelings 
than those who have never been depressed (Teasdale & Cox, 2001), and among 
people who are depressed, those with more negative thoughts and beliefs recover 
more slowly than those who think less negatively (Dent & Teasdale, 1988; Williams, 
Healy, Teasdale, White, & Paykel, 1990).  
 
3.4 The role of memory 
Both Beck’s and Teasdale’s theories centrally concern the negative content of 
cognition, in the form of memories, beliefs and attitudes. However, the theories differ 
in the emphasis they place on these different cognitive constructs. Beck saw 
maladaptive schematic beliefs about the self and others, probably formed during 
childhood, as the fundamental drivers of unhelpful attitudes and negative thoughts. 
Teasdale wrote more about memory. The differential activation hypothesis was based 
on associative network theories of memory and affect, such as that of Gordon Bower 
(1981), which are rooted in the experimental cognitive psychology tradition. 
Associative network theories see cognitive systems as networks of nodes, where 
each node has a meaning and connections of various strengths with nodes 
corresponding to concepts that it has previously been paired with. Thus when a node 
becomes activated to a certain degree, activation can spread to connected nodes 
proportionately to the strength of the connections. The context-dependent learning 
phenomenon, whereby material memorised in a particular environment is recalled 
more readily in the same environment than a different one (e.g. Godden & Baddeley, 
1975), lends itself well to an associative network explanation. The reactivation of a 
context node here leads to spreading activation, raising the likelihood that nodes 
corresponding to items that have been encountered in this context will become active. 
Bower’s “network theory of affect” proposed that an emotional state could serve as 
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context in such a model, and thus drive state-dependent encoding and retrieval of 
memories (Blaney, 1986). In support of this proposal, information encoded in a state 
of low mood is subsequently more accessible when mood is again low than are 
memories from happier states (Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978; Singer & Salovey, 
1988). Mood congruent memory is a related phenomenon: negative information is 
learned more readily in low mood than positive information, and recalled more quickly. 
Matt et al.’s (1992) review of mood congruency studies in relation to depression 
concluded that while non-depressed people recalled 6%-8% more positive than 
negative stimuli, clinically depressed participants showed the opposite bias: up to 10% 
more negative memories than positive ones. Given that the activation of mental 
representations of unpleasant events or bad experiences can affect mood in the same 
way as exposure to the events themselves, it is consistent that interactions of mood 
with information processing in memory could contribute to the vicious cycle that 
Teasdale describes in persisting depression. According to the differential activation 
hypothesis, someone with a large amount of negative content stored in memory will, 
when in low mood, experience the associative activation of this volume of unpleasant 
material, and will thus be more susceptible to a mutually reinforcing cognitive-affective 
downward spiral than someone with more positive memories.   
 
3.4.1 Overgeneral autobiographical memory 
As well as the valence of the content, the form of autobiographical memory appears to 
be different in people with depression to those without. Williams & Broadbent (1986) 
were the first to discover an overgenerality bias in the memories of people with 
depression. They studied 25 patients in the first few days after hospitalisation for a 
suicide attempt (most of whom had been experiencing severe depression). 
Participants were asked to recall a specific autobiographical memory in response to 
each of a set of positive and negative cue words (e.g. “happy”, “angry”). Control 
participants tended to produce a specific memory, as instructed (e.g. “last Tuesday 
evening, I was happy when I went to the cinema with my sister”), but there was a 
striking tendency for overdose patients to report instead generalised memories (e.g. 
“seeing my sister makes me happy”). This effect, observed for both positive and 
negative cue words, was named overgeneral autobiographical memory bias (OGM). 
 
These findings have since been replicated and extended using variations of Williams 
and Broadbent’s original task, which has come to be known as the Autobiographical 
Memory Task (AMT). A number of studies by different research groups have shown 
OGM in adults with clinical depression (Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, & 
Dayson, 1998; Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Puffet, 
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Jehin-Marchot, Timsit-Berthier, & Timsit, 1991; Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & 
Merckelbach, 2001), adolescents with major depressive disorder (Park, Goodyer, & 
Teasdale, 2002) and women with postnatal depression (Croll & Bryant, 2000), as well 
as in currently euthymic individuals with past major depressive or bipolar episodes 
(Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000; Scott, Stanton, Garland, & 
Ferrier, 2000) and in sub-clinically dysphoric participants (Goddard, Dritschel, & 
Burton, 1997; Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-smith, 2004). This combination of findings 
suggests that OGM could be both a trait and a state marker of depression. 
 
Empirical research findings support and somewhat extend Moore & Garland’s (2003) 
observation that an overgeneral categorical thinking style is most pronounced in 
people with particularly persistent depression. Brittlebank and colleagues found that 
OGM in a sample of 22 depressed patients predicted the persistence of depression at 
7-month follow-up (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993). Similar findings were 
obtained by Peeters et al. (2002) and by Raes et al. (2006). This suggests the 
possibility of a causal association. A specifically targeted intervention, Memory 
Specificity Training (MEST), has shown promising effects in a preliminary 
investigation with depressed inpatients (Raes et al., 2009). 
 
3.5 Responses to distress 
Both Teasdale’s and Williams’ theories have drawn on aspects of Susan Nolen-
Hoeksema’s work on rumination. The Response Styles Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991) concerns a person’s responses to low mood, and how these can affect its 
subsequent course. Some people might respond to low mood by suppressing the 
thought of it, some by distracting themselves with activities, some might seek social 
support, and some might ruminate on the aversive state.  
 
3.5.1 Rumination 
Rumination has been defined as “repetitive and passive thinking about one’s 
symptoms of depression and the possible causes and consequences of these 
symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination is related to worry, in that both 
constructs involve a repetitive negative thought process, but they vary in content: 
worry anticipates future threat, while rumination is more closely related to past loss 
and failure (Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Watkins, Moulds, & 
Mackintosh, 2005). Rumination is usually more closely associated with depression, 
and worry with anxiety (McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007). 
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The tendency to ruminate in response to distress appears to be a relatively stable 
individual difference characteristic (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; 
Just & Alloy, 1997). It is typically measured by questionnaire, for example the 
Ruminative Response Scale of the Response Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1991; Just & Alloy, 1997) or the Rumination on Sadness Scale (Conway, 
Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000). The Response Styles Theory proposes that rumination 
prolongs episodes of depression by amplifying the effects of low mood on negative 
thinking and allowing depression to interfere with problem solving and instrumental 
behaviour (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Prospective studies show that a ruminative 
response style predicts the onset of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994; Spasojeviç & Alloy, 2001). Rumination can 
also predict both the severity and duration of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). 
For example, Raes et al. (2006) found that rumination in a sample of 28 depressed 
patients was a significant predictor of depression severity 7 months later, even after 
controlling for baseline depression severity. 
 
A ruminative thinking style can be induced experimentally in the short term, which 
negatively affects mood (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). 
Rumination-focused cognitive behavioural therapy, developed to target this process in 
the long term, has demonstrated encouraging preliminary results in a case series of 
14 individuals with treatment-refractory residual depression (Watkins et al., 2007). 
Rumination reduced significantly following up to 12 sessions of therapy, and 50% of 
the patients treated achieved full remission (defined as a score below 8 on the HRSD 
at termination and below 9 on the BDI for 4 consecutive weeks). 
 
3.5.2 Avoidance 
Avoidance of several kinds has been implicated in the persistence of depression. 
Moore & Garland (2003) distinguished three types. 
1. Behavioural avoidance. Avoidance of activities can be manifest as gross 
withdrawal, or in more subtle forms such as avoidance of deviation from a routine.  
2. Cognitive avoidance. This relates to unwanted thoughts, memories or 
discussions of particular situations. 
3. Emotional avoidance, of painful affect.  
 
Behavioural avoidance was the first of these to receive much attention in the literature  
(Mowrer, 1939) as a mechanism by which access to environmental reinforcers, which 
might usually have alleviated a transient state of depression, becomes restricted, 
perpetuating a pathologically low mood state. Behavioural Activation therapy 
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(Lewinsohn, Antonuccio, Steinmetz, & Teri, 1984) was developed to correct this loss 
of positive reinforcement, and to this day shows positive effects on people with 
depression which some argue are equivalent to the efficacy of more complex 
cognitive therapy packages (Jacobson & Gortner, 2000). Leventhal (2008) argued the 
case that avoidance behaviour is the central cause of the transformation from 
“normal” states of sadness to pathological depression.  
 
The internal forms of avoidance described by Moore & Garland can be subsumed 
under the construct of “experiential avoidance” proposed by Steve Hayes (Hayes, 
Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Experiential avoidance is defined as “the 
phenomenon that occurs when a person is unwilling to remain in contact with 
particular private experiences (e.g. bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, 
behavioural predispositions) and takes steps to alter the form or frequency of these 
events and the contexts that occasion them, even when these forms of avoidance 
cause behavioural harm” (Hayes et al., 2004; Hayes et al., 1996). Bringing together 
the findings from studies totalling 1068 mental health service users and 1347 
university students, Hayes et al. (2004) report that higher levels of experiential 
avoidance were associated with higher levels of both depression and anxiety, as well 
as trauma, general psychopathology and a lower quality of life. These associations 
have been widely replicated in general population samples and groups with affective 
disorders (see Chawla & Ostafin (2007) for a review). Acceptance and commitment 
therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) is one of a number of “third wave” 
psychological treatments that explicitly targets avoidance (Hayes, Jacobson, Follette, 
& Dougher, 1994), and this approach has shown significant positive impact on 
depression in trials (Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans, & Geller, 2007; Zettle & 
Rains, 1989). 
 
3.6 Theoretical integration 
The cognitive processes invoked in the accounts above are consistently shown to be 
interrelated, and can comprise a multifactorial dynamic account of the persistence of 
symptoms in depression. Mark Williams proposed the Capture and Rumination, 
Functional Avoidance and eXecutive control model (CaR-FA-X; Williams, 2006) to 
integrate the overgeneral memory bias phenomenon within a framework of related 
processes, including difficult experiences, functional avoidance, ruminative thinking 
and problem solving difficulties. A diagram of the model is reproduced in Figure 3.1. 
  Chapter 3 
  Page 65 
 
Figure 3.1. The CaR-FA-X model, reproduced from Williams (2006). 
 
The construct of functional avoidance invoked here is very similar to Hayes’ 
description of experiential avoidance: functional avoidance is the process whereby 
individuals avoid re-experiencing specific painful memories of negative past events 
because of the distress that they cause. Williams describes a process of memory 
retrieval in which the search for a specific episode gets truncated at an intermediate 
(overgeneral) stage. This truncation is reinforced as it serves to avoid the negative 
affect associated with specific bad memories. In this way “functional avoidance” 
connects negative cognitive content (as emphasised by Beck and Teasdale) with the 
development of an enduring overgenerality in autobiographical memory. Ruminative 
processing can “capture” the retrieval process at this intermediate abstract-conceptual 
level, further decreasing the likelihood of a specific memory being retrieved. The 
capacity for executive control affects the individual’s ability to remain focused on 
retrieval in the face of distraction.  
 
Consistent with the CaRFAX model, it has been shown that autobiographical memory 
task performance correlates with scores on measures of avoidant coping (Hermans, 
Defranc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen, 2005), rumination (Raes et al., 2005) and executive 
control (Dalgleish et al., 2007). Further, experimental studies have shown that 
induction of a ruminative thinking style reduces memory specificity, both in depressed 
patients (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) and in students 
(Raes, Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2008). Rumination also impairs effective 
problem solving (Donaldson & Lam, 2004). Interference with problem solving ability is 
a common pathway by which all of the theories outlined above propose that 
depressive cognitive biases exert their effects on symptom persistence (Beck, 1976; 
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Teasdale, 1988; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Williams, 2007). Problem solving difficulties 
are thought to perpetuate dysfunction by impairing instrumental behaviours and 
leading the individual into unhelpful situations. 
 
3.6.1 Problem solving difficulties 
Depressed people often have difficulty in solving interpersonal problems (Beck, 1976). 
Marx et al. (1992) established that patients with depression perform more poorly than 
healthy controls on a measure of social problem solving cognition, the Means-Ends 
Problem Solving task (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975). In this task, participants are 
presented with the beginning and the end of each of a set of stories. Each beginning 
describes the protagonist with a particular need, and each ending shows the need 
having been met. The task requires the participant to provide the middle of the story, 
in the form of a sequence of means. Responses are scored on the number of relevant 
means produced and the overall effectiveness of the solution.  
 
Poor problem solving performance is not specific to depression: in Marx et al.’s (1992) 
study, a group of anxious patients also performed more poorly than controls. The 
problem solving deficit measured by the MEPS may be a general psychopathological 
marker. Platt & Spivack’s early studies described MEPS deficits in a mixed group of 
psychiatric inpatients dominated by people with psychotic disorders (Platt & Spivack, 
1972a; Platt & Spivack, 1972b). 
 
Problem solving performance prospectively predicts recovery from depression. For 
example, Garland et al. (2000) found that problem solving performance predicted 3-
month and 6-month prognosis in a group of 20 depressed patients. Problem solving 
therapy focuses on training in adaptive problem solving attitudes and skills. A recent 
meta-analysis of studies with 21 independent samples concluded that problem solving 
therapy is significantly more effective in reducing depressive symptoms than no 
treatment or support groups, and equally as effective as other psychological therapies 
or medication (Bell & D'Zurilla, 2009). 
 
3.6.2 Summarising empirically supported cognitive factors in 
depression persistence 
Several features stand out in the literature as reliably associated with symptom 
persistence in depression, and also as promising therapeutic targets where 
intervention might interrupt the vicious cycle of dysfunction. These are: depressogenic 
cognitive content, in the form of negative memories, dysfunctional beliefs and 
attitudes; an overly general bias in autobiographical memory; the tendency to 
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ruminate in response to distress; avoidance; and difficulties with interpersonal 
problem solving. In conceptualising ways in which coexisting depression might lead to 
the persistence of psychotic symptoms such as delusions, these cognitive features 
are potentially relevant. In the next chapter, existing evidence will be reviewed for the 
associations of these depression related cognitive factors with psychosis, and the 
case will be examined for a systematic investigation of the role that these processes 
might play in the maintenance of persecutory delusions. 
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Chapter 4. Depression related cognitive processes 
and persecutory delusion persistence 
 
The previous chapter identified cognitive constructs that stand out in the literature as 
linked with the persistence of depression. These processes have not yet been 
investigated together in a group of people with persecutory delusions, although 
several have been examined individually, with some evidence suggesting causal 
effects. The research concerning depression-related cognitive factors in people with 
persecutory delusions is summarised in this chapter, which concludes with a 
proposed framework for their interactive roles in the maintenance of distressing threat 
beliefs.  
 
4.1 Schematic beliefs 
Negative core beliefs about the self and others have been emphasised in recent 
cognitive models of persecutory delusions (Bentall et al., 2001; Bentall & Swarbrick, 
2003; Freeman et al., 2002). Persecutory delusions have been argued to relate to 
such beliefs (e.g. “I am vulnerable”; “other people are devious”) in a direct and non-
defensive way (Smith et al., 2006; Freeman et al., 2002). Research by Freeman, 
Fowler and colleagues has been consistent with this proposal. Fowler et al. (2006) 
found that a sample of 252 people with psychosis endorsed significantly more 
negative schematic beliefs both about self and about others than a non-clinical control 
group. In a related study, employing an overlapping sample, Smith et al. (2006) found, 
among a sample of 100 psychosis patients, that those endorsing more negative 
beliefs about self and others had persecutory delusions of greater severity and were 
more preoccupied and more distressed by them than those endorsing less negative 
beliefs.  
 
Fowler et al. (2011) extended these cross-sectional findings, using structural equation 
modelling to examine the longitudinal relationships between negative cognition, 
depression and paranoia over a year in 301 people with psychosis. Models where the 
direction of effect went from negative cognition and depression to paranoia were 
found to fit the data significantly better than models in which paranoia led to negative 
cognition and depression, suggesting that paranoia is causally affected by these 
processes. The “negative cognition” factor used here was a combination of the 
“negative beliefs about self” subscale of the Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS; Fowler 
et al., 2006) and the negative cognition subscale of the Beck Depression Inventory 
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(BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), but the authors reported that using only BCSS 
items for the negative cognition factor produced the same pattern of results. 
 
A contrasting view is that persecutory ideation is the result of defence mechanisms 
acting to preserve fragile self esteem (Bentall et al., 1994). People with persecutory 
delusions show an externalising attributional bias for negative events, particularly 
towards blaming other people for bad things happening (reviewed in Bentall et al., 
2001; Garety & Freeman, 1999). However, Bentall and colleagues’ proposal that this 
attributional bias functions to protect self esteem, camouflaging implicit negative 
beliefs about the self with explicit normal ones by deflecting the blame for negative 
events onto others (Bentall et al., 1994; Bentall & Kaney, 1996), has been 
controversial. A defence account would be consistent with relatively high or normal 
levels of self esteem in patients, whereas low self esteem has frequently been 
reported (e.g. Bentall et al., 2008; Fowler et al., 2011; Freeman et al., 1998). Garety & 
Freeman’s comprehensive review (1999) also failed to find consistent support for 
implicit-explicit self esteem discrepancies in paranoid individuals. These mixed 
findings may have to do with difficulty in reliably measuring self esteem, particularly 
implicit self esteem, or it may be that self esteem is particularly variable over time in 
people with persecutory delusions (Bentall et al., 2001). Whether or not defensive 
processes are invoked, these theories agree on the importance of negative appraisals 
of the self in driving paranoid thinking. 
 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, several trials have used self esteem 
interventions for people with psychosis (Hall & Tarrier, 2003; Knight et al., 2006; 
Laithwaite et al., 2009; Laithwaite et al., 2007), and most of these achieved concurrent 
reductions in depression and in positive psychotic symptoms. This convergent 
evidence supports the proposal that negative beliefs about the self can contribute to 
the persistence both of depression and of delusional persecutory beliefs. 
 
4.1.1 Developmental origins of schematic beliefs 
Schematic belief structures are thought to mediate the effect of early adverse life 
experiences on the later development of psychopathology. It is well established that 
early loss and trauma events predict the development of later emotional and 
psychological problems, including affective disorders and psychosis (e.g. Cirulli, 
Berry, & Alleva, 2001; Read, Perry, Moskowitz, & Connolly, 2001; Heim, Owens, 
Plotsky, & Nemeroff, 1997). However, most individuals who have adverse 
experiences in childhood do not go on to develop significant psychopathology: 
adversity is not a sufficient condition. In those who do, it is thought that the experience 
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of poor attachment relationships is internalised and carried forward into adulthood in 
the form of internal representational models which go on to influence maladaptive 
behaviour, increasing vulnerability to adult psychopathology (Bowlby, 1988).  
 
The formulation of mental models of the self and others given in the developmental 
attachment literature can be seen as equivalent to the construct of schematic beliefs 
such as are measured by Fowler’s Brief Core Schema Scales, which have shown a 
strong association with persecutory ideation (Fowler et al., 2006; Fowler et al., 2011). 
The conceptualisation of internal working models put forward in the attachment 
literature is distinguished from Beck’s original description of the schema concept in 
that it reflects “more motivated and affectively charged constructs, representing 
emotional states associated with interpersonal relationships as well as beliefs” (Berry, 
Barrowclough, & Wearden, 2007, p. 465). The broad developmental perspective of 
attachment theory can be helpful in conceptualising the interactive contributions of 
cognitive, affective and interpersonal factors to the persistence of symptoms such as 
paranoia. 
 
4.1.2 Attachment theory and psychosis 
A long-established body of research on infants has demonstrated that the majority 
very quickly (within the first year of life) develop one of three broad patterns of 
attachment behaviour towards a primary caregiver: secure attachment, insecure 
ambivalent attachment, or insecure avoidant attachment (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, 
& Wall, 1978). Secure infants use the primary caregiver as a base for exploration, 
show signs of missing the caregiver when parted, and are comforted readily when the 
caregiver returns. Insecure ambivalent infants are often too fretful to explore, become 
very unsettled when parted from the primary caregiver, and show anger or excessive 
distress when reunited. Insecure avoidant infants explore readily, show little sign of 
distress when parted from the caregiver, and actively avoid contact upon the 
caregiver’s return. Attachment styles tend to be relatively stable throughout an 
individual’s life, and appear to transmit through generations (Waters, Merrick, 
Treboux, Crowell, & Albersheim, 2000; Benoit & Parker, 1994). Securely attached 
children are likely to become autonomous adults, while ambivalent children develop 
preoccupied or enmeshed adult attachment behaviours, and avoidant infants grow up 
to be dismissive of attachment.  
 
Groups of people with psychosis (including chronic and first episode samples) show a 
high rate of insecure attachment styles (Dozier, Cue, & Barnett, 1994; Couture, 
Lecomte, & Leclerc, 2007; Dozier & Lee, 1995; Dozier, Stevenson, Lee, & Velligan, 
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1991), particularly of the avoidant type (MacBeth, Gumley, Schwannauer, & Fisher, 
2011; Ponizovsky, Nechamkin, & Rosca, 2007; Berry, Barrowclough, & Wearden, 
2008) (reviewed in Berry et al., 2007; Read & Gumley, 2008). Data are scarce 
regarding specific relationships of attachment styles with individual symptoms, but 
there is some evidence of a significant association between insecure attachment and 
paranoia (Berry, Wearden, Barrowclough, & Liversidge, 2006; Berry et al., 2008; 
MacBeth, Schwannauer, & Gumley, 2008). It has mostly been reported that insecure 
attachments are associated with a broad range of symptoms, but a recent analogue 
study (Pickering, Simpson, & Bentall, 2008) found among 503 students that an 
insecure attachment style specifically predicted paranoia, not hallucinations. It has 
been proposed that insecure attachment can lead to paranoia and interpersonal 
distrust via underdeveloped capacities to self-soothe, to attune to the mental states of 
others and to reflect on one’s own affective experience, and through the use of 
submissive/subordination or dominant interpersonal strategies (Gumley & 
Schwannauer, 2006).  
 
4.2 Avoidance 
Moore & Garland (2003) distinguished behavioural, cognitive and affective forms of 
avoidance in relation to persistent depression. Each of these has been examined, 
albeit to a lesser extent, in people with psychosis. 
 
4.2.1 Behavioural avoidance 
Behavioural avoidance, as a safety-seeking behaviour, is known to be very common 
in people with persecutory delusions. Freeman et al. (2001) found that 23 out of 25 
participants with persecutory delusions had used the strategy of avoidance in the last 
month, and Freeman et al. (2007) similarly found this for 78 out of 100 participants. It 
is hypothesised that avoidance and other related safety behaviours, such as escape 
from situations of perceived threat, contribute to the persistence of delusional beliefs 
by preventing contact with disconfirmatory evidence: if you avoid or always escape 
from a feared situation, you are unlikely to find out that it might actually be harmless 
(Freeman, 2007). This formulation was influenced by cognitive accounts of the 
persistence of anxiety disorders (e.g. Salkovskis, 1991), and behavioural avoidance 
has since become an established therapeutic target in the psychological treatment of 
persecutory delusions. 
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4.2.2 Experiential avoidance 
Cognitive and emotional avoidance, subsumed under the construct of experiential 
avoidance, has been conceptualised as a central process in the development and 
maintenance of psychological distress across the diagnostic spectrum (Hayes et al., 
2004), and recently this has received particular attention in relation to delusions and 
paranoia. Goldstone et al. (2011) found that experiential avoidance (EA) statistically 
fully mediated the cross-sectional relationship between life hassles and both delusions 
and delusional distress in a group of 100 people with psychosis, and that it also partly 
mediated this relationship in a non-clinical control group. Two more non-clinical 
studies have reported similar findings. Udachina et al. (2009) found with an 
experience sampling method that current high EA in subclinically paranoid students 
predicted subsequent increases in paranoia, even when previous paranoia was taken 
into account. Oliver et al. (2011) reported that among 700 university students, 
psychological flexibility – the direct inverse of EA, measured in the same way – 
moderated the association between negative schematic beliefs and delusional 
thinking (the association was also mediated by anxiety).  
 
4.2.3 Therapies targeting avoidance 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999), which targets EA 
specifically as a means of changing the way that clients relate to distressing 
experiences, has been applied to psychosis in three randomised controlled trials 
(Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006; Bach & Hayes, 2002; White et al., 2011). Findings 
included lower psychotic symptom believability after ACT compared to treatment as 
usual (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006), fewer hospital admissions 
(Bach & Hayes, 2002) or crisis contacts (White et al., 2011), more reductions in 
negative affect or depression (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006; White et al., 2011), in the 
distress associated with psychotic symptoms (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006) and in 
negative symptoms (White et al., 2011). Mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT; 
Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002) also seeks to reduce clients' avoidant struggle 
with symptoms, the focus here being non-judgmental awareness of experience. 
MBCT has established efficacy for relapse prevention and symptom reduction in 
recurrent depression (Teasdale et al., 2000; Helen Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Hofmann, 
Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Barnhofer et al., 2009), and recent evidence suggests that 
it can also benefit people with psychosis (Chadwick, Taylor, & Abba, 2005; Chadwick, 
Hughes, Russell, Russell, & Dagnan, 2009). These treatment studies add weight to 
the hypothesis that avoidance, as well as having a special relationship with 
depression, is also likely to be an important process in the pathological persistence of 
positive psychotic symptoms like delusions. 
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4.3 Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory (OGM) 
The overgeneral autobiographical memory effect has not been systematically 
investigated in relation to delusions, and the findings of the few relevant studies are 
inconsistent. Williams et al.’s (2007) comprehensive review of research concerning 
autobiographical memory specificity and emotional disorder found the strongest links 
of OGM with depression and with trauma, but also included a study of people with 
persecutory delusions (Kaney, Bowen-Jones, & Bentall, 1999) and another of post-
psychotic depression (Iqbal, Birchwood, Hemsley, Jackson, & Morris, 2004). Kaney et 
al. (1999) compared the autobiographical memory task (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 
1986) performance of 20 inpatients with delusions, 20 depressed outpatients and 20 
non-clinical controls, hypothesising that people with delusions would show similar 
information processing biases to those who are depressed. The delusions group did 
show an overgeneral memory bias compared to controls, but surprisingly, the 
depressed group in this study did not show a statistically significant OGM effect. This 
finding is difficult to interpret. Given that this was the first study of OGM in people with 
persecutory delusions, the results might indicate that the memory bias is even 
stronger in this group than in people with non-psychotic major depression. However, 
the contribution of comorbid depression in the delusions group was not investigated in 
relation to OGM.  These 20 patients had an average BDI of 14.7 (in the “mild 
depression” range) with a standard deviation of 9.57, and the authors report no 
analysis of the relationship between BDI scores and AMT performance. The OGM 
effect may or may not have been related to comorbid depression, or, as the authors 
suggest, to trauma history.  
 
Iqbal et al.’s (2004) study concerned post-psychotic depression occurring in the wake 
of a first psychotic episode. They compared 13 first-episode patients who had 
developed this form of depression to a group of 16 who had not, and found that the 
depressed group produced fewer specific memories on the AMT. The nature of the 
participants’ psychotic symptoms at the time of testing was not reported. Taylor et al 
(2010)  recently reported the counterintuitive finding that among a group of 60 people 
with schizophrenia, a history of suicide attempts was associated with good 
performance on the AMT – specific memories. Notably, this effect was observed when 
adjusting for depression and trait anxiety: suicide attempts are associated with 
memory specificity within a particular level of affective disturbance. The authors 
propose that memory overgenerality may serve a protective function for people with 
psychosis in restricting access to the content of painful experiences. Any association 
between OGM and depression within the group was not reported. The study also, like 
Iqbal et al. (2004), did not report on the participants’ psychotic symptoms, so the 
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relevance of the findings to persecutory delusions is questionable. A more thorough 
investigation of the potential role of OGM in delusion persistence should pay due 
attention to its strong association with potentially coexisting depression. 
 
4.4 Rumination and worry 
Rumination has hardly been examined in people with persecutory delusions, the only 
available report being of a pilot intervention study (Hepworth et al., 2011) targeting 
increased emotional processing. Significant reductions were found from pre- to post-
treatment in delusion severity, depression and worry, but the reduction in rumination 
was non-significant. The scores of the participants with delusions on the ruminative 
response scale (RRS) of the response styles questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991) were very high at both assessment points: mean scores were 58.58 
pre-therapy and 49.83 post-therapy. For comparison, Donaldson & Lam (2004) found 
mean RRS scores of 34.2 in a group of non-psychotic depressed patients and 14.2 
among non-clinical controls. 
 
Worry – a construct closely related to rumination, sharing the form of negative 
repetitive thought – has received some attention in people with persecutory delusions. 
Groups with persecutory delusions can have very high levels of worry, comparable to 
those seen in generalized anxiety disorder (Freeman & Garety, 1999; Bassett, 
Sperlinger, & Freeman, 2009). Levels of worry are associated with intensity of 
delusional distress (Morrison & Wells, 2007; Freeman & Garety, 1999), and worry has 
been shown to predict the persistence of delusions over time (Startup et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, a randomised controlled trial of a psychological intervention reducing 
worry in people with persecutory delusions also achieved significant reductions in 
delusional distress and a trend towards reductions in the frequency of paranoid 
thoughts (Foster et al., 2010).  
 
Hepworth et al. (2011) proposed that worry and rumination exert a negative impact on 
delusions through a detrimental impact on emotional processing. This pathway of 
effect through avoidance of emotional processing has been established in the context 
of depression and anxiety disorders (Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006; Watkins, 2004). 
Worry and rumination are dominated by verbal linguistic processing, which can 
prevent full activation of emotional responses (Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986) and 
thus interfere with habituation to the distressing content (Foa & Kozak, 1986). Both 
types of repetitive thinking are of interest with respect to their associations with 
delusion severity and persistence. 
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4.5 Problem solving Difficulties  
Poor problem solving performance is characteristic of people with depression, but is 
not specific to this disorder. The deficit measured by the Means-Ends Problem 
Solving task (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975) may be a general psychopathological 
marker. In Marx et al.’s (1992) study, for example, both groups of depressed and 
anxious patients performed more poorly than controls. Notably, Platt & Spivack’s early 
studies described MEPS deficits in a mixed group of psychiatric inpatients dominated 
by people with psychotic disorders (Platt & Spivack, 1972a; Platt & Spivack, 1972b). 
There is also some evidence that problem solving therapy (Bell & D'Zurilla, 2009) can 
lead to improvements in psychotic symptoms (Tarrier et al., 1993), though a specific 
relationship with persecutory delusions has not been investigated. 
 
Mark Williams’ CaRFAX model (Williams, 2006), as described in the previous chapter, 
conceptualises problem solving difficulties as a common mediator through which more 
specific cognitive factors such as memory bias can exert their effects on symptom 
persistence. It is likely that cognitive processes independent of affect can also impair 
problem solving performance. The CaRFAX model acknowledges here the 
contribution of overall executive capacity (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Dalgleish et al., 
2007). No associations have been found between performance on the MEPS and IQ 
in groups of depressed and non-depressed students (Gotlib & Asarnow, 1979), but it 
remains possible that this relationship could exist in people with delusions.  
 
Particular psychosis-related cognitive features may also be relevant to the problem 
solving performace of groups of people with persecutory delusions. The “jumping to 
conclusions” (JTC) reasoning bias (Garety et al., 1991) is a data gathering bias 
whereby individuals seek fewer pieces of evidence than control groups would before 
coming to accept a given belief. JTC is reliably found in people with persecutory 
delusions (e.g. Startup et al., 2008; Corcoran et al., 2008), and is relatively 
independent of affect (Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007; So, Freeman, & Garety, 
2008): this reasoning bias is thought to contribute to delusional severity independently 
of the influence of emotional dysregulation (Garety et al., 2005). The relationship 
between JTC and social problem solving performance has yet to be systematically 
examined. 
 
4.6 Theoretical integration 
Freeman et al.’s (2002) model, as described in Chapter 1, explicitly implicated 
depression related cognitive factors in the persistence of persecutory delusions, via 
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the gathering of biased evidence to support the threat belief, but details of the specific 
processes involved and the mechanisms of their effects have so far been unclear. The 
preceding chapter reviewed the systematic body of work conducted in the field of 
depression by Mark Williams’ research group, and others, regarding cognitive 
mechanisms of symptom persistence, and in the present chapter, insights from 
depression research were applied to elaborating our understanding of the key 
transferable cognitive features that might also influence the persistence of persecutory 
delusions. 
  
Williams' (2006) CaRFAX model of depression persistence, as introduced in Chapter 
3, describes a number of specific biased cognitive processes and a framework 
conceptualising their maladaptive effects via difficulties in social problem solving. 
Figure 4.1 depicts a hypothetical hybrid model, in which the details of these cognitive 
processes and their effects, as described in the depression literature, are applied to 
flesh out the part of Freeman et al's (2002) model that concerns the effect of 
depressive cognitive factors on the gathering of evidence to support threat beliefs 
(which is hypothesised to contribute to their persistence over time).  
 
The framework depicted in Figure 4.1 is specifically concerned with features that are 
known to be related to depression; factors that are relatively independent of affect, 
such as executive capacity and JTC, are not included here. Negative schematic 
beliefs are thought to develop through difficult early experiences; they are relatively 
stable, and by their unpleasant nature can provoke maladaptive coping responses 
such as rumination and/or avoidance. These response strategies prevent contact with 
specific details of lived experience, and thus can result in an overgeneral 
autobiographical memory bias. Effective social problem solving is impaired by the 
scarcity of specific information accessible in memory, as well as by avoidance of 
certain experiences and by ruminative preoccupation of thought. Poor problem solving 
is likely to increase the occurrence of negative experiences, which can reinforce the 
threat belief, ruminative thinking may cause the over-representation of negative 
thoughts through repetition, and an overgeneral style of memory could reinforce the 
rigidity of the belief by failing to retain the nuances of specific events. Thus it is 
plausible that the same processes that maintain depression could also contribute to 
the persistence of distressing persecutory delusions. 
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Figure 4.1. An integrated model of how depression-related cognitive factors might 
contribute to the persistence of persecutory delusions over time. 
 
4.7 Summary 
Compelling evidence exists that negative schematic beliefs predict the persistence of 
persecutory delusions over time, as they do with depression. In order to expand our 
understanding of the way that depressive cognitive factors might contribute to the 
maintenance of distressing persecutory beliefs, it will be helpful to apply the more 
detailed insights collected in the field of affective disorder to researching the cognitive 
maintenance mechanisms of paranoid beliefs.  
 
Having reviewed the evidence connecting depressive cognition with delusions, a 
hybrid framework was put forward combining Williams’ (2006) cognitive model of 
depression and Freeman et al.’s (2002) model of persecutory delusion persistence. 
As suggested by the broader scope of Freeman et al.’s original model, other factors 
than those reviewed here are also likely to contribute to the maintenance of threat 
beliefs. Some of these might be related to anxiety, which is very often concurrent with 
psychosis (Freeman & Garety, 1999) as well as with depression (Kaufman & Charney, 
  Chapter 4 
  Page 78 
2000; Brady & Kendall, 1992). The novel empirical investigation of persecutory 
delusion persistence that is described in the following chapters will focus on cognitive 
processes related to depression, but measures of several other previously researched 
contributing factors will also be included, so that their relative effects can be observed 
within a single paradigm.
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Chapter 5. Aims and methods of the present 
investigation 
 
Findings linking depression with the persistence of persecutory delusions have 
supported the role of negative schematic beliefs in the maintenance of persecutory 
fears. Other depression related cognitive factors have scarcely been investigated in 
this population, and some findings have been difficult to interpret; for example, where 
the respective levels of depressive and psychotic symptoms in the studied participant 
groups were not systematically reported. The present investigation therefore sought to 
assess longitudinally the severity and persistence of persecutory delusions and of 
depression in a group of people with psychosis, and to examine the relationship 
between the cognitive factors identified in the previous chapter and the persistence of 
certain clinical symptoms. In order to allow comparisons to be made with findings from 
the depression literature, a group of participants with non-psychotic depression and a 
non-clinical control group were also included. 
 
5.1  Main aims 
1. To determine whether depression in people with persecutory delusions is 
associated with the same cognitive factors implicated in major depressive disorder: 
negative schematic beliefs, experiential avoidance, rumination, overly general 
autobiographical memory and problem solving difficulties. 
 
2. To examine depression and depression-related cognitive factors as predictors 
of the persistence of persecutory delusions over time. 
 
5.2 Design 
Figure 5.1 summarises the experimental design. A group of people with persecutory 
delusions in the context of functional psychosis was recruited, and a comprehensive 
clinical interview assessment was used to determine which of these individuals would 
also meet diagnostic criteria for a current major depressive episode. This classification 
was used to split the group into two: a subgroup of people with delusions with 
concurrent depression, and a subgroup of people with delusions without concurrent 
depression.  
 
In order to address the first aim of this investigation - to determine whether depression 
in people with persecutory delusions is associated with the same cognitive factors 
  Chapter 5 
  Page 80 
implicated in major depressive disorder - the two subgroups of people with delusions 
(with and without depression) were asked to complete measures of schematic beliefs, 
experiential avoidance, rumination, autobiographical memory specificity and problem 
solving. The scores of the two subgroups were then compared, to examine which 
cognitive features might accompany depression specifically, when it occurs alongside 
persecutory delusions. In order that comparisons could be drawn with previously 
documented cognitive features of major depressive disorder, the same measures 
were administered to a group of people with non-psychotic depression and a non-
clinical control group. 
 
A prospective follow-up assessment was included to address the second aim of the 
project. All participants with delusions were re-assessed after six months (where 
possible), so that depression and associated cognitive factors could be tested as 
predictors of change in delusion severity over the follow-up period. Six months was 
chosen as a practically feasible follow-up period, intermediate in relation to other 
known longitudinal studies using similar participants and measures (Startup et al., 
2007, three months; Green et al., 2008, six months; Fowler et al., 2011, 12 months; 
Drake et al., 2004, 18 months).  
 
For the purposes of analysis, the cross-sectional and longitudinal components of the 
investigation will be treated separately, as Study One and Study Two.  
 
Study One: cross-sectional       Study Two: longitudinal 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Design of the two linked studies. 
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5.3 Hypotheses 
Each of the two studies had one main hypothesis, the evaluation of which was 
augmented by the testing of several secondary hypotheses. Secondary hypotheses 
concerned replicating previous findings and relating the results of the main analysis to 
them. Following the findings of previous research studies, it was expected that some 
cognitive factors would show specific associations with depression or with delusions, 
while other features would be elevated in all groups with significant psychopathology. 
The longitudinal analyses aimed to replicate the finding, observed in Chapter 2, that 
concurrent depression in groups with psychosis predicts the persistence of positive 
symptoms − focussing here explicitly on persecutory delusions – and to examine the 
possible cognitive mechanisms underlying this association. 
 
5.3.1 Study One: cross-sectional 
1. It was hypothesised that between 25% and 75% of participants with delusions 
would meet diagnostic criteria for major depression, so that the depressed and non-
depressed subgroups would both be large enough for adequately powered 
comparisons to be made.  
 
2. The primary hypothesis of Study One was that those among the delusions 
group who were found to be concurrently depressed, when compared to those who 
were not depressed, would show a pattern of cognitive features that has previously 
been linked with major depressive disorder: 
• more negative schematic beliefs; 
• more experiential avoidance; 
• higher levels of rumination; 
• less specific autobiographical memory;  
• poorer problem solving performance. 
In recognition of the continuous distribution of depression, the dimensional 
relationships between scores on these cognitive variables and depression severity 
were also examined within the combined delusions group. 
 
The following secondary hypotheses related to additional analyses undertaken to 
contextualise the study’s main findings in relation to the existing literature.  
 
3. Depressed patients without delusions will show the same pattern of cognitive 
features described above when compared to non-clinical controls, replicating the 
findings of previous published studies. 
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4. Each of the clinical groups will show more negative schematic beliefs, higher 
levels of worry and poorer problem-solving performance than the non-clinical control 
group. 
 
5. Participants with delusions will jump to conclusions more often than 
participants without delusions, irrespective of levels of depression. 
 
The relationship between jumping to conclusions and problem-solving performance 
was also examined. 
 
5.3.2 Study Two: longitudinal 
1. The primary hypothesis of Study Two was that initial levels of depression and 
related cognitive factors would predict the persistence of persecutory delusions 
prospectively over six months. 
 
2. It was also hypothesised that scores on depression-related cognitive factors 
would predict the persistence of depression after six months, in line with previous 
findings in the depression literature. 
 
The relationships between changes in symptom severity and changes in cognitive 
process variables were also examined. 
 
5.4 Ethical approval and research sites 
An application was made through the Integrated Research Applications System for 
review of the project (comprising both the cross-sectional and longitudinal studies) by 
an NHS Research Ethics Committee and by the R&D department of each of the four 
London NHS Trusts where recruitment would take place: the South London and 
Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, the Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust, 
the North East London NHS Foundation Trust and the Barnet, Enfield and Haringey 
Mental Health NHS Trust. The project was accepted into the NIHR portfolio. The 
Moorfields and Whittington NHS Research Ethics Committee reviewed the study and 
some amendments to the information sheets and consent forms were agreed. The 
committee declared a favourable opinion of the project (ref. 09/H0721/61). The R&D 
departments of the four NHS trusts also gave their approval for recruitment to go 
ahead. 
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A local collaborator was established at each site. Consultant psychiatrists, 
psychologists and team leaders of relevant community care teams were contacted to 
request their approval for recruitment of patients in their care, and presentations were 
made at team meetings to explain the project and to encourage referrals by nurses 
and social workers. Access was arranged to two registers of patients with an interest 
in research participation: the research register of the Social, Hope And Recovery 
Project (SHARP), in Lambeth, and the Psychological Intervention Clinic for oUt-
patients with Psychosis (PICUP) research register, based in Southwark.  
 
5.5 Participants   
Based on the power calculations reported at the end of this chapter, 60 participants 
were recruited with persecutory delusions, 30 with non-psychotic depression and 30 
non-clinical controls. Inclusion criteria are given for each group below.  
 
5.5.1 Delusions group 
Sixty patients were sought with current persecutory delusions as part of a 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorder: ICD-10 schizophrenia, delusional disorder or 
schizoaffective disorder. These inclusion criteria were chosen to mirror those used in 
other studies of persecutory delusions identified in the literature review, in order that 
the findings would be comparable.  
 
The definition of a persecutory delusion used in this study was that given by Freeman 
& Garety (2000), who gave two main criteria that a delusion must meet to be classified 
as persecutory: that the individual believes that harm is occurring, or is going to occur, 
to him or her, and that the individual believes that the persecutor has the intention to 
cause harm. 
 
Patients were recruited through inpatient and outpatient mental health services in four 
inner-city London NHS Trusts: the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation 
Trust, the Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust, the North East London NHS 
Foundation Trust and the Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust.  
 
Clinical care teams suggested the names of 197 people with psychosis for 
participation in the study, and the Participant Information Sheet was given to these 
individuals so that they could consider taking part. The experimenter spoke to 103 of 
these people, who had been happy for their contact details to be passed on. Of these 
103, 21 were not interested in participation or were too busy, eight were excluded 
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because they did not hold current persecutory beliefs, eight said they were willing to 
take part but lost contact before an appointment could be arranged, three initially 
wanted to take part but then changed their minds, two did not attend arranged 
appointments and subsequently lost contact, and one completed half of the 
assessment measures and did not want to continue. Sixty people with delusions 
consented and completed the first assessment. 
 
All of the study participants were outpatients at the time of assessment. 27 of the 60 
participants were recruited through community mental health services in the Barnet, 
Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust. 26 participants were recruited through 
the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, of whom four were contacted 
through the SHARP research register and three through the PICUP research register. 
Seven participants were recruited through services in the Camden and Islington NHS 
Foundation Trust. 
 
5.5.2 Depression group 
30 people with major depression and without any history of psychosis or bipolar 
affective disorder were sought through outpatient services in the NHS trusts listed 
above. Some participants were referred to the study by clinical team members, and 
some referred themselves after seeing posters that were displayed in the teams’ 
waiting rooms. Additionally, nine people who heard about the study through non-
clinical recruitment were significantly depressed at the time of contact, and were 
therefore included in this group. The SCAN clinical interview schedules (see section 
5.6.1) were used to confirm diagnoses and the absence of psychotic symptoms. All 
people with depression who were not already in contact with mental health services 
were given information about the ways that they could access support in their borough 
and online if they should like to do so. 
 
Clinical teams suggested the names of 12 people for participation in the study, and 
the Participant Information Sheet was given to these individuals so that they could 
consider taking part. The experimenter spoke to eight of these people, of whom one 
refused to take part, one was excluded because she had auditory hallucinations, and 
one lost contact before an appointment could be arranged. Five of the people 
suggested by teams completed the assessments. All of these were referred by 
services in the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, of whom two 
were contacted through the SHARP research register. 
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23 people contacted the study after seeing posters in waiting rooms. Two of these 
were excluded for having psychotic symptoms, four lost contact, one changed their 
mind about taking part and 16 completed the study assessments.  
 
Of the nine depressed people recruited who came into contact with the study through 
the non-clinical recruitment route, five had been re-contacted after participating in 
other research (Freeman et al., 2008; Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, & Southgate, 
2009; Freeman et al., 2010), and four had responded to posters seen around the local 
community.  The advertisement asked for people with no history of mental health 
problems, and individuals were not sure whether the levels of difficulty that they 
experienced would disqualify them from participation. Participants joined the 
depressed group after the SCAN was used to confirm that they met diagnostic criteria 
for major depression. The severity of depression in this group, as measured by the 
BDI, was not significantly different from that in the group recruited through clinical 
services (t(28) = -1.598, p = .12). 
 
5.5.3 Non-clinical control group 
Non-clinical control participants with no history of psychosis or of depression were 
sought through two routes. 115 people were re-contacted after having taken part in 
previous studies (Freeman et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2009; Freeman et al., 2010), 
for which they had volunteered after receiving a flyer in the post, and had declared an 
interest in further research participation. Additionally, leaflets were distributed in local 
community settings, including Camberwell Job Centre, Camberwell Library and local 
cafes. 
 
Interest was expressed in the study by 63 people, and telephone contact was 
established with 53 of them. Nine of these people were currently depressed, and were 
recruited into the depression group as described above. Six people were excluded 
from the study for having had a history of mental health problems (but no current 
depression), and eight people lost contact. 30 people consented to participate and 
completed the study assessments. 12 of these had been re-contacted after taking part 
in other studies, and 18 had initiated contact after seeing a poster locally. 
 
5.5.4 Common exclusion criteria for all groups 
Individuals were excluded from participation if they had any organic brain disorder or 
primary substance abuse disorder, or if they were unable to give informed consent, or 
possessed an insufficient grasp of the English language to complete the measures. 
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5.6 Materials  
5.6.1 Clinical symptom interviews 
Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN) version 2.1 (World 
Health Organisation, 1998).  
The SCAN 2.1 is a system of semi-structured clinician rated interview schedules for 
psychiatric diagnosis, developed by the World Health Organisation. At the core of the 
SCAN 2.1 is the Present State Examination, version 10.2 (PSE-10.2). Part 1 relates to 
disorders of mood or neurosis, and Part 2 covers psychotic and cognitive processes. 
Items are scored according to the intensity, frequency and duration of individual 
symptoms or experiences, which are cross-examined using definitions given in the 
glossary that accompanies the manual. The system permits classification of both 
current and lifetime psychiatric disorders according to DSM-IV or ICD-10 criteria. The 
computerized version, IShell, allows input of ratings as they are made throughout the 
interview, which can then undergo processing with the appropriate algorithms to 
produce a set of diagnoses. The SCAN is traditionally used by experienced clinicians, 
but it has been shown that even less experienced trained interviewers can administer 
it reliably (Rijnders et al., 2000). The present experimenter completed formal training 
in the use of the SCAN over 9th – 13th November 2009 at the WHO-accredited training 
centre at Nottingham University. 
 
In the current study, all sections of the SCAN 2.1 were included which are used in the 
assessment of schizophrenia spectrum disorders and of major depression. The 
diagnostic interviews were voice recorded for all participants who consented. The 
results of the SCAN interviews were used to verify participants’ clinical diagnoses. 
The main purpose of the interview was to establish which of the participants with 
delusions would also meet diagnostic criteria for concurrent depression: this 
classification was then used to split the group into two for comparison. A randomly 
selected 15 of the 60 participants with delusions’ depression interviews were re-rated 
by an independent assessor, blind to the other’s ratings, to establish the reliability of 
the experimenter’s diagnostic classifications. The second rater was also trained in use 
of the SCAN, and had wide experience in the assessment of people with 
psychopathology. The two raters produced the same diagnosis for all but one of these 
interviews: this participant was judged by the experimenter as meeting criteria for 
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Psychotic SYmptoms RATing Scales (PSYRATS; Haddock et al., 1999). The 
PSYRATS is a 17-item instrument rating delusions and hallucinations. Each item is 
given a rating from 0 to 4. The instrument has demonstrated very good inter-rater 
reliability (intra-class correlation coefficients ranging from 0.79 to 1.0) and test-retest 
reliability (intra-class correlation coefficient 0.70). Only the 6-item Delusions Scale 
was used here. These items relate to delusional conviction, preoccupation (frequency 
and duration), distress (frequency and intensity) and functional impairment.  
 
Four items were added to the PSYRATS Delusions Scale to enhance the resolution of 
the measurement of the main dimensions of interest and to explore the role of 
avoidance. Each was rated as a percentage from 0 to 100. The items were delusional 
conviction, delusional distress, the degree of effort used to avoid thinking about the 
belief, and the degree of success in avoiding thoughts about the belief. 
 
5.6.2 Clinical symptom questionnaires 
Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS; Green et al., 2008). The GPTS is a 32-
item self-report measure of paranoid thoughts over the last month, split into two parts. 
Part A assesses ideas of reference (e.g. “People have been dropping hints for me”) 
and Part B assesses ideas of persecution (e.g. “I was sure someone wanted to hurt 
me”). Each part contains subscales for conviction, preoccupation and distress related 
to paranoid thoughts. Items are rated on a 1-5 scale, with higher numbers indicating a 
greater level of paranoid thinking. This instrument was developed explicitly for 
consistency with Freeman & Garety’s (2000) definition of a persecutory delusion, and 
with the content of diagnostic questions used in the SCAN interview. Good internal 
consistency was shown in both patients with persecutory delusions (α = .90) and non-
clinical controls (α = .95). High test-retest reliability was also found (intra-class 
correlation coefficient = 0.87 over a two week interval). Convergent validity was 
supported by correlations with other questionnaire measures of paranoia and 
delusional ideation: the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and the Peters 
et al. Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 1999). An advantage of the GPTS is that it 
captures paranoia severity across the spectrum: people with delusions of persecution 
were found to score significantly more highly than non-clinical controls, but with 
overlap between the distributions, and widely ranging scores in each (32-149 in the 
non-clinical group; 32-160 in the delusions group). In those with persecutory 
delusions, subscale scores also showed appropriate associations with corresponding 
item scores on the PSYRATS interviewer-rated delusions scale (Haddock et al., 
1999), and clinical change over six months from baseline assessment was captured 
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by changes in scores that correlated significantly with PSYRATS change scores 
(Green et al., 2008).   
 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). The BDI is a 21-item self-report 
measure of the cognitive, affective and somatic symptoms of depression. It has shown 
good internal consistency (α = 0.84), moderate-high test-retest reliability (intra-class 
correlation coefficients from 0.48 to 0.86) and good concurrent validity with clinician-
rated measures of depression. When administered to groups of people with 
psychosis, the correlation of the BDI with the psychosis-specific Calgary Depression 
Scale for Schizophrenia (CDSS; Addington et al., 1993) has been reported as 
approaching unity: r = .91 (Birchwood et al., 2000).  
 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The BAI is a 21-
item self-report measure of the cognitive and physiological symptoms of anxiety. 
Participants rate the items (e.g. “Heart pounding or racing”; “Fear of losing control) 
according to how severely they have been bothered by each experience over the 
previous week (0 = not at all bothered, 1 = mildly, 2 = moderately, 3 = severely). The 
scale has demonstrated high internal consistency (α = 0.92) and test-retest reliability 
over a week (r – 0.75). 
 
5.6.3 Cognitive process questionnaires 
Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS; Fowler et al., 2006). The BCSS contain 4 
subscales of 6 items each scored on a 0-4 scale, which assess endorsement of 
beliefs in four categories: Positive Self, Negative Self, Positive Other and Negative 
Other. Higher scores indicate greater belief endorsement. These scales were 
developed with non-clinical and psychosis groups, where the subscales demonstrated 
high internal consistency (α between 0.78 - 0.88), good convergent and discriminant 
validity in relation to associated measures, and encouraging test-retest reliability over 
3 weeks (r between 0.70 - 0.84).  
 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). This 22-item questionnaire measures to what 
extent the participant generally responds to feeling sad, down or depressed by 
ruminating on his/her symptoms and the causes and consequences of these. Each 
item (e.g. “ Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better”) is rated on a 1-
4 frequency scale, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of rumination when 
distressed (1 = almost never; 4 = almost always). The scale has exhibited high 
internal consistency (α = 0.89) and high test-retest reliability over 5 months (r = 0.80). 
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Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). 
The PSWQ was developed to measure trait worry style, with an emphasis on clinically 
significant worry. Its 16 items refer to the generality of worry across situations (e.g. "I 
am always worrying about something"), the excessiveness of worry (e.g. "my worries 
overwhelm me"), and its uncontrollability (e.g. "I know I should not worry about things, 
but I just cannot help it"), which reflect the clinical characteristics of generalised 
anxiety disorder (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). Each item is rated on a 5-point scale (1-
5). Items 1, 3, 8, 10 and 11 are reverse scored (e.g. item 8: “I find it easy to dismiss 
worrisome thoughts"). Summed total scores can range from 16 to 80, with higher 
scores indicating a greater tendency to worry. The scale has demonstrated high 
internal consistency in clinical and nonclinical samples, with α values between 0.86 - 
0.95 (Van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999; Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & 
Borkovec, 1994; Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992). Good convergent and discriminant 
validity have also been shown with a large sample of anxiety disorder patients (Brown 
et al., 1992). 
 
Avoidance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004). This measure of 
experiential avoidance has 9 items (e.g. "if I could magically remove all the painful 
experiences I’ve had in my life, I would do so"), and the endorsement of each is rated 
on a 1-7 scale. Items 1, 4, 5 and 6 are reverse scored (e.g. item 5: "I’m not afraid of 
my feelings"). Summed total scores can then range from 9 - 63, with higher scores 
indicating greater experiential avoidance. The AAQ was designed to assess the 
tendency towards avoidant coping, independent of the specific content of the 
experiences that one currently avoids. Hayes et al. (2004) examined the scale's 
psychometric properties in a series of studies with over 2400 participants in total, 
reporting satisfactory internal consistency (α = 0.70) and four-month test-retest 
reliability (r = 0.64). 
 
5.6.4 Verbal cognitive tasks 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). The AMT is 
widely used to assess the specificity of episodic memories accessed by people with 
emotional disorders (Williams et al., 2007). This task requires participants to recall a 
specific autobiographical memory in response to each of a set of positive and 
negative cue words, presented orally and printed on cards. The instructions define an 
appropriate memory as “an event that lasted less than a day, and occurred at a 
particular time and place.” Three practice cues are used at first to confirm that the 
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participant understands the instructions. Positive and negative cue words are then 
alternated, and prompts are used when a participant fails to produce a specific 
response, up to a 60 second time limit for each cue. Memories produced are coded as 
either specific (e.g. "watching a film at the cinema last Saturday"), overgeneral-
categorical (e.g. "going to the cinema"), overgeneral-extended (e.g. "the first year of 
college"), semantic associate (not a memory, e.g. "that word reminds me of my 
sister") or no response. Research has mostly focused on the specificity of the first 
memory response given to each cue. The present protocol additionally recorded the 
specificity of the memories produced after further prompting, up to the 60s time limit. 
 
Williams & Broadbent's original (1986) task used five positive and five negative cue 
words presented in a fixed order: happy, sorry, safe, angry, interested, clumsy, 
successful, hurt, surprised and lonely. In the present study, six positive and six 
negative words were used in each of two alternate forms for assessment at the two 
time points. The same number of cues was used in a previous study of people with 
persecutory delusions (Kaney et al., 1999), and a higher number of words increases 
the probability that parametric analyses may be used. Cue words for the present study 
were selected from a pool used by Brittlebank et al. (1993), with the four sets of six 
words approximately matched according to emotionality ratings and Kucera-Francis 
frequency (Kucera & Francis, 1967). Negative and positive words were alternated with 
negative first, in order to end the procedure with a positive memory. The sets of words 
chosen for the alternate forms were as follows. 
 
Form A: tired, friendly, weakness, pleasant, guilty, proud, ugly, lucky, sad, carefree, 
mistake, calm. 
 
Form B: failure, happy, hurt, excited, bored, relieved, hopeless, peaceful, rejected, 
sunny, blame, hopeful. 
 
Means-Ends Problem-Solving procedure (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975). This task 
was devised as a broad measure of interpersonal problem-solving cognition. 
Participants are presented with the beginning and the end of each of a set of stories. 
Each beginning describes the protagonist in a situation with a particular need (e.g. 
having just moved into a new neighbourhood and wanting to make friends locally), 
and each ending shows the need having been met (e.g. the protagonist has many 
good friends and feels at home in the neighbourhood). The task requires the 
participant to provide the middle of the story, in the form of a sequence of means 
leading from the initial situation to the desired endpoint. Responses are then scored 
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on the number of “relevant means” (problem solving steps) produced, and on the 
overall effectiveness of the given solution. 
 
The specific administration and scoring procedure used in this study was based on 
that developed by Marx, Williams and Claridge (1992). The task instructions 
presented a clear problem solving set, asking participants to provide the ideal solution 
for each problem, and to describe it in very specific terms so that anybody could follow 
the plan of action. The experimenter read the stories to each participant. Participants 
followed the content on A4 cards, which had the beginning of the story printed on the 
top and the end on the bottom, with the middle part left blank to clarify visually that 
this section was to be filled in. Answers were taken down by the experimenter 
verbatim, and audio recorded where participants had consented. They were then 
scored on (1) the total number of distinct relevant problem solving steps produced and 
(2) the overall effectiveness of the solution from 1 to 7 (where 1 = not at all effective 
and 7 = extremely effective), following the guidance in Platt & Spivack’s original 
manual (Platt & Spivack, 1975).  The responses of the delusions group were re-
scored by an independent rater, a graduate psychologist blind to participants’ clinical 
status, so that inter-rater reliability could be calculated. Marx et al. (1992) found 
Pearson correlation coefficients between two raters of r = .82 for number of relevant 
means, and r = .86 for overall effectiveness. In the present study, the correlation 
coefficients between the two raters were calculated as r = .88 for number of relevant 
means and r = .84 for overall effectiveness, both p < .01. 
 
Marx et al. (1992) used four of Platt & Spivack’s original ten scenarios. These and two 
more of the originals were used in the present study, selected so that different 
interpersonal life areas would be represented, and divided into two alternate forms (of 
three scenarios each) for the two assessment time-points. The stories were presented 
in a fixed order. 
 
Beads task (Garety et al., 1991). This is a probabilistic reasoning task that has been 
used extensively with people with delusions (reviewed in Freeman, 2007; Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). Participants are invited to decide from which of two hidden jars 
coloured beads are being drawn. The jars contain beads of two colours mixed in 
reverse proportions, in this case 60 red beads and 40 white beads in one jar, 40 red 
beads and 60 white beads in the other. Beads are drawn one by one in a fixed order, 
and after each bead the participant can either decide on the source jar or request 
another piece of evidence (bead). The participants are informed that each bead is 
returned to the jar after it has been drawn, so that the proportions of beads always 
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remain the same. The key variable is the number of beads requested before a 
decision is made. If the participant does not choose to make a decision after 20 beads 
have been drawn, they are asked to decide at this point. The beads were drawn in the 
following order: 
 
White, Red, Red, White, White, Red, White, White, White, Red, White, White, White, 
White, Red, Red, White, Red, Red, White. 
 
In order to classify people who “jump to conclusions” in their data gathering style, the 
most common cut-off point used is two beads drawn or fewer (Garety et al., 2005). 
The first two beads in the above sequence contain one of each colour, and thus do 
not indicate a probability that one or other colour is dominant in the chosen jar. 
Decisions made after 2 beads or fewer were coded as JTC, and decisions after 3 
beads or more as not JTC. 
 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; Ginsberg, 2003). This instrument was 
developed and had norms established alongside the widely-used Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale - Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997), for the purpose of 
estimating the pre-morbid IQ (intelligence before possible cognitive decline or brain 
injury) of individuals aged 16 – 89 years old. Participants are required to read aloud a 
list of 50 words with irregular pronunciations. The number of correct responses is 
used in combination with the participant’s age to derive an estimate of pre-morbid 
intellectual functioning. 
 
Verbal fluency, or the FAS test (Benton & Hamsher, 1976).  Verbal fluency is 
considered a broad measure of executive control / working memory capacity. In 
Benton & Hamsher's task, participants were given 60 seconds on each of three trials 
to generate as many words as possible starting with the letter F, then A, then S, 
excluding proper nouns and repetitions of the same word stem with a different suffix. 
Verbal fluency was measured by the sum of valid words produced in the three trials. 
In the present study just one letter was used on each testing occasion, as has been 
considered sufficient by previous investigators (e.g. Dalgleish et al., 2007; Rosen & 
Engle, 1997). The letter S was used in the first assessment session, and the letter A 
was used in the second.  
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5.7 Procedure 
Table 5.1 summarises the measures used at the first and second assessment points.  
 
Measures at initial assessment 
Repeated at 
follow-up 
Clinical symptom questionnaires   
Q1      Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale Yes 
Q2      Beck Depression Inventory Yes 
Q3      Beck Anxiety Inventory No 
Clinical symptom interviews   
•       Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry No 
•       Psychotic SYmptoms RATing Scales: Delusions Scale Yes 
Cognitive process questionnaires   
Q4      Brief Core Schema Scales Yes 
Q5      Ruminative Response Scale Yes 
Q6      Penn State Worry Questionnaire Yes 
Q7      Avoidance and Acceptance Questionnaire Yes 
Verbal cognitive tasks   
T1      Autobiographical Memory Test Alternate form 
T2      Means-Ends Problem-Solving procedure Alternate form 
T3      Beads task No 
T4      Wechsler Test of Adult Reading No 
T5      FAS verbal fluency test Alternate form 
 
Table 5.1. Measures completed by participants with delusions at the first and second 
assessment points.  
The non-psychotic depressed participants and non-clinical controls completed the 
same measures, a single time, with the exception of the PSYRATS. 
 
5.7.1 Study One: cross-sectional 
At baseline, comprehensive assessments were made of persecutory delusions, 
depression and the cognitive factors of interest. Diagnoses and presence of 
persecutory delusions were confirmed using the interview Schedules for Clinical 
Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN) version 2.1 (World Health Organisation, 
1998). The SCAN depression schedule was used to divide patients with delusions into 
two subgroups: those who met ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for concurrent depression 
alongside their psychotic disorder in one subgroup, and in the other subgroup those 
who did not meet criteria for a depression diagnosis. The Psychotic SYmptoms 
RATing Scales (PSYRATS; Haddock et al., 1999) were also used to assess the 
current multidimensional severity of delusions. Alongside these established interview 
measures, participants completed a number of questionnaires and cognitive tasks 
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designed to measure the cognitive factors that were hypothesised to distinguish 
between groups. 
 
The groups of non-psychotic depressed people and non-clinical control participants 
completed the same assessments as the participants with delusions, with the 
exception of the PSYRATS. 
 
Assessments took place either at the Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London, or 
at the participant's care team base, with the exception of four participants, who were 
seen at home, because they had particularly strong fears about going outside and 
travelling by public transport. 
 
5.7.2 Study Two: longitudinal 
Six months after the first assessments, the participants in the delusions group were 
followed up for a repeat assessment of the main clinical and cognitive variables of 
interest.  
 
5.8 Missing data 
There were high completion rates of the measures, with minimal missing data. 
  
5.8.1 Study One: cross-sectional 
At first assessment there was 0.06% missing questionnaire data in total, excluding 
whole missed questionnaires, or 0.37% missing data if whole missing questionnaires 
were included in the calculation. 
 
5.8.1.1 Whole measures 
One participant in the delusions group did not complete the BAI or PSWQ or AAQ, 
due to some difficulty with the English language. This individual's WTAR score was 
also discarded as invalid. One further person in the delusions group did not complete 
AAQ due to comprehension difficulty, and one more did not complete the Beads task 
because of time constraints. One non-clinical participant did not complete the WTAR 
due to poor eyesight (she had completed the questionnaires at home using special 
magnifying equipment), and for one of the participants with delusions the standardised 
WTAR score could not be computed because he had not wanted to give his age. 
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5.8.1.2 Individual items 
On the PSYRATS (only administered to people in the delusions group), one person 
did not give a percentage figure for delusional distress. Another participant did not 
answer the "duration of preoccupation" item or the “conviction” item. 
 
Two people with delusions and one non-clinical participant each omitted one item of 
the GPTS. Data for the BDI and BAI were complete (except for the person who did not 
complete the whole BAI, as mentioned above). Four people with delusions each 
omitted one item of the BCSS. One depressed person omitted one item of the RRS. 
Two depressed people each omitted one item of the PSWQ. One person with 
delusions omitted one item of the AAQ.  
 
For the individual missing items of the GPTS, BCSS, RRS, PSWQ and AAQ, each 
omission was replaced with the participant's mean score from the other items on the 
scale (or subscale, in the case of the BCSS). This was done after the necessary 
items’ scores had been reversed in the PSWQ and AAQ. 
 
5.8.2 Study Two: longitudinal 
Of the 60 participants in the delusions group, six did not complete the second 
assessment. Two of these no longer wanted to participate, two could not be 
contacted, and two wanted to participate but were not able to attend an appointment 
in the necessary time before the end of data collection. The participants who 
completed the second assessment did not differ significantly from those who did not in 
baseline depression (BDI: t(58) = .92, p = .36) or paranoia (GPTS: t(58) = -.55, p = 
.59) scores. 
 
Among the 90% of participants who did complete the second assessment, there was 
a total of 0.07% missing questionnaire data, excluding whole missed questionnaires, 
or 0.70% missing data if whole missing questionnaires were included in the 
calculation.  
 
5.8.2.1 Whole measures 
Of the 54 participants who took part in the second assessment, one did not complete 
the PSWQ or AAQ due to English language difficulty, and two more did not complete 
the AAQ (one due to comprehension difficulty, one due to time constraints). 
 
  Chapter 5 
  Page 96 
5.8.2.2 Individual items 
On the PSYRATS, one participant did not give a figure for how successful they were 
at avoiding thinking about the belief, as they no longer believed it to be true and never 
thought about it. One more participant did not give a percentage figure for the intensity 
of delusional distress. 
 
One participant omitted one item of the BCSS, one person omitted an item of the 
RRS, one person omitted one item of the PSWQ, and two people omitted one item 
each of the AAQ. These individual missing values were replaced with participants’ 
scale or subscale means, as described above for Study One. 
 
5.9 Analyses and power calculations 
All analyses were carried out using SPSS version 19. Two-tailed tests were used, with 
significance level set at α =.05. 
 
5.9.1 Study One: cross-sectional 
The distributions of the data from the four groups of participants were examined for 
significant violations of normality and for differences in key demographic 
characteristics. The data met requirements for planned parametric analyses to go 
ahead.  
 
In order to avoid the increased probability of Type 1 error associated with multiple 
testing, an omnibus multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used with post-
hoc pairwise comparisons to test most of the study hypotheses. When sample sizes 
are equal, as in the present study, analysis of variance is quite robust against 
violations of the assumptions of normality and of homogeneity of variance (Field, 
2009, p. 360). A one-way independent samples MANOVA was run, with group as 
between-subjects factor, and post-hoc Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference tests 
were used to examine specific hypotheses.  
 
The main hypothesis was tested by comparing the scores obtained by the two 
subgroups with delusions on the measures of schematic beliefs, autobiographical 
memory, experiential avoidance, rumination and problem solving.  
 
The depressed group without delusions were compared to the non-clinical control 
group on the same measures. 
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Each of the clinical groups was compared against the non-clinical control group on 
scores of schematic belief endorsement, worry levels and problem solving 
performance. 
 
Dichotomised Beads Task scores were compared among the groups using chi-
squared tests to examine any associations of delusions and depression with JTC. 
 
A dimensional analysis was used to further examine the main hypothesis, in 
recognition of the continuous distribution of depression and the loss of power 
associated with dichotomised group comparisons. Within the combined delusions 
group, correlation coefficients were calculated between participants’ levels of 
depression and cognitive factor scores.  
 
Finally, analysis of variance was used to examine any association between JTC and 
problem solving performance. 
 
5.9.2 Power calculations for cross-sectional analyses 
Williams et al. (2007) reported an average effect size of d = 1.12 in 11 studies 
comparing AMT performance of depressed patients to that of non-clinical controls. 
Iqbal et al. (2004) found a difference in overgenerality with effect size d = 1.02 
between post-psychotically depressed patients and non-depressed individuals 
following a psychotic episode. Assuming, conservatively, a 3:1 ratio of group size, a 
two group t-test with a 0.05 two-tailed significance level would have 80% power to 
detect an effect size of 1.00 when the total delusion sample size is 44. 
 
In a group of people who had recently experienced a psychotic relapse, Smith et al. 
(2006) found correlations between depression and subscales of the Brief Core 
Schema Scales of between .42 and .62. This corresponds to a moderate effect size. 
In order to have 80% power to detect a correlation of .40 with a .05 two-tailed 
significance level, a sample of 47 patients with delusions would be required. 
 
5.9.3 Study Two: longitudinal 
The main hypothesis was tested by investigating depression and associated cognitive 
factors as predictors of change in delusions. Partial correlations were computed 
between follow-up delusion severity and baseline scores on depression and each 
cognitive factor of interest, having controlled for baseline delusion severity. This would 
reveal any significant associations with prognosis. A multiple linear regression model 
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was then run with severity of delusions at follow-up as the dependent variable, 
severity at baseline as a covariate and the significant factors identified by correlation 
analysis as predictors. If a significant increase in r2 resulted from addition to the model 
of these factors, they could be accepted as significant predictors.  
 
The second hypothesis was tested as above, but with depression at follow-up as the 
dependent variable and baseline depression as covariate. Partial correlations were 
computed to reveal cognitive factors associated with change, and a multiple linear 
regression model was then run with these as predictor variables so that significant r2 
increases could be detected. 
 
5.9.4 Power calculations for longitudinal analyses 
Scarce data were available regarding predictors of change over time on the 
PSYRATS Delusions Scale. A partial correlation of moderate effect size r = .30 
between predictor and outcome would correspond to an r2 increase for the model of 
.09. For a multiple linear regression model that already includes one covariate 
(baseline severity) to have 80% power to detect at .05 two-tailed significance level an 
increase in r2 of .09, the sample size required varies depending on the correlation 
between the covariate and dependent. Given a correlation of large effect size r = .70, 
r2 = .49, the sample size required would be 39. If the correlation between covariate 
(baseline severity) and dependent (follow-up severity) were r = .60, the sample size 
required to detect the same increase in r2 would be 51.  
 
Published longitudinal studies of people with persecutory delusions suggest 
successful follow-up rates of around 80%. Startup et al. (2007), for example, reported 
83% follow-up after three months. Successful six month follow-up of 80% of the 
sample of 60 participants in this study would have produced longitudinal data for 48 
participants.  
 
Delusions are often relatively stable. Only nine out of 25 patients in the Startup et al. 
study showed change over time. Absence of measurable change has a large impact 
on statistical power. The present study used a longer follow-up interval and a larger 
sample size in order to increase the probability of capturing change. 
 
5.10  Summary 
An investigation was designed to address two principal aims with two linked studies: 
the first was cross-sectional, and the second was longitudinal. The first aimed to 
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determine whether depression in people with delusions is accompanied by the same 
cognitive factors identified in the literature on major depressive disorder, and the 
second aimed to examine these cognitive factors as predictors of delusion persistence 
over time. Specific hypotheses were devised, and the appropriate measures and 
statistical procedures were selected for their testing. Groups of participants were 
recruited from the populations of interest, with sufficient sample sizes to give at least 
80% power to detect at .05 two-tailed significance levels the predicted effect sizes. 
The study protocols were administered to the participants, data were collected and 
scored, and the planned statistical analyses were carried out. The next two chapters 
report the results of Study One and Study Two, respectively.
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Chapter 6. Study One: cross-sectional 
 
In this chapter, the results are reported of a cross-sectional investigation of 
depression and associated cognitive factors in a group of 60 people with persecutory 
delusions, 30 people with non-psychotic depression and 30 non-clinical controls. The 
main aim of this investigation was to determine whether depression in people with 
persecutory delusions is associated with the same cognitive factors implicated in 
major depressive disorder: negative schematic beliefs, experiential avoidance, 
rumination, overly general autobiographical memory and problem solving difficulties. 
First, the group with delusions were assessed and classified into two subgroups 
according to which individuals met diagnostic criteria for current major depression. All 
groups completed measures of cognitive variables, as detailed in the previous 
chapter. Group differences and correlations between cognitive variables and symptom 
levels were examined to test theory-driven hypotheses about the cognitive features 
that accompany delusions and depression. Additional exploratory analyses were 
applied to investigate the relationships between cognitive features previously linked 
with depression and those previously linked with delusions. 
 
6.1 Results 
6.1.1 Participant characteristics 
The persecutory delusions group were all outpatients at the time of testing, and 
ranged in age from 20 to 65 years old, with a mean age of 41 years. Table 6.1 
presents further demographic details. Among the 60 participants with delusions, 45 
(75%) had a case-note diagnosis of schizophrenia, six (10%) had a diagnosis of 
schizoaffective disorder, one (2%) was diagnosed with delusional disorder and eight 
(13.3%) had uncertainty about which schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis was most 
appropriate. Of the 58 people with delusions for whom medication details were 
retrieved, 52 (90%) were currently taking antipsychotic medication. Doses of these 
medications were converted to chlorpromazine equivalents, and classified into low 
doses (up to 200mg chlorpromazine equivalent), medium doses (201mg to 400mg 
chlorpromazine equivalent) and high doses (above 400mg chlorpromazine 
equivalent). 14 participants (24%) were on low doses of antipsychotics, 17 people 
(29%) were on medium doses, and 21 people (36%) were on high doses. 20 
participants (33%) in the delusions group were also taking antidepressant medication. 
 
The depressed group ranged from 23 to 69 years old, with a mean age of 43 years. 
The non-clinical controls were aged between 19 and 66, with a mean age of 40 years. 
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Further demographic information is given in Table 6.1. None of the participants in 
these two groups had ever taken antipsychotic medication, and the non-clinical 
controls were free from anything prescribed for mental health. Of the 30 people with 
depression, 13 (43%) were taking antidepressant medication at the time of testing. 
 
The delusions group contained more people with non-white ethnicity, χ2(1) = 13.75, p 
< .01, more people who classified themselves as unemployed, χ2(1) = 22.56, p < .01, 
and fewer people with formal higher education qualifications (undergraduate degree 
or above), χ2(1) = 13.89, p < .01, than the participants without psychosis. The lower 
estimates of pre-morbid IQ derived from the WTAR for the delusions group compared 
to the groups without psychosis, t(115) = 5.36, p < .01, are consistent with their lower 
reported levels of educational attainment, and the mean group scores are similar to 
those reported in other studies of similar groups (e.g. Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, 
Antley, & Slater, 2010; Startup, Freeman, & Garety, 2007).  
 
6.1.2 Diagnosis of depression in people with delusions 
Hypothesis 1 was that between 25% and 75% of participants with persecutory 
delusions would meet diagnostic criteria for major depression, so that the depressed 
and non-depressed subgroups would both be large enough for adequately powered 
comparisons to be made.  
 
Of the 60 participants with delusions who were interviewed using the SCAN, 30 
(exactly 50%) were found to meet ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for a current episode of 
major depression. Hypothesis 1 was thus supported. The delusions group was split 
into two according to this diagnostic classification. The group with persecutory 
delusions without depression will hereafter be referred to as PD, the group with 
persecutory delusions and depression will be referred to as PD+D, the group with 
non-psychotic depression will be referred to as D, and the non-clinical control group 
will be referred to as NC. The demographic characteristics of the four groups of 
participants are summarised in Table 6.1.  
 
The PD+D group were taking significantly higher doses of antipsychotic medication 
(chlorpromazine equivalent M = 505mg, 95% CI [373mg, 636mg]) than the PD group 
(M = 297mg, 95% CI [203mg, 390mg]), t(56) = 2.61, p = .01. The PD+D group were 
also significantly more likely to be taking antidepressants than the PD group: 17 of 30 
(57%) in the PD+D group were on antidepressants compared to 3 of 28 (11% of those 
with available medication data) in the PD group, χ2(1) = 13.54, p < .01. 
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The groups were all similar in age and sex ratio. A one-way independent samples 
ANOVA with group as between subjects factor showed no main effect of group on 
age, F(3, 115) = 0.42, p = .74, and a chi-squared test indicated no significant sex 
differences between the groups, χ2(3) = 3.04, p = .39.  
Group PD (N=30) 
PD+D 
(N=30) D (N=30) NC (N=30) 
Age mean (SD) 40.1 (10.7) 42.8 (9.6) 42.5 (13.1) 40.4 (13.1) 
Sex     
Male 19 (63%) 17 (56.7%) 14 (46.7%) 13 (43.3%) 
Female 11 (36.7%) 13 (43.3%) 16 (53.3%) 17 (56.7%) 
Ethnicity     
White 8 (26.7%) 15 (50.0%) 23 (76.7%) 20 (66.7%) 
Black Caribbean 8 (26.7%) 6 (20.0%) 4 (13.3%) 0 
Black African 7 (23.3%) 3 (10.0%) 1 (3.3%) 4 (13.3%) 
Black other 2 (6.7%) 4 (13.3%) 1 (3.3%) 0 
Indian 2 (6.7%) 0 0 2 (6.7%) 
Pakistani 0 0 1 (3.3%) 0 
Other 2 (6.7%) 2 (6.7%) 0 3 (10.0%) 
Not given 1 (3.3%) 0 0 1 (3.3%) 
Marital status     
Single 25 (83.3%) 25 (83.3%) 20 (66.7%) 18 (60.0%) 
Married 1 (3.3%) 2 (6.7%) 4 (13.3%) 6 (20.0%) 
Divorced / Separated 4 (13.3%) 3 (10.0%) 6 (20.0%) 5 (16.7%) 
Not given 0 0 0 1 (3.3%) 
Highest education level    
None 6 (20.0%) 3 (10.0%) 4 (13.3%) 0 
GCSE 5 (16.7%) 10 (33.3%) 4 (13.3%) 4 (13.3%) 
AS/A Level 5 (16.7%) 5 (16.7%) 5 (16.7%) 5 (16.7%) 
Diploma / Foundation 
degree 5 (16.7%) 6 (20.0%) 2 (6.7%) 2 (6.7%) 
Undergraduate Degree 5 (16.7%) 4 (13.3%) 8 (26.7%) 11 (36.7%) 
Postgraduate diploma 3 (10%) 2 (6.7%) 7 (23.3%) 7 (23.3%) 
Doctoral degree 0 0 0 1 (3.3%) 
Not given 1 (3.3%) 0 0 0 
Occupation     
Working full-time 0 0 6 (20.0%) 5 (16.7%) 
Working part-time 4 (13.3%) 1 (3.3%) 3 (10.0%) 10 (33.3%) 
Unemployed under 1 year 2 (6.7%) 1 (3.3%) 6 (20.0%) 2 (6.7%) 
Unemployed over 1 year 18 (60.0%) 23 (76.7%) 8 (26.7%) 2 (6.7%) 
Student full-time 0 0 0 1 (3.3%) 
Student part-time 2 (6.7%) 1 (3.3%) 2 (6.7%) 3 (10.0%) 
Volunteer 3 (10.0%) 2 (6.7%) 2 (6.7%) 3 (10.0%) 
Homemaker 1 (3.3%) 1 (3.3%) 0 1 (3.3%) 
Retired 0 1 (3.3%) 3 (10.0%) 3 (10.0%) 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) 










Table 6.1. Demographic characteristics of the participant groups. 
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6.1.3 Delusion severity in the subgroups 
The content of the main persecutory belief of each of the participants with delusions is 
given in Appendix D. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 summarise the multidimensional severity of 
delusions reported by participants in the PD and PD+D groups, as measured by 
PSYRATS items with specific reference to the main persecutory belief. 










































































































Figure 6.2. The multidimensional severity of persecutory delusions in the PD+D 
group. 
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The overall severity of persecutory delusions, as measured by the total score of the 
six 0-4 rated PSYRATS delusions scale items, was significantly higher in the PD+D 
group than the PD group, t(57) = 2.77, p < .01. The two groups’ scores on the four 
supplementary percentage-scored items were compared to examine the 
multidimensional structure of the severity difference.  No significant differences were 
found between the groups’ reported conviction levels, t(57) = 0.66, p = .51, their 
efforts to avoid thinking about the content of the delusion, t(58) = 1.20, p = .23, or their 
success in avoiding such thoughts, t(58) = 0.83, p = .41. There was a significant 
difference in the amount of distress associated with the delusions, t(57) = 3.29, p < 
.01. The PD+D group reported being significantly more distressed by their persecutory 
beliefs (M = 81.23%, 95% CI [74.39%, 88.08%]) than the PD group (M = 60.79%, 95% 
CI [49.98%, 71.61%]). 
  
6.1.4 Clinical symptom questionnaires and interviews 
Table 6.2 summarises the four groups' scores on interview and questionnaire 
measures of clinical symptom severity.  
Group PD (N=30) PD+D (N=30) D (N=30) NC (N=30) 
PSYRATS mean total 
(SD) 13.76 (3.76) 16.40 (3.58) n/a n/a 
GPTS mean total (SD) 94.40 (31.72) 110.50 (31.16) 65.70 (25.35) 41.54 (11.66) 
SCAN  
Subclinical or no  
depression 30 (100%) 0 0 30 (100%) 
Mild depression 0 5 (16.7%) 2 (6.7%) 0 
Moderate depression 0 14 (46.7%) 12 (40%) 0 
Severe depression 0 11 (36.7%) 16 (53.3%) 0 
BDI 
Mean total (SD) 15.73 (7.87) 33.03 (14.86) 30.00 (8.96) 5.83 (4.00) 
"Minimal" (0-13) 15 (50.0%) 1 (3.3%) 1 (3.3%) 30 (100%) 
"Mild" (14-19) 6 (20.0%) 6 (20.0%) 2 (6.7%) 0 
"Moderate" (20-28) 7 (23.3%) 6 (20.0%) 9 (30.0%) 0 
"Severe" (29-63) 2 (6.7%) 17 (56.7%) 18 (60.0%) 0 
BAI 
Mean total (SD) 14.97 (11.15) 29.48 (13.90) 22.20 (9.91) 4.70 (4.88) 
"Minimal" (0-7) 10 (33.3%) 1 (3.3%) 2 (6.7%) 22 (73.3%) 
"Mild" (8-15) 9 (30.0%) 5 (16.7%) 7 (23.3%) 7 (23.3%) 
"Moderate" (16-25) 5 (16.7%) 4 (13.3%) 10 (33.3%) 1 (3.3%) 
"Severe" (26-63) 6 (20.0%) 19 (63.3%) 11 (36.7%) 0 
Missing 0 1 (3.3%) 0 0 
Table 6.2. Clinical characteristics of the participant groups. 
 
The relationships between clinical interview scores and questionnaire measure scores 
of symptom severity were examined. Within the combined group with delusions, a 
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significant correlation was found between PSYRATS total scores (relating to the 
current main persecutory belief) and GPTS total scores (relating to overall severity of 
persecutory ideation), r = .38, p < .01. The SCAN diagnostic algorithms classified 
depression levels as either none, mild, moderate or severe. A one-way independent 
samples ANOVA was run on the combined delusions group data, with SCAN 
depression severity as between subjects factor, to compare the BDI scores across the 
range of severity categories. A significant effect of group was found, F(3, 56) = 20.55, 
p < .01, with mean BDI rising incrementally with each SCAN depression severity step. 
 
6.1.5 Comparison of cognitive factors across groups using 
MANOVA 
Table 6.3 shows descriptive statistics of the four participant groups’ scores on the 
main cognitive factors.  
Table 6.3. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the groups' cognitive 
factor scores. 
* Two of the PD group did not complete the AAQ; one of the PD+D group did not 
complete the AAQ or the PSWQ. 
 
The distributions of the groups’ scores were examined to determine whether 
requirements for parametric testing would be met. For most measures, Shapiro-Wilk 
tests indicated that the groups’ scores were normally distributed, skewness and 
kurtosis did not significantly differ from zero, and Levene’s tests showed that the 
homogeneity of variance assumption was tenable. The distribution of the non-clinical 
control group’s scores on the Negative Other subscale of the BCSS was the only one 
Group PD (N=30*) PD+D (N=30*) D (N=30) NC (N=30) 
Schematic beliefs: Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) 
Self Negative 4.83 (3.57) 12.27 (7.06) 8.37  (4.57) 1.67  (1.49) 
Self Positive 13.03 (5.94) 6.13 (5.32) 8.60 (4.90) 13.67 (4.85) 
Other Negative 11.35 (6.83) 14.20 (6.85) 7.63 (4.57) 2.77 (4.19) 
Other Positive 9.57 (5.79) 8.19 (6.96) 7.37 (3.95) 13.13 (4.47) 
Avoidance (AAQ) 35.88 (7.79) 44.66 (7.04) 41.83 (6.80) 30.07 (6.45) 
Rumination (RRS) 46.97 (12.11) 61.53 (13.90) 60.47 (9.32) 37.10 (9.73) 
Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) 
Total specificity 5.53 (3.06) 6.10 (2.82) 8.33 (2.38) 8.57 (2.08) 
Means-Ends Problem Solving (MEPS) 
Total means 9.57 (4.39) 9.50 (3.79) 14.47 (5.02) 12.37 (3.36) 
Effectiveness 10.27 (2.78) 10.20 (2.93) 13.50 (3.13) 13.03 (2.06) 
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with a kurtosis value significantly different from zero (kurtosis = 3.37, SE = 0.83, z = 
4.06). 
 
Analysis of variance is relatively robust against violations of the assumptions of 
normality and variance homogeneity when group sizes are equal, as they are here, so 
this method was deemed appropriate for the analysis. A multivariate one-way 
independent samples analysis of variance (MANOVA) was run, with group as the 
between subjects variable, to compare the groups’ scores on the cognitive factors of 
interest. Using Pillai’s trace, there was a significant effect of group on cognitive factor 
scores, V = 1.10, F(30, 318) = 6.17, p < .01. Univariate follow-up ANOVAs revealed 
significant main effects of group on every cognitive factor tested. Table 6.4 
summarises these results. Post-hoc Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference tests 
were then used to test specific hypotheses. This procedure aims to keep the error rate 
below α = .05, and has been recommended as the most favourable post-hoc method 
for power and robustness under homogeneous variance conditions (Stoline, 1981). 
Some of the mean scores quoted below in the context of pairwise comparisons differ 
from those given in Table 6.3, because cases were excluded in the MANOVA 
procedure: three participants with missing data were not included in the multivariate 
analysis. 
Variable Result 
Schematic beliefs: Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) 
Self Negative F (3, 113) = 28.90, p < .01 
Self Positive F (3, 113) = 13.36, p < .01 
Other Negative F (3, 113) = 22.14, p < .01 
Other Positive F (3, 113) = 7.12, p < .01 
Avoidance (AAQ) F (3, 113) = 25.26, p < .01 
Rumination (RRS) F (3, 113) = 30.09, p < .01 
Memory specificity (AMT) F (3, 113) = 11.20, p < .01 
Means-Ends Problem Solving (MEPS) 
Total means F (3, 113) = 9.45, p < .01 
Effectiveness F (3, 113) = 12.06, p < .01 
Worry (PSWQ) F (3, 113) = 21.41, p < .01 
Table 6.4. Results of the one-way between subjects MANOVA. 
 
6.1.6 Comparing the two groups with delusions 
Hypothesis 2 - the main cross-sectional hypothesis of this study - was that the group 
with delusions and depression would show more negative schematic beliefs, more 
experiential avoidance, more rumination, less specific autobiographical memory and 
poorer problem solving than the group with delusions without depression. 
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Post-hoc Tukey’s pairwise comparisons indicated significant differences between the 
PD group and the PD+D group’s scores on negative beliefs about the self and positive 
beliefs about the self, both p < .01. There were no significant differences in negative 
beliefs about others, p = .19, or positive beliefs about others, p = .68. Figure 6.3 
illustrates the BCSS subscale scores of the PD and PD+D groups. 
 
Figure 6.3. Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) subscale scores of the PD and PD+D 
groups. 
Means are given between upper and lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals, which 
correspond to the error bars on the graph. 
 
The effect sizes for the significant differences were calculated as Cohen’s d = 1.33 for 
Self Negative beliefs and d = 1.22 for Self Positive beliefs, which both correspond to 
large effects (Cohen, 1992). 
 
Because the BCSS subscale scores of the groups were not all normally distributed, 
Mann-Whitney U tests were also used to compare the scores of the two groups with 
delusions. The results were the same: the groups’ scores differed on beliefs about the 
self, but not on beliefs about others. 
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Tukey‘s pairwise comparisons also indicated significant differences between the two 
delusions groups’ experiential avoidance (AAQ) scores and their rumination (RRS) 
scores, both p < .01. The PD+D group’s AAQ scores (M = 44.66, 95% CI [41.98, 
47.33]) were significantly higher than those of the PD group (M = 35.88, 95% CI 
[32.86, 38.90]). The PD+D group’s RRS scores (M = 60.90, 95% CI [55.69, 66.11]) 
were also significantly higher than those of the PD group (M = 46.93, 95% CI [42.08, 
51.78]). The effect sizes for these differences were calculated as d = 1.18 for 
experiential avoidance scores and d = 1.12 for rumination, which both correspond to 
large effects. 
 
No significant differences were indicated between the memory specificity (AMT) or 
problem solving (MEPS) scores of the two groups with delusions. Using the total 
number of specific first responses given to the 12 AMT cue words, the PD+D group's 
scores (M = 6.03, 95% CI [4.95, 7.12]) were not significantly different from the PD 
group's scores (M = 5.39, 95% CI [4.24, 6.55]), p = .79. This was the same regardless 
of whether scores for positive cues and negative cues were analysed separately or 
summed to a total. The analysis was repeated with a different scoring procedure: 
specific memories produced were counted up to the allotted 60 second limit, where 
previously only first responses had been counted. The pattern of results was the 
same. The MEPS total relevant means scores of the PD+D group (M = 9.62, 95% CI 
[8.18, 11.06]) were not significantly different from those of the PD group (M = 9.61, 
95% CI [7.96, 11.25]), and the MEPS total effectiveness scores of the PD+D group (M 
= 10.28, 95% CI [9.15, 11.40]) were not significantly different from those of the PD 
group (M = 10.25, 95% CI [9.24, 11.26]), both p > .99. 
 
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. The group with depression alongside delusions 
reported more negative and less positive schematic beliefs about the self, more 
experiential avoidance and more rumination than the group with delusions without 
depression. However, the groups did not differ in terms of memory specificity or 
problem solving performance. 
 
6.1.7 Comparing the two groups without delusions 
Hypothesis 3 was that the group with non-psychotic depression would report more 
negative schematic beliefs, more experiential avoidance and more rumination than the 
non-clinical control group, and would show less specific autobiographical memory and 
poorer problem solving performance. 
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Post-hoc Tukey’s pairwise comparisons indicated that the depressed group’s scores 
differed significantly from those of the non-clinical controls, in the expected direction, 
on every schematic belief subscale of the BCSS, all p < .01. Figure 6.4 illustrates the 
BCSS subscale scores of the D and NC groups. 
 
Figure 6.4. Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) subscale scores of the D and NC 
groups. 
Means are given between upper and lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals, which 
correspond to the error bars on the graph. 
 
The effect sizes of these differences were calculated as d = 1.97 for Self Negative 
scores, d = 1.04 for Self Positive scores, d = 1.11 for Other Negative scores and d = 
1.36 for Other Positive scores, all corresponding to large effects. 
 
Because the BCSS subscale scores of the groups were not all normally distributed, 
Mann-Whitney U tests were also used to compare the scores of the D and NC groups. 
The results were the same: the groups’ scores differed on every BCSS subscale, all p 
< .01. 
 
Tukey’s tests also indicated significant differences between the D and NC groups’ 
experiential avoidance (AAQ) and rumination (RRS) scores, both p < .01. The D 
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group’s AAQ scores (M = 41.83, 95% CI [39.29, 44.37]) were significantly higher than 
those of the NC group (M = 30.07, 95% CI [27.66, 32.47]). The D group’s RRS scores 
(M = 60.47, 95% CI [56.99, 63.95]) were also significantly higher than those of the NC 
group (M = 37.10, 95% CI [33.47, 40.73]). Effect sizes were calculated as d = 1.77 for 
AAQ scores and d = 2.45 for RRS scores, both corresponding to large effect sizes. 
 
No significant differences were found between the scores obtained by the D group 
and the NC group on the memory specificity test (AMT) or the problem solving task 
(MEPS). Using the total number of specific first responses given to the 12 AMT cue 
words, the D group's scores (M = 8.33, 95% CI [7.44, 9.22]) were not significantly 
different from the NC group's scores (M = 8.57, 95% CI [7.79, 9.34]), p = .99. The 
analysis was repeated with positive and negative cues summed separately, and with 
total numbers of specific memories produced up to the 60 second time limit rather 
than just first responses, and in all cases the result was the same: no differences were 
indicated in performance between the two groups. The MEPS total relevant means 
scores of the D group (M = 14.47, 95% CI [12.59, 16.34]) were not significantly 
different from those of the NC group (M = 12.37, 95% CI [11.11, 13.62]), p = .21, and 
the MEPS effectiveness scores of the D group (M = 13.50, 95% CI [12.33, 14.67]) 
were not significantly different from those of the NC group (M = 13.03, 95% CI [12.26, 
13.80]), p = .91. 
 
Hypothesis 3 was partially supported. The group with non-psychotic depression 
reported more negative and less positive schematic beliefs about themselves and 
others, more experiential avoidance and more rumination than the non-clinical control 
group, but there were no differences found in memory specificity or problem solving. 
 
6.1.8 Comparing each clinical group to the non-clinical control 
group 
Hypothesis 4 was that each of the clinical groups would report more negative 
schematic beliefs and more worry than the non-clinical control group, and that the 
clinical groups would show poorer problem solving performance than the controls. 
 
Tukey’s tests indicated that the PD+D and D groups differed significantly from the 
control group, in the expected direction, on every schematic belief subscale of the 
BCSS, all p < .01. Negative Self scores of the PD+D group (M = 12.21, 95% CI [9.48, 
14.95]) were significantly higher than those of the NC group (M = 1.67, 95% CI [1.11, 
2.22]). Positive Self scores of the PD+D group (M = 6.03, 95% CI [3.99, 8.08]) were 
significantly lower than those of the NC group (M = 13.67, 95% CI [11.86, 15.48]). 
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Negative Other scores of the PD+D group (M = 14.41, 95% CI [11.80, 17.02]) were 
significantly higher than those of the NC group (M = 2.77, 95% CI [1.20, 4.33]). 
Positive Other scores of the PD+D group (M = 7.92, 95% CI [5.29, 10.56]) were 
significantly lower than those of the NC group (M = 13.13, 95% CI [11.46, 14.80]), all 
p < .01. Statistics regarding the differences between the D and NC groups' scores 
have already been reported in Section 6.1.7. 
 
The PD group only differed significantly from the NC group on one of the BCSS 
subscales: Other Negative. The PD group’s Other Negative scores (M = 11.36, 95% 
CI [8.60, 14.08]) were significantly higher than those of the NC group (M = 2.77, 95% 
CI [1.20, 4.33]), p < .01. The PD group’s Other Positive scores (M = 9.50, 95% CI 
[7.36, 11.64]) were non-significantly lower than those of the NC group (M = 13.13, 
95% CI [11.46, 14.80]), p = .05, and their Self Negative scores (M = 4.71, 95% CI 
[3.46, 5.96]) were non-significantly higher than those of the NC group (M = 1.67, 95% 
CI [1.11, 2.22]), p = .06. No significant difference was indicated between the PD 
group’s Self Positive scores (M = 12.64, 95% CI [10.36, 14.92]) and those of the NC 
group (M = 13.67, 95% CI [11.86, 15.48]), p = .88. 
 
Because not all of the groups’ BCSS subscale scores were quite normally distributed, 
Mann-Whitney U tests were also used to compare each of the clinical groups to the 
non-clinical controls. Results of the tests indicated that each of the clinical groups 
differed significantly from the non-clinical controls on every BCSS subscale, except 
that the PD group did not differ from controls in positive beliefs about the self.  
 
Pairwise comparisons of the groups’ worry (PSWQ) scores indicated that both the 
PD+D group’s scores (M = 59.03, 95% CI [54.33, 63.74]) and the D group’s scores (M 
= 60.07, 95% CI [56.06, 64.07]) were significantly higher than those of the NC group 
(M = 39.10, 95% CI [34.23, 43.97]), both p < .01.  The PD group’s scores (M = 46.04 
95% CI [41.45, 50.62]) did not differ significantly from those of the NC group, p = .13.  
 
Tukey’s tests on the MEPS scores of the groups did not indicate any significant 
differences between the NC group and any of the other groups’ total numbers of 
scored relevant means, though differences between the NC group and the PD and 
PD+D groups approached significance. The statistics regarding non-significant 
differences between the D and NC groups were given in the previous section. A non-
significant trend was indicated towards MEPS total relevant means scores of the NC 
group (M = 12.37, 95% CI [11.11, 13.62]) being higher than the total relevant means 
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scores of the PD group (M = 9.61, 95% CI [7.96, 11.25]), p = .06, and the PD+D group 
(M = 9.62, 95% CI [8.18, 11.06]), p = .06.  
 
Significant differences were indicated between the MEPS effectiveness scores of the 
NC group and the PD and PD+D groups, but not between the NC group and the D 
group. The MEPS effectiveness scores of the NC group (M = 13.03, 95% CI [12.26, 
13.80]) were significantly higher than those of both the PD group (M = 10.25, 95% CI 
[9.24, 11.26]) and the PD+D group (M = 10.28, 95% CI [9.15, 11.40]), both p < .01. 
 
Hypothesis 4 was partially supported. The clinical groups all held more negative 
beliefs about other people than controls, but only the two depressed groups held 
significantly more negative beliefs about themselves. The two depressed groups also 
scored more highly on worry than controls, but the PD group did not. The two groups 
with delusions were found to have significantly lower effectiveness scores on the 
problem solving task (MEPS) than controls, but none of the groups differed 
significantly from controls with regard to the total number of means scored. 
 
6.1.9 Unexpected findings regarding memory specificity and 
problem solving performance 
Tukey’s pairwise comparisons following the MANOVA indicated that the memory 
performance of each of the two groups with delusions differed significantly from the 
performance of each of the two groups without delusions, regardless of levels of 
depression. The total specificity scores of the PD group (M = 5.39, 95% CI [4.24, 
6.55]) and the PD+D group (M = 6.03, 95% CI [4.95, 7.12]) were lower than those of 
the D group (M = 8.33, 95% CI [7.44, 9.22]) and the NC group (M = 8.57, 95% CI 
[7.79, 9.34]), all p < .01. This pattern is similar to the findings given above for problem 
solving performance: the PD and PD+D groups scored significantly lower than the D 
and NC groups. This unexpected result was investigated further. 
 
Both AMT and problem solving performance have been linked with executive capacity 
(Williams, 2006; Dalgleish et al., 2007), so associations were examined with verbal 
fluency scores. It has previously been reported that people with psychosis have 
reduced verbal fluency compared to non-clinical controls (e.g. Frith, 2004). The 
participants with delusions in the present study scored significantly lower on the verbal 
fluency task than those without delusions, t(118) = 3.85, p < .01. Within the combined 
delusions group, verbal fluency was significantly correlated with MEPS total means (r 
= .40, p < .01) and MEPS effectiveness scores (r = .44, p < .01), and the correlation 
between verbal fluency and AMT specificity approached significance (r = .23, p = .07). 
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Premorbid IQ estimates derived from the WTAR were significantly lower for 
participants with delusions than for those without delusions, t(115) = 5.37, p < .01. 
Within the combined delusions group, estimated IQ was significantly correlated with 
MEPS total means (r = .35, p < .01), MEPS effectiveness scores (r = .28, p = .03) and 
AMT specificity (r = .38, p < .01). 
 
One-way independent samples ANOVAs with the presence of delusions as between-
subjects factor and AMT and MEPS scores as dependent factors indicated a 
significant effect of delusions on AMT specificity, F(1, 118) = 30.77, p < .01, MEPS 
total means, F(1, 118) = 25.43, p < .01, and MEPS effectiveness, F(1, 118) = 36.91, p 
< .01. Adding verbal fluency as a covariate to these models did not account for the 
group effects: the presence of delusions still had a significant main effect on each of 
the AMT and MEPS scores, all p < .01. Similarly, when WTAR scores were added 
(instead of verbal fluency) as a covariate, the effects of delusion presence on the AMT 
and MEPS scores all remained significant, all p < .01.  
 
6.1.10 Jumping to conclusions 
Hypothesis 5 was that more of the participants with delusions than of those without 
delusions would jump to conclusions (JTC) on the Beads Task, irrespective of levels 
of depression. 
 
The JTC data were dichotomised, and a chi-square test was used to compare the 
numbers of people who did and did not JTC in the combined delusions group to the 
corresponding numbers in the combined group without delusions. Of the 59 people 
with delusions who completed the Beads Task, 25 jumped to conclusions (where JTC 
is defined as making a decision after two beads or fewer). Of the 60 people without 
delusions, 5 jumped to conclusions. There was a significant association between the 
presence of delusions and JTC, χ2 (1) = 18.28, p < .01, such that people with 
delusions were significantly more likely to jump to conclusions than those without 
delusions. 
 
To examine any association of depression with JTC, chi-square tests were used to 
compare the numbers of people who did and did not JTC in the subgroups with and 
without depression within each delusion status group. Of the 29 people in the PD 
group who completed the Beads Task, 18 jumped to conclusions. Of the 30 people in 
the PD+D group, 7 jumped to conclusions. In the D group, 3 of 30 JTC, and in the NC 
group, 2 of 30 JTC. Within the delusions group, there was a significant association 
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between the presence of depression and JTC, χ2 (1) = 9.06, p < .01, such that people 
with delusions and depression were significantly less likely to jump to conclusions 
than people with delusions without depression. No association of depression with JTC 
was found in the groups without delusions. 
 
Hypothesis 5 was supported by the finding that participants with delusions were 
significantly more likely to JTC than those without delusions. However, the prediction 
that JTC rates would be unrelated to depression was contradicted by the finding that 
among participants with delusions, those who were concurrently depressed were 
significantly less likely to JTC than those who were not concurrently depressed. 
 
The unexpected finding of less JTC in the PD+D group than the PD group was 
explored further. The mean number of beads drawn to decision by the PD+D group 
(M = 4.87, 95% CI [3.26, 6.47]) was very close to that of the PD group (M = 4.86, 95% 
CI [2.65, 7.07]), t(57) < .01, p < .99. Cross-tabulation of the numbers of beads drawn 
by individuals in the groups revealed that 13 people in the PD group and 7 in the 
PD+D group decided after one bead, 5 people in the PD group and none in the PD+D 
group decided after two beads, and 1 person in the PD group and 11 people in the 
PD+D group decided after 3 beads. Thus, if scores had been dichotomised at 3 beads 
or fewer for JTC rather than 2, the two groups with delusions would not have 
appeared significantly different. Of the PD group, 19 people had decided by 3 beads, 
and in the PD+D group, 18 people had decided, χ2 (1) = 0.19, p = .66. 
 
6.1.11 Dimensional analysis of the combined delusions group 
Correlation analysis was used to investigate the associations between levels of 
depression and cognitive factor scores in the combined delusions group. The Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) was used as the dimensional measure of depression for 
these analyses. The distribution of BDI scores in the combined delusions group 
showed significant positive skew (skewness = 0.84, SE = 0.31, z = 2.71), so 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients were calculated as measures of association. 
 
Table 6.5 summarises Spearman's rs coefficients and associated significance values 
of the correlations between BDI depression levels and cognitive factor scores. The 
results indicated significant positive correlations between BDI depression levels and 
schematic beliefs, experiential avoidance, rumination and worry. Correlations of large 
effect size (Cohen, 1992) were found between higher levels of depression and more 
negative beliefs about the self, fewer positive beliefs about the self, more experiential 
avoidance, more rumination and more worry. Depression did not show any significant 
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association with memory specificity or with problem solving performance. Memory 
specificity and problem solving performance scores were correlated with each other. 
MEPS 
 
  BDI SN SP ON OP AAQ RRS AMT 
 
M E 
Schematic beliefs: Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) 
.75** 
         Self Negative 








        Self Positive 







.24 .49** -.05        Other Negative 







-.26* -.18 .40** -.06       Other Positive 







.64** .53** -.59** .26 -.28*      Avoidance (AAQ) 





.62** .51** -.28* .31* .05 .46**     Rumination (RRS) 





Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) 
      
-.05 .03 -.07 -.24 -.05 .04 -.02    Total specificity 
.71 .80 .58 .06 .72 .75 .90    







.04 .03 -.12 -.10 -.27* .08 .14 .33*   Total means 
.77 .85 .35 .47 .04 .55 .28 .01 
 
 
-.04 -.08 -.03 -.13 -.22 .08 .11 .34** .92**  Effectiveness 
.77 .55 .82 .31 .10 .54 .40 < .01 < .01  
.59** .49** -.47** .15 -.19 .59** .44** .06 .07 .08 Worry (PSWQ) 
<.01 <.01 <.01 .26 .14 < .01 < .01 .65 .60 .57 
Table 6.5. Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between depression and cognitive 
factor scores in the combined delusions group. 
Significance values are given below coefficients. ** indicates significance at p < .01 
level; * indicates significance at p < .05 level. 
 
6.1.12 Jumping to conclusions and problem solving in people 
with delusions 
A one-way independent samples MANOVA was run on the combined delusions group 
data to compare the MEPS total means and effectiveness scores of those who 
jumped to conclusions on the Beads Task and those who did not JTC. Using Pillai’s 
trace, the multivariate effect of JTC on MEPS scores just missed significance, V = 
0.10, F(2, 56) = 3.15, p = .051. The high correlation (rs = .92) between the two MEPS 
measures may have caused the MANOVA to lose power, a phenomenon reported by 
Ramsey (1982). Univariate follow-up ANOVAs indicated significant effects of JTC on 
both the total relevant means scores (F(1, 57) = 6.40, p = .01) and effectiveness 
scores (F(1, 57) = 5.15, p = .03). Inspection of the descriptive statistics indicated that 
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the 25 people with delusions who did JTC scored fewer MEPS means (M = 8.20, 95% 
CI [6.57, 9.83]), than the 34 who did not JTC (M = 10.74, 95% CI [9.44, 12.03]), and 
that those who JTC also scored lower on effectiveness (M = 9.40, 95% CI [8.32, 
10.48]) than those who did not JTC (M = 11.00, 95% CI [10.05, 11.95]). 
 
Those among the combined delusions group who JTC had significantly lower WTAR 
scores (M = 83.92, 95% CI [76.41, 91.43]) than those who did not JTC (M = 96.72, 
95% CI [90.79, 102.64]), t(55) = 3.01, p < .01. Adding WTAR scores as a covariate to 
the ANOVA models above reduced the main effects of JTC. With MEPS total relevant 
means as dependent factor, the main effect of JTC was no longer significant, F(1,54) 
= 3.18, p = .08, and the same was the case with MEPS effectiveness scores as the 




The finding that exactly half of the participants with persecutory delusions currently 
met ICD-10 research diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder is consistent 
with reports of other studies in psychosis (Birchwood, Iqbal, & Upthegrove, 2005; 
Buckley et al., 2009), and indicates substantial prevalence of clinically significant 
depression in this group. Over half (57%) of the people with delusions who met 
diagnostic criteria for depression were prescribed antidepressant medications, which 
suggests recognition by clinical teams of depression as a significant symptom 
dimension for treatment in this group. The subgroup with concurrent depression 
experienced delusions of higher severity overall than those who were not depressed, 
and this difference was marked in the levels of distress associated with persecutory 
beliefs, rather than the strength of their conviction. 
 
6.2.1 Cognitive factors associated with depression 
The primary cross-sectional hypothesis was that those among the delusions group 
who were found to be concurrently depressed, when compared with those who were 
not depressed, would show a pattern of cognitive features that has previously been 
linked with major depressive disorder: 
• more negative schematic beliefs; 
• more experiential avoidance;  
• higher levels of rumination; 
• less specific autobiographical memory;  
• poorer problem solving performance. 
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Some, but not all, of the hypothesised depression-related cognitive features were 
elevated in the PD+D group compared to the PD group. The results showed that 
those with delusions who were also depressed had more negative schematic beliefs 
about themselves and reported more experiential avoidance (EA) and more 
rumination than those with delusions who were not concurrently depressed. However, 
no significant differences were evident in schematic beliefs about others, memory 
specificity or problem solving performance.  
 
In order to contextualise this pattern of group differences in relation to previous 
reports about the features of major depressive disorder, the same comparisons were 
made between a group of people with non-psychotic depression and a group of non-
clinical controls. The pattern of results was the same as that between the two groups 
with delusions, with the additional difference that the depressed group had more 
negative schematic beliefs about other people than the non-clinical control group. 
Again, no evidence was found for a difference in memory specificity or problem 
solving performance. 
 
Dimensional analysis of the associations between depression levels and cognitive 
variables in the combined delusions group supported the associations found of 
depression with schematic beliefs, EA and rumination. It was additionally found that 
worry was associated with high levels of depression. This last finding was not related 
to any a priori hypotheses, and might be a characteristic of the present sample rather 
than the wider population of interest. 
 
6.2.1.1 Schematic beliefs 
The hypothesised elevation of negative schematic beliefs in people with persecutory 
delusions and depression compared to those without depression was confirmed in this 
group. The findings indicated that depression occurring alongside delusions was 
accompanied by more negative schematic beliefs, particularly about the self. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that no significant differences were found in beliefs about other 
people, which were very negative in both of these subgroups, in line with the common 
presence of persecutory delusions. Comparisons of the schematic belief scores of the 
group with non-psychotic depression and the non-clinical controls confirmed the 
expectation that the depressed group endorsed more negative and fewer positive 
beliefs than controls, in relation to the self and others. 
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The finding that the PD group without depression only differed significantly from 
controls on one BCSS subscale – Other Negative, as fits with the presence of 
persecutory delusions – while the PD+D group scored substantially more negative 
and less positive beliefs than controls on all subscales, is consistent with reports in 
the literature of wide variation in the self esteem of people with persecutory delusions, 
and suggests that part of this variation may be associated with different levels of 
concurrent depression. This is not to say that the PD group’s scores on all three other 
schematic belief subscales were very similar to those of the NC group. The 
differences between Self Negative and Other Positive subscale scores of the PD and 
NC groups approached significance (both reached significance if a Mann-Whitney test 
was used instead of Tukey’s HSD), while the Self Positive subscale scores of the two 
groups did not show any indication of a significant difference. 
 
6.2.1.2 Responses to distress: experiential avoidance and rumination 
The pattern of responding to unpleasant phenomena with avoidance or rumination 
that has been reported previously in people with depression was replicated in this 
study in people whose depression accompanied persecutory delusions. People with 
persecutory delusions and concurrent depression reported significantly more 
experiential avoidance and more of a tendency to ruminate in response to distress 
than those with delusions without depression. Levels of EA and rumination similarly 
distinguished a group of non-psychotic depressed people from non-clinical controls, 
as predicted. The effect sizes of these differences were all comparably large. 
Dimensional analysis of the combined delusions group indicated that levels of EA and 
rumination were strongly correlated with severity of depression.  
 
Experiential avoidance and ruminative response style have been conceptualised in 
the depression literature as relatively stable trait characteristics, which predispose 
individuals to respond to distress in certain ways that may be unhelpful and can lead 
to the perpetuation of emotional disorder. An alternative proposal would be that 
questionnaires such as the AAQ and RRS measure mood-dependent cognitive 
phenomena that are symptoms, rather than causes, of depression. It would not be 
warranted to devote a great deal of attention to phenomena that are causally posterior 
and unimportant in determining subsequent prognosis of principal clinical variables 
(such as distress and occupational functioning). The relevance of researching 
processes such as experiential avoidance and rumination rests on the premise that 
they affect subsequent clinical symptoms, such as low mood. Observational 
association studies, such as that described in this chapter, cannot discriminate 
between causal frameworks of opposite direction. However, prospective studies have 
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found that ruminative response style can predict the onset, severity and duration of 
depressive episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994; Spasojeviç & Alloy, 2001), and manipulation studies 
have supported a causal effect of these response patterns on subsequent mood 
states. Depressed people induced experimentally to ruminate show worsening of low 
mood (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Donaldson & Lam, 2004). Similarly, 
experimental induction of a conceptual-evaluative form of self-focussed attention 
(another description of the pathological ruminative mindset) has been shown to cause 
low mood in those with high trait ruminative response style (Watkins, 2004). With 
regard to the processes that experiential avoidance invokes, both thought suppression 
(cognitive avoidance) and emotional suppression (emotional avoidance) induced 
experimentally in relation to unpleasant content have been found to result in 
subsequent increased distress (e.g. Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006; 
Marcks & Woods, 2005). Rumination-focused CBT and experiential avoidance-
focused Acceptance and Commitment Therapy have both demonstrated clinical 
efficacy in treating depression (Watkins et al., 2007; Forman, Herbert, Moitra, 
Yeomans, & Geller, 2007; Zettle & Rains, 1989). It is true that rumination and 
avoidance occur in response to distress, and in this way are a symptom of it, but the 
pattern of findings here summarised suggests that the degree of inclination towards 
these particular distress responses can have an effect on the degree or duration of 
subsequent affective disturbance experienced. Returning to the findings of the present 
study, it would be premature to suggest that depression in the PD+D group was 
caused by tendencies towards rumination or avoidance, but it is possible that these 
response tendencies might be associated with symptom persistence in this group with 
delusions and depression in an analogous way to that reported in major depressive 
disorder. Longitudinal investigation will be necessary to examine this possibility 
further. 
 
Worry – a construct that shares with rumination the form of negative, repetitive 
thinking but is more future-orientated - was also found to correlate strongly with levels 
of depression in the combined delusions group. It has previously been found that 
worry can predict the persistence of delusions over time (Startup et al., 2007) and that 
treating worry in psychological therapy can reduce the distress associated with 
persecutory delusions (Foster et al., 2010) The results of the present study suggest 
that those people with delusions who have high levels of worry might also have high 
levels of depression. However, this was an exploratory finding of the present study, 
with no corresponding a priori hypothesis, and as such cannot be said to generalize to 
the population beyond the present sample. 
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6.2.2 Unexpected findings regarding memory specificity and 
problem solving performance 
No evidence was found for the predicted associations of depression with overgeneral 
memory bias (OGM) and problem solving difficulties. Not only were these features not 
found the subgroup with delusions and depression compared to those with delusions 
without depression, but there was also no difference in either of these performance 
scores between the non-psychotic depressed group and non-clinical controls. 
Significant differences were found, in both memory and problem solving performance, 
between the groups with delusions and the groups without delusions. Thus the 
unexpected findings have two principal aspects: the non-replication of previously 
reported associations of task performance with depression, and the finding instead of 
significantly reduced performance by participants with delusions compared to those 
without delusions. 
 
6.2.2.1 Non-replication of association of depression with AMT and MEPS 
task performance 
The non-replication here of an overgeneral autobiographical memory bias (Williams et 
al., 2007) and problem-solving deficits (Marx et al., 1992; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) 
that have previously been found by a number of studies in people with depression 
might be explained by differences between the participant samples used in 
comparison groups. Efforts were made in the present study to recruit community 
control participants who would be demographically comparable to the patient groups, 
and as a result the non-clinical control group might have been more similar to the 
others than some used in previous studies. Table 6.6 summarises the four groups’ 
average item scores on the MEPS from the present study (Table 6.3 reported total 
scores summed from three items), alongside the corresponding figures given by Marx 
et al. (1992).  
Group 
MEPS average 
means  (SD) 
MEPS average 
effectiveness (SD) 
Present study     
PD (N=30) 3.19 (1.46) 3.42 (0.93) 
PD+D (N=30) 3.16 (1.26) 3.40 (0.98) 
D (N=30) 4.82 (1.67) 4.50 (1.04) 
NC (N=30) 4.12 (1.12) 4.34 (0.69) 
Marx et al. (1992)     
D (N=20) 6.75 (6.08) 3.71 (1.39) 
NC (N=20) 11.70 (3.40) 4.94 (0.90) 
Table 6.6. Average items scores on the MEPS in the present study groups and figures 
reported by Marx et al. (1992). 
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It would be invalid to directly compare findings from different studies, but the largest 
difference between the studies that can be seen in the table is between the numbers 
of relevant means produced by the non-clinical control groups. Marx et al. used a 
sample drawn from a subject panel affiliated with the Experimental Psychology 
Department of the University of Oxford, and no details of educational attainment or IQ 
were reported. It is possible that the community control group used in the present 
study may have been demographically and cognitively more similar to the clinical 
groups than was the case for the participants recruited by Marx and colleagues.  
 
Donaldson & Lam (2004) reported a similar approach to that used in the present study 
for non-clinical recruitment: their control group was recruited through leaflets in the 
same job centre, and the adjacent post office, in Camberwell, South London. 
Donaldson and Lam, like the present study, did not find a baseline deficit in problem 
solving performance by their depressed group compared to controls: the mean total 
effectiveness score for 2 summed MEPS situations was reported as 7.6 in the 
depressed group and 7.2 in the control group. A key finding of Donaldson and Lam’s 
study was that a problem solving deficit emerged in the depressed group when they 
were induced to ruminate. It is possible that among community groups of the sort 
recruited by Donaldson and Lam, and those taking part in the present study, non-
clinical individuals’ MEPS responses are not sufficiently more effective than those of 
depressed people for a difference to be detectable under normal circumstances. 
 
6.2.2.2 Poor AMT and MEPS performance of participants with delusions 
relative to those without delusions 
The pattern of results obtained in the present study using the AMT was similar to that 
reported by Kaney et al. (1999), who also found OGM in people with persecutory 
delusions, and not in depressed people without psychosis, compared to non-clinical 
controls. The present study aimed to systematically examine levels of depression in 
the groups in relation to memory performance, which Kaney and colleagues did not 
report. No relationship was found here between depression and OGM. Instead, both 
subgroups with delusions, regardless of depression level, produced fewer specific 
memories than the groups without delusions. Problem solving performance followed 
the same unexpected pattern as AMT scores: no evidence was found for any 
association with depression, and instead the groups with delusions consistently 
scored less highly than those without delusions. 
 
AMT and MEPS performance scores were significantly correlated with each other, 
and with verbal fluency and WTAR scores, which might suggest a common underlying 
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cognitive component, such as general executive capacity or verbal cognitive 
processing speed. Meta-analyses of studies in schizophrenia have reported that 
executive functioning deficits in groups with psychosis tend to be proportional to 
general IQ and overall performance on a range of cognitive tasks (Heinrichs & 
Zakzanis, 1998; Henry & Crawford, 2005; Laws, 1999). The participants with 
delusions in the present study had significantly lower premorbid IQ estimates than the 
participants without delusions, in line with their lower levels of educational attainment. 
However, statistically controlling for WTAR scores or verbal fluency in the analysis did 
not account for the AMT performance difference or the MEPS performance difference 
between participants with delusions and those without.  
 
Williams and Broadbent’s original (1986) AMT study had participants who had all 
recently attempted suicide. A number of other studies have found specific 
associations of suicidality, rather than low mood, with AMT and problem solving 
performance (Schotte & Clum, 1987; Pollock & Williams, 2001; Pollock & Williams, 
2004). One study of people with psychosis has linked AMT performance with 
suicidality (Taylor, Gooding, Wood, & Tarrier, 2010), but with findings in the opposite 
direction to those of Williams & Broadbent (1986). Taylor et al. found that among a 
group of people with psychosis, those who had attempted suicide produced more 
specific memories than those who had not attempted suicide. An interpretation was 
made that within a group with such high levels of difficult experiences and past trauma 
as tend to be found in people with psychosis, the overgeneral autobiographical 
memory bias might serve a protective function in decreasing conscious contact with 
distressing representations of one’s past. It is possible that if suicidality and levels of 
past trauma had been systematically investigated in the present study alongside 
depression and paranoia, associations with AMT and problem solving performance 
might have been found. 
 
6.2.3 Jumping to conclusions 
The hypothesis was confirmed that people with persecutory delusions were 
significantly more likely to jump to conclusions on the Beads Task than people without 
delusions. This finding is in line with those of previous studies of people with 
persecutory delusions (Corcoran et al., 2008; Startup et al., 2008), and may not apply 
in the same way to other delusion subtypes (Menon, in press). The present study 
additionally found that those with delusions who were concurrently depressed were 
less likely to JTC than those with delusions who were not depressed. This effect of 
depression on JTC has not been reported before, and could be a characteristic of the 
present participant sample without necessarily generalising to the wider population. 
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Nevertheless, the suggestion of an association between problems of affect and data 
gathering bias within a group of people with delusions is interesting, given that the 
contributions of these two factors to delusions have been conceptualised as relatively 
independent (Bentall et al., 2009; Garety et al., 2005). 
 
A further exploratory finding (thus one that may not generalise) was that JTC among 
the group with delusions was associated with poor problem solving performance on 
the MEPS. Such a finding could be taken to indicate that hasty data gathering might 
be causally related to the production of poorly rated problem solving attempts. 
However, it is also possible that the association was simply a result of both JTC and 
MEPS performance being related to premorbid IQ. When WTAR scores were 
controlled for in the analysis, the association between JTC and MEPS performance 
was no longer significant.  
 
6.2.4 Summary of key cross-sectional findings 
Among a group of participants with psychosis who were selected for the presence of 
persecutory delusions (regardless of affective disturbance), it was found that exactly 
half met research diagnostic criteria for current major depression. This subgroup 
reported more negative schematic beliefs about themselves than the subgroup with 
delusions without depression, as well as higher levels of experiential avoidance and 
more of a tendency to ruminate in response to distress. This pattern of depression-
related cognitive features was also found in a group of people with non-psychotic 
major depression, relative to a non-clinical control group. Predicted differences 
between the two subgroups with delusions in memory specificity and problem solving 
performance were not found, but this might not be described as an absence of 
depression-related features, because the non-psychotic depressed group also 
showed no significant deficits in performing these tasks relative to controls. Rather, it 
appeared that performance on tasks of memory and problem solving was poorer in 
the participants with delusions than in those without delusions, regardless of 
depression levels. Low problem solving scores were related to the presence of a JTC 
reasoning bias and to low premorbid IQ estimates, both of which characterised the 
participants with delusions compared to the non-psychotic groups. An unexpected 
finding not previously seen in the literature was that among participants with 
delusions, co-occurring depression was associated with lower rates of JTC.
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Chapter 7. Study Two: longitudinal 
 
In this chapter, the longitudinal results are reported of an investigation that aimed to 
examine change in the severity of persecutory delusions over six months in the same 
sample of patients as described in the last two chapters. The primary hypothesis of 
Study Two was that initial levels of depression and related cognitive factors would 
predict the persistence of persecutory delusions prospectively over a six month 
period. It was secondly hypothesised that scores on depression-related cognitive 
factors would predict the persistence of depression after six months, in line with 
previous findings in the depression literature. 
 
The severity of persecutory delusions and depression was reassessed dimensionally, 
and correlation and regression analyses were used to examine hypotheses regarding 
the prediction of change. The first step was to examine whether baseline depression 
would predict follow-up delusion severity beyond the explanatory power of baseline 
delusion severity. Subsequently, specific cognitive factors, which were hypothesised 
to play a causal role in symptom persistence, were examined in place of depression 
as predictors. These factors, such as schematic beliefs and problem solving 
effectiveness, correspond to more specific constructs than the broad constellation of 
experiences assessed by the BDI, and their statistical associations can be interpreted 
more meaningfully. Having examined these as predictors of change in delusion 
severity to test the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis was addressed by 
evaluating the same factors as predictors of change in depression levels. 
 
7.1 Results 
7.1.1 Participant characteristics 
Of the 60 Study One participants with persecutory delusions, 54 (90%) were 
successfully contacted for a follow-up assessment, approximately six months after the 
first. Some participants were not immediately available for the second appointment, 
and the time elapsed between the two assessments ranged between 25 weeks and 
52 weeks (M = 33.00 weeks, SD = 6.19 weeks). 44 participants (82%) completed the 
second assessment within 9 months of the first. 
 
Of the participants successfully followed up, 25 had been in the PD subgroup for 
Study One, not having met criteria for major depression diagnosis, and 29 had been in 
the PD+D subgroup with concurrent depression. There were 32 male and 22 female 
participants. The average age was 41.2 years (SD = 10.1 years). The participants 
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who completed the second assessment did not differ significantly from those who did 
not on baseline depression (BDI: t(58) = .92, p = .36) or paranoia (GPTS: t(58) = -.55, 
p = .59) scores. 
 
At baseline, 48 (92%) of the 52 participants with available medication data were taking 
antipsychotic medication. 12 (23%) were on a low dose (up to 200mg chlorpromazine 
equivalent), 17 (33%) were on a medium dose (201mg to 400mg chlorpromazine 
equivalent), and 19 (37%) were on a high dose (above 400mg chlorpromazine 
equivalent). The mean dose of antipsychotic medication taken was 420.38mg 
chlorpromazine equivalent (SD = 318.21mg). Antidepressants were additionally 
prescribed to 18 (35%) of the participants, and 19 (37%) participants attended 
individual or group psychological therapy over the interval between the two 
assessment points. 
 
7.1.2 Changes in the severity of persecutory delusions  
GPTS total scores were the main outcome variable used to measure persecutory 
delusion severity at each assessment point. Scores relate to overall current severity of 
paranoia. Changes in PSYRATS scores were also of interest, as a multidimensional 
measure of changes in the severity of the persecutory delusion that was considered 
most prominent at baseline. 
 
7.1.2.1 Overall severity changes of persecutory ideation: GPTS scores 
At baseline, the mean GPTS total score was 101.69 (SD = 32.61), and at follow-up it 
was 91.13 (SD = 33.28). The distributions of GPTS total scores were approximately 
normal at each assessment point (at baseline, Shapiro-Wilk w = .98, p = .45; at follow-
up, w = .97, p = .22). Change scores were calculated, and these were converted to 
percentages of baseline. Figure 7.1 summarises the numbers of participants with 




Figure 7.1. Numbers of participants across the range of GPTS percentage change 
scores. 
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Of 54 people assessed at both times, 27 (50%) reported paranoia improved by more 
than 10% at the second assessment point compared to baseline (as indicated by 
lower GPTS scores). 9 people (17%) reported paranoia increased by more than 10% 
at the second assessment point compared to the first. Follow-up paranoia scores 
within 10% of baseline scores were reported by 18 participants (33%). The follow-up 
scores of 14 participants (26%) differed by more than one standard deviation from 
baseline: 11 improved, and 3 worsened.  
 
7.1.2.2 Multidimensional severity changes of main persecutory 
delusions: PSYRATS scores 
At baseline, the mean interviewer-rated PSYRATS total score was 15.21 (SD = 3.76), 
and at follow-up it was 13.30 (SD = 5.65). The distribution of PSYRATS total scores 
was approximately normal at baseline (Shapiro-Wilk w = .98, p = .57), but not at 
follow-up (w = .94, p = .02). The follow-up score distribution demonstrated significant 
negative skew (skewness = -0.65, SE = 0.33, z = -1.97). Change scores were 
calculated for each item, and for totals. Figure 7.2 summarises the changes in 
PSYRATS item scores relating to each participant’s main persecutory belief. 
 
Changes were observed across all PSYRATS items. Of the 53 participants with 
complete ratings at both assessment points, 31 (58%) had improved by at least one 
PSYRATS point in total over the six month interval. An improvement of at least two 
PSYRATS points (this was the improvement criterion used by Startup et al., 2007) 
was recorded for 18 participants (34%). No change in PSYRATS total scores was 
observed for 11 (21%) participants, and 11 (21%) participants scored at least one 
point higher on total severity at the follow-up assessment than at baseline.  
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Figure 7.2. Frequency of changes in delusion severity as rated using the PSYRATS. 
 
7.1.2.3 Relationship between GPTS changes and PSYRATS changes 
A Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the distribution of PSYRATS change scores 
deviated significantly from normality, w = .87, p < .01. This was associated with 
significant positive skew (skewness = 1.28, SE = 0.32, z = 3.91) and leptokurtosis 
(kurtosis = 2.39, SE = 0.64, z = 3.71). The distribution of GPTS change scores did not 
deviate significantly from normality according to the Shapiro-Wilk test, w = .98, p  = 
.36. Negative skew was non-significant (skewness = -0.34, SE = 0.33, z = -1.03), and 
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leptokurtosis was also non-significant (kurtosis = 0.40, SE = 0.64, z = 0.62). GPTS 
change scores were judged to be suitable for parametric correlation analysis, and 
PSYRATS change scores were not. A non-parametric Spearman’s correlation 
indicated a significant positive association between PSYRATS change scores and 
GPTS change scores, rs = .32, p = .02.  
 
7.1.3 Predicting changes in levels of persecutory ideation 
Figure 7.3 shows a scatter plot of the participants’ GPTS scores at baseline and at six 
month follow-up, with a reference line indicating equal scores at the two assessments. 
Points below the line correspond to participants who showed improvement over the 
interval, and points above the line correspond to participants with increases in 
paranoia severity over time. The correlation between GPTS baseline and follow-up 
scores was significant and high, r = .65, p < .01, corresponding to r2 = 42% shared 
variance between the two measurements.  
. 
 
Figure 7.3. Scatter plot of participants’ Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS) 
scores at baseline and follow-up assessment. Reference line indicates equal scores. 
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7.1.3.1 Age, sex and treatment effects 
Partial correlations were computed to examine any significant effects of age, sex or 
treatment on follow-up GPTS scores, while controlling for baseline scores. Categorical 
variables can be used in correlation analysis when they only have two levels: such 
variables here were sex and whether or not the participant had undergone 
psychological therapy in the period between assessments. No significant partial 
correlations were found of follow-up GPTS scores with age (r = .08, p = .58), sex (r = -
.11, p = .46), antipsychotic medication chlorpromazine equivalent dose (r = .27, p = 
.06), antidepressant medication use (r = .11, p = .45), or psychological therapy (r = -
.14, p = .34). It was therefore deemed inappropriate to control for such variables in the 
further analyses, in view of the loss of power associated with such statistical 
procedures. 
 
7.1.3.2 Partial correlations with depression and cognitive factors 
The prime longitudinal hypothesis of the present study was that levels of depression 
and associated cognitive factor scores would significantly predict additional variance 
in GPTS follow-up scores beyond that which could be predicted from baseline scores. 
In order to test this hypothesis, partial correlations were computed between follow-up 
GPTS scores and each of the predictors of interest, controlling for baseline GPTS 
scores. This would reveal any significant associations with prognosis. Alongside 
depression and cognitive predictors, BAI anxiety scores were also included in the 
partial correlation analysis, in recognition of previous research interest in the role of 
anxiety in persecutory delusions, as well as its documented association with 
depression. Table 7.1 gives the resulting partial correlation coefficients, with 
associated significance values. Significant partial correlations were found for 
depression, anxiety, negative schematic beliefs about the self, MEPS total means 
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Variable Partial correlation with follow-up GPTS scores 
Depression (BDI) r = .42, p < .01 ** 
Anxiety (BAI) r = .32, p = .02* 
Schematic beliefs: Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) 
Self Negative r = .37, p < .01 ** 
Self Positive r = -.17, p = .22 
Other Negative r = -.06, p = .66 
Other Positive r = -.06, p = .68 
Avoidance (AAQ) r = .06, p = .67 
Rumination (RRS) r = .21, p = .14 
Memory specificity (AMT) r = -.17, p = .23 
Means-Ends Problem Solving (MEPS) 
Total means r = -.33, p = .02 * 
Effectiveness r = -.31, p = .03 * 
Worry (PSWQ) r = .34, p = .01 * 
Table 7.1. Partial correlations of baseline predictors with follow-up GPTS scores, 
controlling for baseline GPTS scores. 
** indicates significance at p < .01 level; * indicates significance at p < .05 level. 
 
7.1.3.3 Multicollinearity among predictors 
In order to obtain a stable and meaningful multiple regression model, it is desirable 
that predictor variables are not highly intercorrelated. Table 7.2 summarises the zero-
order correlation coefficients, with associated significance values, between paranoia 
measurements, baseline depression, and the significant cognitive predictors of 














     
Baseline GPTS < .01      
.60** .49** 
    
Depression (BDI) < .01 < .01     
.58** .49** .83** 
   BCSS Self 
Negative < .01 < .01 < .01    
Means-Ends Problem Solving (MEPS)   
-.25 .04 -.02 -.02   
Total means .07 .75 .90 .87   
-.26 -.01 -.11 -.12 .93**  
Effectiveness .06 .96 .41 .35 < .01  
.45** .36** .60** .51** .05 .07 
Worry (PSWQ) < .01 < .01 <.01 <.01 .73 .61 
Table 7.2. Zero-order Pearson's correlation coefficients between paranoia 
measurements and predictors. Significance values are given below coefficients. 
** indicates significance at p < .01 level. 
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Very high correlations (r  > .8) were indicated between BDI and BCSS-SN scores, and 
between the two MEPS scoring measures, indicating such a high degree of shared 
variance that both variables in such a correlated pair should not be used together as 
predictors in a regression model (Field, 2009, p. 224). Worry scores were also highly 
correlated (r > .5), albeit to a lesser degree, with BDI and BCSS-SN scores. 
 
7.1.3.4 Depression predicting changes in persecutory delusion severity 
In order to evaluate any significant increases in R2 associated with the addition of 
depression to a model predicting change in GPTS scores over time, a hierarchical 
linear regression model was run with follow-up GPTS scores as the dependent 
variable, baseline GPTS scores as predictor at the first step and BDI scores as 
additional predictor at the second step. Table 7.3 gives the model coefficients.  
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1         
Constant 23.94 11.51   
Baseline GPTS 0.66 0.11 .65 < .01 
Step 2         
Constant 22.66 10.57   
Baseline GPTS 0.48 0.11 .47 < .01 
Baseline BDI 0.81 0.25 .37 < .01 
R2 = .42 for Step 1, ∆R2 = .10 for Step 2 (p < .01). 
 
Table 7.3. Hierarchical multiple regression predicting follow-up GPTS scores using 
baseline BDI scores. 
 
At the first step, the model using just baseline GPTS scores explained, based on the 
adjusted R2, 41% of the follow-up GPTS variance, F(1, 52) = 37.53, p < .01. Where 
the model R2 statistic indicates how much dependent variable variation in the present 
sample can be explained by the model, the adjusted R2 is an estimate of the broader 
population variance that might be explained by the model, when its complexity and 
multicollinearity are taken into account. Models with more predictor variables and high 
multicollinearity tend to have greater downward adjustments in R2, and might be 
expected to show poorer cross-validity in the broader population than more 
parsimonious models and those with more orthogonal predictors. 
 
The addition of BDI scores to the model led to a significant increase in R2 at the 
second step, explaining a further 10% of the variance in follow-up GPTS scores over 
that explained by baseline GPTS scores, F(1, 51) = 10.72, p < .01. The final model 
had significant fit to the data, F(2,51) = 27.63, p < .01, with adjusted R2 = .50. Each of 
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the two factors in the final model significantly predicted the outcome with the other 
factor controlled. 
 
7.1.3.5 Cognitive factors predicting changes in persecutory delusion 
severity 
Specific cognitive factors were used in place of depression in a hierarchical regression 
model as described above, so that hypothesised associations of particular cognitive 
mechanisms with delusion persistence could be evaluated. The factors identified as 
significant using partial correlations in section 7.1.3.2 were entered as predictors. Due 
to the very high correlation between the two MEPS measures, which are likely to 
measure to a high degree the same underlying construct, just the total relevant means 
scores were used in this analysis. The first step was identical to that described in 
section 7.1.3.4. At the second step, BCSS self negative belief scores, MEPS total 
means scores and PSWQ worry scores were added as predictors. Table 7.4 gives the 
model coefficients. The coefficients at the first step differ somewhat from those in 
Table 7.3, because one participant with missing PSWQ data was excluded from the 
present analysis. 
 
  B SE B β p 
Step 1         
Constant 19.94 10.99   
Baseline GPTS 0.69 0.10 .69 < .01 
Step 2         
Constant 20.05 16.73   
Baseline GPTS 0.53 0.11 .53 < .01 
BCSS self negative 0.85 0.58 .18 .15 
MEPS total means -1.92 0.76 -.23 .02 
PSWQ worry 0.50 0.27 .20 .07 
R2 = .47 for Step 1, ∆R2 = .14 for Step 2 (p < .01). 
 
Table 7.4. Hierarchical multiple regression predicting follow-up GPTS scores using 
baseline cognitive factor scores. 
 
At the first step, the model using just baseline GPTS scores explained, based on the 
adjusted R2, 46% of the follow-up GPTS variance, F(1, 51) = 45.00, p < .01. The 
addition of the three cognitive factors to the model led to a significant increase in R2 at 
the second step, explaining a further 14% of variance in the participants' follow-up 
GPTS scores over that explained by baseline GPTS scores, F(3, 48) = 5.45, p < .01. 
The final model had significant fit to the data, F(4, 48) = 18.29, p < .01, with adjusted . 
R2 = .57. Baseline GPTS scores and MEPS total means scores each significantly 
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predicted follow-up GPTS scores with the other factors held constant, but BCSS self 
negative beliefs and PSWQ worry did not.  
 
The primary hypothesis was supported by the finding that levels of self-reported 
depression and several specific cognitive factors linked with affective disturbance 
significantly predicted follow-up levels of persecutory ideation beyond the predictive 
power of baseline severity. Depression, negative schematic beliefs about the self, 
poor problem solving performance and worry all showed significant predictive 
associations of medium effect size. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis indicated 
that baseline depression levels enabled 10% of the variation in follow-up paranoia to 
be explained on top of what could be predicted by baseline paranoia scores. An 
alternative model indicated that the three significantly predictive cognitive factors 
together enabled 14% of follow-up paranoia variance to be predicted beyond that 
accounted for by baseline paranoia levels. 
 
7.1.4 Changes in levels of depression 
At baseline, the mean BDI score among 54 participants was 24.96 (SD = 15.6), and at 
follow-up it was 23.85 (SD = 16.47). The distribution of BDI scores at baseline 
demonstrated significant positive skew (skewness = 0.78, SE = 0.33, z = 2.39); the 
distribution at follow up showed non-significant positive skew (skewness = 0.58, SE = 
0.33, z = 1.79). Change scores were calculated and converted to percentages of 
baseline. Figure 7.4 summarises the numbers of participants with BDI percentage 




Figure 7.4. Numbers of participants across the range of BDI percentage change 
scores. 
 
Of the 54 participants successfully followed up, 25 (46%) had BDI depression scores 
reduced by more than 10% at follow-up compared to baseline, 17 (31%) had 
depression scores increased by more than 10%, and 12 participants (23%) scored 
within 10% in either direction of their baseline score at follow-up. The follow-up scores 
of 4 participants (7%) differed by more than one standard deviation from baseline: 2 
improved, and 2 worsened.  
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7.1.5 Predicting changes in levels of depression 
Figure 7.5 shows a scatter plot of baseline and follow-up BDI scores, with a reference 
line indicating equal scores at the two assessment points. BDI scores at the two 




Figure 7.5. Scatter plot of participants’ Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scores at 
baseline and follow-up assessment. Reference line indicates equal scores. 
 
7.1.5.1 Age, sex and treatment effects 
Partial correlations were computed to examine any significant effects of age, sex or 
treatment on follow-up BDI scores, while controlling for baseline scores. No significant 
partial correlations were found of follow-up BDI scores with age (r = .04, p = .79), sex 
(r = .04, p = .79), antipsychotic medication chlorpromazine equivalent dose (r = .06, p 
= .70), antidepressants (r = .01, p = .94), or psychological therapy (r = -.01, p = .95). It 
was therefore deemed inappropriate to control for such variables in further analyses. 
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7.1.5.2 Cognitive factors predicting changes in depression levels 
The second longitudinal hypothesis was that baseline scores on depression-related 
cognitive factors would predict the persistence of depression over the follow-up 
period. To test this hypothesis, partial correlations were computed between follow-up 
BDI scores and cognitive predictor variables, with baseline BDI scores entered as a 
covariate. This would identify any factors that might account for significant variation in 
follow-up depression scores, beyond that accounted for by baseline scores.  
 
Partial correlations indicated significant associations of follow-up BDI scores with 
BCSS self negative belief scores and with both MEPS problem solving scores. Table 
7.5 gives the partial correlation coefficients for all of the variables examined. 
 
Variable Partial correlation with follow-up BDI scores 
Schematic beliefs: Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) 
Self Negative r = .34, p = .01 * 
Self Positive r = .20, p = .15 
Other Negative r = .12, p = .39 
Other Positive r = .16, p = .27 
Avoidance (AAQ) r = .09, p = .53 
Rumination (RRS) r = .02, p = .90 
Memory specificity (AMT) r = -.20, p = .15 
Means-Ends Problem Solving (MEPS) 
Total means r = -.33, p = .02 * 
Effectiveness r = -.32, p = .02 * 
Worry (PSWQ) r = .08, p = .58 
 
Table 7.5. Partial correlations of baseline predictors with follow-up BDI scores, 
controlling for baseline BDI scores. 
* indicates significance at p < .05 level. 
 
In order to evaluate any significant increases in R2 associated with the addition of 
cognitive factors to a model predicting change in BDI scores over time, a hierarchical 
linear regression model was run with follow-up BDI scores as the dependent variable, 
baseline BDI scores as predictor at the first step and cognitive predictors added at the 
second step. BCSS self negative belief scores and MEPS total means scores were 
used as cognitive predictors. Table 7.6 gives the model coefficients.  
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  B SE B β p 
Step 1         
Constant 0.17 2.19   
Baseline BDI 0.95 0.08 .87 < .01 
Step 2         
Constant 7.17 3.16   
Baseline BDI 0.65 0.13 .59 < .01 
BCSS self negative 0.76 0.29 .32 .01 
MEPS total means -0.67 0.26 -.16 .01 
R2 = .75 for Step 1, ∆R2 = .05 for Step 2 (p < .01). 
 
Table 7.6. Hierarchical multiple regression model predicting follow-up BDI scores. 
 
At the first step, the model using just baseline BDI scores explained, based on the 
adjusted R2, 75% of the follow-up BDI variance, F(1, 52) = 158.06, p < .01. The 
addition of the two cognitive factors to the model led to a significant increase in R2 at 
the second step, explaining a further 5% of the variance in follow-up BDI scores over 
that explained by baseline BDI scores, F(2, 50) = 6.94, p < .01. The final model had 
significant fit to the data, F(3, 50) = 69.36, p < .01, with adjusted R2 = .80. Baseline 
BDI scores, BCSS self negative belief scores and MEPS total means scores each 
significantly predicted follow-up BDI scores with the other factors held constant. 
 
The second hypothesis was supported by the finding that scores on cognitive factors 
predicted follow-up depression scores over and above the substantial variance that 
could be predicted by baseline depression scores. Higher follow-up depression scores 
were significantly predicted by greater negative schematic beliefs about the self and 
poorer problem solving performance at baseline. 
 
7.1.6 Changes in cognitive factor scores 
Table 7.7 shows descriptive statistics for the main cognitive factor scores at each of 
the two assessment points.  
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N = 54* Baseline M (SD) Follow-up M (SD) 
Schematic beliefs: Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) 
Self Negative 8.78 (6.88) 8.39 (6.67) 
Self Positive 8.87 (6.28) 8.96 (6.76) 
Other Negative 13.13 (6.98) 13.44 (7.04) 
Other Positive 8.93 (6.58) 8.93 (6.60) 
Avoidance (AAQ) 40.98 (8.06) 40.73 (8.20) 
Rumination 
(RRS) 54.39 (15.12) 54.00 (13.65) 
Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) alternate forms 
Total specificity 5.83 (2.90) 5.85 (3.13) 
Means-Ends Problem Solving (MEPS) alternate forms 
Total means 9.22 (3.91) 15.57 (7.70) 
Effectiveness 10.04 (2.81) 11.54 (3.27) 
Worry (PSWQ) 53.11 (13.03) 54.94 (13.87) 
 
Table 7.7. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of cognitive factor scores 
at the two assessment points. 
* Baseline AAQ N=52, Baseline PSWQ N=53, Follow-up AAQ N=51, Follow-up 
PSWQ N=52. 
 
The similarity of each pair of figures indicated considerable stability over time. The 
only measure showing a mean change bigger than one SD was the MEPS total 
means score, which might have been affected by the different problem situations used 
in the two alternate forms (these had not been matched for difficulty). 
 
7.1.7 Associations between symptom changes and cognitive 
changes 
Change scores were calculated for the main symptom measures (GPTS; BDI) and 
cognitive variables by subtracting each participant’s follow-up score from their 
baseline score. Correlation coefficients were calculated between change scores on 
symptom measures and cognitive factors. Table 7.8 shows these correlation 
coefficients and associated significance values. 
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N = 54* Paranoia (GPTS) (p) Depression (BDI) (p) 
Depression (BDI) .39 < .01     
Schematic beliefs: Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) 
Self Negative .29 .03 .14 .31 
Self Positive -.14 .31 -.43 < .01 
Other Negative .41 < .01 .03 .84 
Other Positive .02 .89 -.10 .48 
Avoidance (AAQ) .13 .37 .27 .06 
Rumination (RRS) .12 .38 .38 < .01 
Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) 
Total specificity -.06 .65 -.05 .70 
Means-Ends Problem Solving (MEPS) 
Total means -.07 .63 -.01 .94 
Effectiveness .09 .51 .17 .22 
Worry (PSWQ) -.15 .31 .28 .05 
 
Table 7.8. Pearson's r correlation coefficients and significance values (in parentheses) 
between change scores of symptoms and cognitive factors. 
*AAQ N=50, PSWQ N=51. 
 
Significant positive associations were indicated between paranoia changes and 
changes in negative beliefs about the self and negative beliefs about others, such that 
increases in paranoia were associated with increases in negative beliefs. Significant 
positive associations were indicated between depression changes and changes in 
rumination and worry, such that increases in depression were associated with 
increases in the cognitive factor scores. Additionally, a significant negative association 
was found between changes in depression and changes in positive beliefs about the 
self, such that increases in depression were associated with decreases in positive 
beliefs about the self, and vice versa. Changes in paranoia scores and depression 
scores were also significantly correlated with each other, such that symptom 
improvements in one domain were associated with improvements in the other. All of 
these associations were of approximately medium effect size. 
 
7.2 Discussion 
The two longitudinal study hypotheses concerned prediction of symptom changes 
over time. In order to test these hypotheses, it was crucial that symptom changes 
were detected over the follow up period.  
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7.2.1 Describing symptom changes 
Most participants' GPTS paranoia follow-up scores differed from their baseline scores 
by more than 10%, and a quarter of the scores changed by more than one standard 
deviation. Most participants' BDI depression scores also differed from baseline by 
more than 10%, but only 4 of 54 changed by more than a standard deviation. It is 
possible that the depression SD was relatively large compared to the paranoia SD, 
because the present participants were selected for clinically high paranoia, while 
depression levels were not controlled.  
 
PSYRATS scores indicated changes on every dimension of delusion severity, 
including preoccupation, conviction, distress and functional impairment. A third of 
participants (34%) showed improvements of two points or more in total over the 
follow-up period. Startup et al. (2007) reported that 24% of their participant sample 
showed this magnitude of improvement over three months. 
 
GPTS and PSYRATS change scores were significantly correlated, indicating that 
changes in the severity of specific, prominent, operationally defined (Freeman & 
Garety, 2000) persecutory delusions were associated with changes in the same 
direction in the overall severity of paranoid ideation. This gives convergent support for 
the validity of measuring persecutory delusion change using the GPTS. 
  
7.2.2 Predicting changes in persecutory delusion severity 
The main hypothesis of the study was that depression and associated cognitive 
factors would predict the persistence of persecutory delusions over time. This 
hypothesis was supported by findings that follow-up severity of persecutory ideation 
was significantly predicted, beyond what could be explained by baseline severity, by 
baseline levels of depression and cognitive factor scores. The following cognitive 
predictors were chosen for this investigation because of their prominence in the 
depression literature: schematic beliefs, experiential avoidance, rumination, 
autobiographical memory bias and social problem solving performance. Worry was 
also included, because previous research indicated an association between this 
process and the persistence of delusions (Startup et al., 2007). Results indicated that 
negative schematic beliefs about the self, social problem solving deficits and worry 
each significantly predicted higher follow-up persecutory delusion severity beyond 
what could be accounted for by baseline severity scores, all with medium effect size. 
No significant predictive effects were found of other subtypes of schematic belief, 
avoidance, rumination or memory bias.  
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7.2.2.1 Depression predicts persistence of persecutory delusions 
Depression alone was found to significantly predict 10% of variation in follow-up 
paranoia severity, on top of what could be predicted by baseline severity scores. The 
association was positive, such that at every given level of baseline paranoia severity, 
higher baseline depression scores predicted higher follow-up paranoia scores. This is 
in line with the findings of previous studies reviewed in Chapter 2 (Bergstein et al., 
2008; Drake et al., 2004; Fowler et al., 2011; Thewissen et al., 2011), and contributes 
to mounting evidence that depression in people with persecutory delusions is 
associated with impaired recovery.  
 
The complexity of depression can impair the interpretation of its role to some extent. 
The BDI assesses a range of cognitive, affective and somatic symptoms, which are 
typically summed to a total severity score. Items relating to sleep and appetite have 
equal weighting to those about low mood and suicidal thoughts. It is of interest 
whether certain features of depression might play a particularly significant role, and 
this cannot be deduced from associations of total summed scores. It is common to 
divide the BDI into two subscales: a cognitive subscale and an affective-somatic 
subscale (Steer, Ball, Ranieri, & Beck, 1999; Beck et al., 1996). The selection of 
cognitive process measures included in the present study allowed even more specific 
associations to be examined. 
 
7.2.2.2 Cognitive factors predict persistence of persecutory delusions 
Negative schematic beliefs, problem solving scores and worry were each significantly 
predictive of the persistence of persecutory delusions over the follow-up period. A 
combination of these three factors was found to significantly predict 14% of variation 
in follow-up paranoia severity, beyond what could be predicted by baseline severity 
scores. At every given level of baseline paranoia severity, more negative beliefs about 
the self, poorer problem solving and more worry predicted higher follow-up paranoia 
severity. 
 
The main novel finding of the present study was that low problem solving performance 
scores predicted the persistence of persecutory delusions over time. This is the first 
known study of social problem solving in a group of people specifically selected for the 
presence of delusions. Platt and Spivack's early studies of the MEPS (Platt & Spivack, 
1972a; Platt & Spivack, 1972b) used mixed groups of psychiatric inpatients dominated 
by those with schizophrenia, but clinical symptom profiles were not reported, and 
psychiatric control groups were not used, so the results said little about the 
relationship between performance deficits and any particular symptom dimension. 
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Social problem solving deficits have also been shown in groups of participants with 
bipolar disorder, depression and anxiety disorders (Bellack, Sayers, Mueser, & 
Bennett, 1994; Marx et al., 1992). Platt and Spivack interpreted their original findings 
in terms of a broad problem-solving approach to psychopathology, whereby an 
impaired ability to generate appropriate solutions to life problems drives the functional 
impairment of the maladjusted individual. Williams' (2006) model of depressive 
cognitive processes also proposed that a range of information processing biases exert 
their effects on symptom persistence via interference with problem solving ability.  
 
The results of the present study suggest that people with persecutory delusions 
experience less improvement of paranoia over time if they perform less well on 
problem solving tasks. This novel finding is interpreted with caution. In particular, 
causality cannot be inferred from an observational study such as this. It is possible 
that other, unmeasured variables underlie the statistical associations between study 
measures. Given the present results, it is plausible that problem solving difficulties 
might contribute to the maintenance of persecutory delusions and depression over 
time, for example by affecting instrumental behaviours and leading the individual into 
unhelpful situations. Conversely, it might be that those individuals who are not going 
to improve have lower problem solving scores for a different reason, for example that 
they have more severe pathology to begin with. However, in the present sample of 
participants, problem solving scores were not significantly correlated with paranoia or 
depression levels, and changes in problem solving scores did not correlate with 
symptom change scores. Problem solving scores were thus relatively independent of 
symptom severity, yet predicted the persistence of both paranoia and depression over 
time. 
 
Consistent with the proposal that problem solving deficits can contribute to the 
persistence of persecutory delusions, there is an indication in the literature that 
problem solving therapy might lead to significant improvements in psychotic 
symptoms, including delusions (Tarrier et al., 1993).  
 
The finding that negative schematic beliefs about the self predicted the persistence of 
paranoia replicates the results of Fowler et al. (2011), suggesting that this effect can 
be detectable even with considerably fewer participants, a shorter follow-up period 
and a less sophisticated analysis technique. The finding that worry predicted the 
persistence of delusions replicates the results of Startup et al. (2007), extending the 
effect over a further three months. Startup et al.’s additional finding that anxiety 
predicted the persistence of delusions was also replicated here. The focus of the 
  Chapter 7 
  Page 142 
present study was on processes related to depression, but this is not to suggest that 
these features are specific to just depression, or that other symptom dimensions are 
unimportant. The role of depressive processes in delusion persistence is 
conceptualised within a multifactorial framework, as described in Chapter 1, alongside 
other factors including anxiety and reasoning bias. 
 
7.2.2.3 Negative findings for experiential avoidance, rumination and 
memory specificity 
No significant association with persecutory delusion persistence was found for 
experiential avoidance, rumination or memory specificity. None of these factors are 
known to have been previously investigated as predictors of paranoia persistence 
over time, with the exception of Udachina et al.’s (2009) experience sampling study, 
which reported that over short periods of time (across successive beep assessments, 
where beeps occurred ten times a day for six consecutive days) high experiential 
avoidance predicted subsequent paranoia increases. Udachina et al.’s study 
concerned subclinical paranoia in a sample of students. The present study found no 
evidence to support a predictive effect of experiential avoidance on the persistence of 
paranoia in people with persecutory delusions. Udachina et al. used a revised version 
of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011), which had 
not been published and was not known to the authors of the present study at the time 
that measures were selected. The AAQ-II was devised as an improvement on the first 
AAQ, with the aim of addressing some criticisms regarding the understandability of 
items and the scale's psychometric properties. It is possible that if the AAQ-II had 
been used in the present study instead of the original AAQ, significant predictive 
effects might have been observed.   
 
Rumination showed a non-significant association with delusion persistence (partial 
correlation r = .21, p = .14), which might have reached significance in a larger sample. 
The related construct of worry, which also involves repetitive negative thinking, but 
with somewhat different content, did demonstrate a significant predictive effect. It has 
been proposed that negative repetitive thought is a transdiagnostic pathological 
mental process involved in most Axis 1 disorders, but that the measures of rumination 
and worry used here – the Ruminative Response Scale and the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire – are not well suited for measuring repetitive negative thought in people 
with diagnoses other than depression and generalized anxiety disorder, respectively, 
because both focus on disorder-specific thought content (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; 
Ehring et al., 2011). Ehring and colleagues proposed that a content-free measure of 
perseverative thought would be less vulnerable to bias by particular symptoms (Ehring 
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et al., 2011). The present study employed the most widely used measures of 
rumination and worry, in order that the findings would be comparable to those of 
previous research. The finding that worry significantly predicted the persistence of 
paranoia, but rumination did not, illustrates the differential performance of 
perseverative thought measures with different content. It is possible that, for people 
with persecutory delusions, “worry” forms of repetitive thought, which tend to be 
anxious and future-orientated, are more relevant than “rumination” forms of repetitive 
thought, which tend to be past-orientated and sad rather than fearful. 
 
Memory specificity, measured using the Autobiographical Memory Task, showed no 
significant relationship with the persistence of paranoia in the present study. No other 
study is known to have examined longitudinal symptom prediction using the AMT in a 
group of people with delusions. The three known cross-sectional studies that 
measured AMT performance of groups with psychosis all obtained quite different 
findings (Kaney, Bowen-Jones, & Bentall, 1999; Iqbal, Birchwood, Hemsley, Jackson, 
& Morris, 2004; Taylor et al., 2010), as outlined in Chapter 4. No empirical support has 
been found for an effect of memory specificity on the persistence of psychotic 
symptoms. 
 
7.2.3 Predicting changes in depression severity 
The second hypothesis was that depression persistence would be predicted by 
cognitive factors selected from previous research on major depressive disorder. The 
five factors examined as predictors were schematic beliefs, experiential avoidance, 
rumination, autobiographical memory bias and social problem solving performance. 
The hypothesis was partially supported by a similar pattern of findings to that reported 
for paranoia. Negative schematic beliefs about the self and problem solving scores 
predicted follow-up depression severity, beyond the predictive power of baseline 
severity scores. Experiential avoidance, rumination and memory specificity were not 
found to predict depression persistence. 
 
All five factors selected for this analysis have been found to predict the persistence of 
depression over time, but no previous studies are known to have examined this in a 
group of people with persecutory delusions. The results of the present study suggest 
that negative schematic beliefs about the self and problem solving difficulties could 
perpetuate depression occurring alongside persecutory delusions in a similar way to 
that proposed for major depressive disorder. This is consistent with Fowler et al.’s 
(2011) finding that negative schematic beliefs about the self and low mood were 
reciprocally associated over time in a group of participants who recently experienced 
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a psychotic relapse. No support was found in the present study for an association of 
experiential avoidance, rumination or memory bias with depression persistence. 
Rumination change scores correlated significantly with depression change scores, 
and the experiential avoidance change scores’ correlation with depression change 
scores approached significance, which suggests that these two factors had some 
association with symptom levels. It might be that experiential avoidance and 
rumination in this group act as state-like markers of depression and not as predictors 
of change. Memory specificity scores did not demonstrate any significant association 
with depression persistence, and change scores were not significantly correlated with 
symptom changes. The role that overgeneral memory bias is thought to play in the 
perpetuation of depression (Williams et al., 2007) may not apply in the same way to 
depression occurring alongside persecutory delusions. 
 
7.3 Summary 
The main hypothesis was supported by findings that the persistence of paranoia over 
time was significantly predicted by depression and by two of the five hypothesised 
cognitive predictors: negative schematic beliefs about the self and problem solving 
difficulties. The significance of depression and of negative schematic beliefs about the 
self in predicting the persistence of paranoia has been reported in several previous 
studies, and the present findings accrue to support these effects. Previous findings 
that worry predicts paranoia persistence were also replicated.  
 
The second hypothesis was also supported by significant findings for two of five 
hypothesised predictors. The same two cognitive factors - negative schematic beliefs 
about the self and problem solving difficulties - were found to significantly predict the 
persistence of both paranoia and depression. 
 
The next chapter will bring together the cross-sectional findings of the previous 
chapter and the longitudinal results described here, integrate them in the context of 
previous findings and reflect on theoretical and possibly clinical implications. The 
limitations of the present research will also be summarised with reference to some 
possible uncontrolled sources of error, and some directions for future investigation will 
be indicated. 
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Chapter 8. Integrated discussion and conclusions 
 
It has been demonstrated that depression is common in people with psychosis, and 
that the burden of additional morbidity that it carries is significant. Despite widespread 
acknowledgement of the scale of this problem, there is no agreed management 
strategy, and clinicians' widely discordant treatment approaches reflect different 
beliefs about the aetiology of depressive symptoms occurring in this context 
(Addington et al., 2002; Upthegrove, 2009).  
 
The dominant view that depression is, in one way or another, secondary to psychotic 
disorder may have obscured investigation of the opposite effect, proposed among 
others by Garety et al. (2001): that depression and its antecedents can drive the 
occurrence or persistence of positive psychotic symptoms. The present thesis set out 
to examine such an effect, focusing on Freeman et al.'s (2002) model of the 
persistence of persecutory delusions. 
 
The prevalence of clinical depression in participants with persecutory delusions was 
substantial, and corresponded closely to previous reports concerning symptomatically 
unspecified groups of people with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. It was shown 
that depression in this context shares a number of cognitive features with major 
depressive disorder, and that high levels of depression predict the persistence of 
persecutory delusions over time.  
 
Evidence of shared cognitive features not only helps to identify depression in this 
group as similar to that seen in major depressive disorder, but suggests mechanisms 
that might connect affective disturbance with psychosis. Freeman et al.'s (2002) 
account proposed that certain cognitive features of depression can contribute directly 
to the persistence of persecutory beliefs, while other cognitive factors can predispose 
individuals to both paranoia and depression. This chapter brings together cross-
sectional and longitudinal findings for each of the putative cognitive mechanisms, 
which are examined against the predictions of theoretical models. Some possible 
implications for clinical practice and directions for further research are discussed. 
 
8.1 The relationship between depression and psychosis 
"Everything is a bit jaded. Everything is procrastinated or postponed. Procrastination, 
delay, a kind of fretting enters into the picture. Because your better sense of yourself 
is taken away, by the anguish and the psychosomatic intrusion. In an immediate 
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personal sense, your moods and your temper and your feelings are not altogether 
adjusted as you, you are no longer adjusted as you, you are adjusted as a kind of 
paler version or some diluted form of yourself. You are not quite yourself to receive 
what's going on… It's a very unusual thing, and I have no way of actually sharing what 
it is about, as a kind of cultural matter, or at least a subjective matter or a social 
matter. It's actually fenced off in a kind of limbo state. And that in itself has its own 
correlation in anguish and isolation." 
 
This is a direct quote from one of the participants of the present study, who has a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, describing his experience of depression and persecution. 
The mention of "psychosomatic intrusion" here refers to painful experiences of 
physical and psychic attacks, which he believed were perpetrated by a local gang. He 
described the two principal symptoms resulting from these attacks as "torpor and 
lassitude". A description like this, of debilitating weariness and lethargy, of having 
become "a paler version" of oneself, would be recognised by many as a strong 
indicator of depression. The results of the SCAN interview indicated severe 
depression, one of the clearest cases in the present participant cohort. This man had 
never been offered psychological therapy, and had been maintained on a stable dose 
of a single neuroleptic medication for a number of years. The apparent absence, in 
this case, of any clinical attempt to address the depressive aspect of the individual's 
presentation reflects a lack of consensus on best practice (Addington et al., 2002) and 
a limited understanding of the relationship between depression and psychosis. 
 
It is widely acknowledged that depression is common in people with schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders, that it is associated with poor functional outcomes and that it 
should be treated (Siris & Bench, 2003; Buckley et al., 2009; Hausmann & 
Fleischhacker, 2002). Nevertheless, the proposal that depressive processes might 
contribute to the occurrence or persistence of positive symptoms like hallucinations 
and delusions (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001; Freeman et 
al., 2002) is relatively radical. Almost all twentieth century accounts of schizophrenia 
placed depression either as an epiphenomenon of the assumed primary disease 
process, a side-effect of treatment or, at best, a comorbidity: perhaps resulting from 
demoralisation – quintessentially secondary. This hierarchy is challenged by evidence 
suggesting that depression might play a causal, or at least prognostic, role in the 
trajectory of positive symptoms. If depression were necessarily secondary to 
schizophrenia, it should not feature prominently in the prodromal phase (Häfner et al., 
2005), should not predict transition to psychosis of at-risk individuals (Krabbendam et 
al., 2005) and should not prospectively predict the severity of positive symptoms, as 
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demonstrated in the present research and in five previous studies reviewed in Chapter 
2. If this pattern of findings is taken to be reliable and valid in reflecting the 
characteristics of the population of people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders, 
then it is logical to propose that depression might play a causal role in prolonging or 
exacerbating psychotic processes, or that common underlying risk factors might drive 
the association by causing both depression and persisting psychosis.  
 
The theoretical models of Garety, Freeman and colleagues (Garety et al., 2001; 
Freeman et al., 2002) incorporate causal effects between depression and psychotic 
symptoms, as well as common vulnerability factors (e.g. negative schematic beliefs) 
that contribute to their co-occurrence. The assertion that depression can influence 
psychotic symptoms is not intended to contradict the proposal that psychosis can 
cause depression (e.g. Birchwood et al., 2000), but the focus here is to address the 
relative neglect in the literature of the former effect. The evidence of the present 
investigation concerns persecutory delusions specifically, though other investigators 
have found support for associations of depression with other psychotic symptoms, 
such as verbal auditory hallucinations (Soppitt & Birchwood, 1997; Birchwood & 
Chadwick, 1997). 
 
8.2 Depression and persecutory delusions 
At first assessment, it was hypothesised that between 25% and 75% of participants 
with persecutory delusions would concurrently meet ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for 
current major depression. This was the usual prevalence range reported from 
previous studies of depression in schizophrenia by Birchwood et al. (2005). The 
hypothesis was confirmed in the present study, with a 50% prevalence rate of major 
depression among participants with persecutory delusions. This is exactly the same 
figure as the average reported in Buckley et al.’s (2009) review of schizophrenia 
studies.  
 
8.2.1 Depression predicts the persistence of paranoia 
Longitudinally, it was hypothesised that levels of depression would predict the 
persistence over time of persecutory delusions. This was based on the results of the 
systematic literature review reported in Chapter 2, which notably included the studies 
of Drake et al. (2004) and Fowler et al. (2011), both reporting a predictive effect of 
depression on paranoia. This hypothesis was also confirmed in the present study: for 
every given baseline paranoia score, higher baseline depression scores significantly 
predicted higher follow-up paranoia scores. Hierarchical multiple linear regression 
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modelling indicated that baseline depression scores predicted 10% of variance in 
follow-up paranoia severity, on top of what could be accounted for by baseline 
paranoia severity. 
 
The main finding reported here, that depression levels have a predictive effect on 
subsequent paranoia, seems to be robust, as it parallels the findings of several other 
studies that used different participant selection criteria, assessment measures and 
time intervals. Drake et al. (2004) and Fowler et al. (2011) used longer follow-up 
periods than the present study, 18 months and 12 months respectively. Thewissen et 
al. (2011) conducted an experience sampling study with measurements taken ten 
times a day for several days, and also found that depression predicted the severity of 
subsequent paranoia. The present study sample was mixed in duration of illness, 
while Drake et al. (2004) used a first episode sample and Fowler et al. (2011) had 
participants experiencing a relapse. While the present study used the Green et al. 
Paranoid Thoughts Scales (Green et al., 2008), a questionnaire specially developed 
to measure paranoia, Drake et al. (2004) and Fowler et al. (2011) extracted paranoia 
factors from clinical interview assessments, and Thewissen et al. asked participants 
completing their experience sampling study to rate four items on seven-point Likert 
scales: ‘I feel that others dislike me’, ‘I feel that others might hurt me’, ‘I feel 
suspicious’, and ‘I feel safe’ (reverse scored). One further study reviewed in Chapter 2 
(Bergstein et al., 2008) found that depression levels at an initial assessment predicted 
delusion severity 12 months later, where delusion severity was measured using the 
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999). The 21-item PDI 
includes two items with clear persecutory content, and the rest include ideas of 
reference, grandiosity, control, magical or paranormal beliefs and subjective thought 
disorder. It is possible that the predictive effect of depression on persecutory ideation 
might extend to delusions in general, and perhaps to other psychotic symptoms. 
 
8.2.2 The cognitive features of depression accompanying 
persecutory delusions 
Depression occurring in a group of people with persecutory delusions was 
accompanied by a number of the same cognitive features that characterised a group 
of people with major depressive disorder, compared to controls. The significance of 
these cognitive factors goes beyond demonstrating similarity between the comorbid 
group and those with non-psychotic depression. From a theoretical perspective, 
certain information-processing biases associated with depression (e.g. memory bias) 
could contribute to the persistence of persecutory ideation, and other cognitive 
markers (e.g. negative schematic beliefs) could serve as underlying risk factors for 
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both affective and psychotic disturbance. As outlined in Chapter 4, the predisposing 
effects of adverse developmental experiences on later psychopathology are thought 
to be mediated by the disruption of primary attachments and formation of enduring 
negative schematic beliefs about the self and others.  
 
8.2.3 Negative schematic beliefs 
Negative schematic beliefs have been proposed to predispose individuals to the 
development and persistence of persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2002), as well 
as depression (Beck, 1976). In the present study, it was hypothesised that among 
participants with persecutory delusions, those who concurrently met criteria for major 
depression (PD+D subgroup) would report more negative schematic beliefs than 
those who were not diagnostically depressed (PD subgroup). Analogously, it was 
hypothesised that a group with non-psychotic major depression (D group) would show 
more negative schematic beliefs than a non-clinical (NC) control group. The 
longitudinal hypothesis was that negative schematic belief scores would predict the 
persistence of persecutory delusions and depression over time. 
 
The findings confirmed that the PD+D subgroup endorsed significantly more negative 
beliefs in relation to the self than the PD subgroup. No significant differences were 
found between the subgroups' schematic belief scores in relation to other people, 
which may represent a ceiling effect, due to the common presence of persecutory 
delusions. The D group endorsed significantly more negative beliefs than the NC 
group on every subscale, as expected.  
 
Analysis of longitudinal data from the combined delusions group confirmed that 
negative schematic beliefs about the self predicted the persistence of both paranoia 
and depression over six months. For every given baseline symptom level, more 
negative schematic beliefs at baseline predicted higher symptom severity at follow-up.  
 
The paranoia prediction result replicates the effect reported by Fowler et al. (2011), 
over a shorter period of time and with fewer participants. Given that depression and 
negative schematic beliefs each predicted the persistence of delusions, and that the 
two predictors were highly intercorrelated, it is likely that depression and negative 
beliefs predicted overlapping portions of the variance in follow-up paranoia scores. 
Negative schematic beliefs about the self are a more specific construct than 
depression, and their role is therefore more straightforward to interpret. The six items 
of the Self Negative subscale of the Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS; Fowler et al., 
2006) are reproduced in Figure 8.1 to illustrate the content of the measure. 
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1. I am unloved   NO     /     YES  >   1 2 3 4  
2. I am worthless   NO     /     YES  >   1 2 3 4 
3. I am weak    NO     /     YES  >   1 2 3 4 
4. I am vulnerable   NO     /     YES  >   1 2 3 4 
5. I am bad    NO     /     YES  >   1 2 3 4 
6. I am a failure   NO     /     YES  >   1 2 3 4 
 
Figure 8.1. The Self Negative subscale of the Brief Core Schema Scales. 
Respondents are required first to answer YES or NO. Then, if the answer is YES, a 
number should be chosen to indicate the strength of agreement with each statement.  
 
The result that negative schematic beliefs about the self also significantly predicted 
follow-up depression levels, beyond what could be accounted for by baseline 
depression, suggests that the schematic belief construct has significance beyond 
playing a symptom role in the depression syndrome. Negative beliefs about the self 
have been shown to predict the persistence of depression (e.g. Dent & Teasdale, 
1988), although no previous study is known to have examined this in a sample 
selected for the presence of persecutory delusions. Fowler et al.'s (2011) structural 
equation modelling analysis, seeking to unpick the directions of associations between 
low mood, negative beliefs about the self and paranoia in people with psychosis, 
found that the best fitting model had reciprocal effects between low mood and 
negative beliefs. Negative beliefs, and not low mood, had an additional independent 
significant effect on paranoia in this model. Causality cannot be inferred from 
observational research, and it is possible that other unmeasured factors could 
underpin the effects reported here. However, findings reviewed in Chapter 2 of 
treatment trials targeting self-esteem in people with psychosis suggest that 
intervention with self-schematic beliefs can lead to reductions in positive psychotic 
symptoms as well as in depression (Hall & Tarrier, 2003; Lecomte et al., 1999; 
Laithwaite et al., 2009; Laithwaite et al., 2007; Knight et al., 2006). This strengthens 
the case for a causal effect of schematic beliefs on psychopathology.    
 
8.2.4 Responses to distress: experiential avoidance and 
rumination 
Styles of responding to distress, for example with avoidance or rumination, are 
thought to predispose certain individuals to persistent episodes of emotional 
disturbance (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). The present study findings indicated that 
depression occurring alongside delusions was accompanied by a similar pattern of 
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responding to distress as is seen in major depressive disorder. As hypothesised, it 
was found that the delusions subgroup who met diagnostic criteria for concurrent 
depression reported significantly higher levels of experiential avoidance and 
rumination than the subgroup without diagnostic depression. These predicted 
differences were also found between the depressed and non-clinical control groups, 
replicating previous findings in the literature.  
 
The longitudinal hypothesis, that these two markers of response style to distress 
would predict the persistence over time of paranoia and depression, was not 
supported. Rumination change scores correlated significantly with depression change 
scores, and experiential avoidance change scores approached a significant 
correlation with depression change scores, so it would appear that these response 
style factors were connected with symptom changes, but the lack of evidence for 
significant predictive effects suggests that they may not have been causally influential.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, the questionnaires used in the present study to measure 
experiential avoidance and rumination have been criticised for the present purpose 
(Bond et al., 2011; Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Ehring et al., 2011): both might have less 
validity for measuring the constructs of interest in people with persecutory delusions 
than would have been desired. It is possible that other ways of measuring avoidant 
and ruminative response styles could have enabled detection of predictive effects. 
 
8.2.5 Memory specificity 
Reduced specificity of autobiographical memories has been proposed to contribute to 
the persistence of emotional disturbance by skewing the evidence available for 
information processing and interfering with problem solving effectiveness (Williams et 
al., 2007). It was hypothesised that both groups of participants with diagnosable 
depression – with delusions and without – would show the overgeneral 
autobiographical memory bias first described by Williams and Broadbent (1986), and 
that this bias would predict the persistence of paranoia and depression over time. 
 
None of the study hypotheses regarding memory specificity were supported by the 
results. Instead, the cross-sectional findings of the present study resembled those of 
Kaney et al. (1999): participants with persecutory delusions, irrespective of subgroup, 
produced significantly fewer specific memories than each of the groups without 
psychosis. The longitudinal hypotheses, that AMT performance deficits would predict 
the persistence of paranoia and depression, also received no support.   
 
  Chapter 8 
  Page 152 
The non-replication here of previous findings regarding overgeneral memory in people 
with depression might be connected with the demographic characteristics of the 
participant groups, as discussed in Chapter 6. The absence of evidence for significant 
differences cannot be taken as evidence of the absence of differences, but 
descriptively the confidence intervals of the depressed and non-clinical groups’ AMT 
scores were mostly overlapping, and the effect size of the difference, if it had been 
significant, would have been around d = 0.1. It is possible that if other factors linked in 
the literature with memory specificity, such as suicidality and trauma history, had been 
included in this study, significant associations might have been found. 
 
The unexpected finding that participants with persecutory delusions, regardless of 
subgroup, performed less well than those without delusions is also interpreted with 
caution. This finding did not correspond to any a priori hypothesis, and might not 
generalise to the wider population, but it is relevant that Kaney et al. (1999) obtained 
similar results. The lower AMT performance of the participants with delusions may 
have reflected a lower general verbal cognitive processing speed or capacity than the 
participants without psychosis, as indexed by their lower verbal fluency scores and 
lower premorbid IQ estimates, corresponding to fewer years of formal education and, 
perhaps, the side-effects of neuroleptic drugs. AMT scores were significantly 
correlated with IQ estimates, and the correlation between AMT scores and verbal 
fluency scores approached significance. However, the specificity difference between 
the participants with delusions and those without remained significant with verbal 
fluency or IQ estimates controlled in the analysis, so neither of these factors could be 
sufficient to account for the effect entirely.    
 
The fact that no evidence was found for the prognostic significance of overgeneral 
memory bias in predicting the persistence of persecutory delusions or concurrent 
depression over time suggests that Williams’ theory of depression persistence 
(Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 2007) might not be applicable to this population: 
memory specificity has not demonstrated the same significance here as has been 
previously found in groups with major depressive disorder. 
 
8.2.6 Problem solving 
This was the first study to find that social problem solving performance, measured by 
the Means-Ends Problem Solving task (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975), could 
prospectively predict the persistence of symptoms in people with persecutory 
delusions. Previous findings that problem solving performance predicted prognosis in 
depression (Garland, Harrington, House, & Scott, 2000) contributed to the 
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development of a theoretical framework (Williams, 2006) proposing that other 
associated cognitive features (e.g. avoidance, rumination) exert their depressogenic 
effects via a common pathway of interference with problem solving, which has an 
impact on the individual’s adaptation to the environment, prolonging affective 
disturbance. Platt & Spivack’s original articles about the MEPS (Platt & Spivack, 
1972a; Platt & Spivack, 1972b) also put forward the idea that deficits in social problem 
solving mediate the maladjusted individual’s dysfunction in the world. 
 
At first assessment, the present study findings on problem solving performance were 
similar to those on memory specificity. The hypothesis that the PD+D subgroup would 
perform less well on the MEPS than the PD subgroup was not supported, and the D 
group showed no deficits compared to the NC group. Instead, it was found that 
participants with delusions, irrespective of depression subgroup, performed 
significantly less well than those without delusions. In the longitudinal analysis, 
however, both prospective hypotheses about problem solving performance were 
supported: low MEPS scores significantly predicted the persistence of both paranoia 
and depression.  
 
The non-replication of previous findings of problem solving deficits in people with 
depression was cautiously interpreted, like the AMT findings, with reference to the 
demographic characteristics of the participant samples. Another study is known to 
have recruited control participants in a similar way to this one, and similarly did not 
find a deficit in people with depression, until participants were induced to ruminate 
(Donaldson & Lam, 2004). The present finding that participants with delusions scored 
significantly lower on problem solving than those without psychosis fits with their 
overall lower levels of educational attainment and employment, as well as lower IQ 
estimates and verbal fluency scores.  
 
Poor social problem solving in people with persecutory delusions is associated with a 
poor prognosis, both in terms of paranoia persistence and ongoing depression. 
Problem solving deficits could impede recovery by impairing instrumental behaviours 
and leading the individual into unhelpful or dangerous situations. Consistent with this 
proposal, there is an indication in the literature that problem solving therapy can lead 
to significant symptom improvements for people with psychosis (Tarrier et al., 1993).  
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8.3 Other cognitive factors, not specifically associated with 
depression 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990) and the Beads Task 
(Garety et al., 1991) were also included in this study, because previous research had 
found significant associations of worry and data gathering style with the presence of 
persecutory delusions. Furthermore, worry has been linked with delusion persistence 
(Startup et al., 2007). It was of interest how the effects of these processes, if 
replicated, might fit with the main depression-related features of interest.  
 
8.3.1 Worry 
Generalised anxiety disorder is the condition most closely associated with worry, and 
patients with this disorder tend to score highly on the PSWQ (Chelminski & 
Zimmerman, 2003). People with persecutory delusions also show high levels of worry 
(Freeman & Garety, 1999; Morrison & Wells, 2007) - many of them comparable to 
treatment-seeking patients with generalised anxiety disorder (Startup et al., 2007) - 
and the same can be true of groups of people with major depression (Starcevic, 
1995). The relatively high levels of worry in people with persecutory delusions and 
those with depression are consistent with high prevalence rates of coexisting anxiety 
disorders in both groups (Freeman & Garety, 2003; Sartorius, Ustun, Lecrubier, & 
Wittchen, 1996).  
 
It was hypothesised that all clinical participants in the present study would have 
significantly higher PSWQ scores at first assessment than the non-clinical control 
group. However, results indicated that only those with diagnostic levels of depression: 
the PD+D group and the D group - had significantly higher levels of worry than the NC 
control group, while the PD group did not differ significantly. This is the same pattern 
that was observed for rumination: each depressed group scored significantly higher 
than the corresponding non-depressed group. This could be taken to indicate that the 
high levels of worry reported previously in people with persecutory delusions could be 
specific to those with significant levels of concurrent depression. This comorbid 
subgroup might also experience high levels of anxiety. In the present study, the PD+D 
group had almost double the average Beck Anxiety Inventory score of the PD group. 
However, as mentioned in section 8.2.3, it would not be appropriate to draw from the 
non-significance of a difference between groups the conclusion that they are 
equivalent. The PD group did report non-significantly higher levels of worry than the 
NC group, and the difference might have reached significance in a larger participant 
sample.  
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No specific longitudinal hypotheses were made in this study regarding worry, but it 
was included in prospective analyses as a predictor alongside the main depression-
related measures. Worry levels at baseline significantly predicted the persistence of 
persecutory ideation over time, as reported previously (Startup et al., 2007): for every 
given level of baseline paranoia, higher baseline worry scores were associated with 
higher follow-up paranoia. This adds to accumulating evidence that worry may 
contribute to the persistence of persecutory delusions. Two small-scale trials have 
recently targeted worry in this population, with encouraging results of significant 
symptom improvement (Foster et al., 2010; Hepworth et al., 2011). A larger-scale 
RCT is underway, which might extend these findings.  
 
8.3.2 Jumping to conclusions: Beads Task performance 
The jumping to conclusions (JTC) data gathering bias that has been previously 
reported in people with persecutory delusions (Corcoran et al., 2008; Startup et al., 
2008) was confirmed in the present sample. It was hypothesised that participants with 
persecutory delusions would JTC more often than those without delusions, 
irrespective of depression levels. The results indicated that participants with delusions 
did JTC significantly more often than those without delusions, in line with previous 
findings. However, it was unexpectedly found that those among the delusions group 
who met criteria for concurrent depression showed significantly less JTC than those 
who did not meet criteria for depression. This is a new finding, was not specifically 
hypothesised and may not generalise beyond the present sample. Even so, the 
suggestion of an interaction between affective disturbances and data gathering bias in 
people with delusions is interesting, as these features have previously been 
conceptualised as relatively independent (Bentall et al., 2009; Garety et al., 2005).  
 
An additional finding of the present study was that JTC in the delusions group was 
associated with low problem solving scores on the MEPS. This was an exploratory 
finding, and might have been due to underlying associations of both factors with IQ. 
Even so, it is possible that the hasty data gathering style proposed to underlie the JTC 
phenomenon might also affect the complexity and effectiveness of social problem 
solving responses. 
 
8.4 Theoretical implications 
The present research explicitly set out to extend a multifactorial cognitive-behavioural 
account of persecutory delusions, described in Chapter 1, with a more detailed 
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conceptualisation of the role of depression and associated cognitive processes in the 
maintenance of threat beliefs.  
 
8.4.1 Support and elaboration of a multifactorial model of 
persecutory delusions 
Freeman et al.’s (2002) model implicated both anxiety and depression in driving 
cognitive and behavioural processes (e.g. attentional and memory biases, avoidant 
safety behaviours) that might reinforce persecutory delusions. Anxiety and associated 
processes such as worry and safety behaviours have now received considerable 
research attention (Freeman & Garety, 1999; Freeman et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 
2007; Startup et al., 2007; Foster et al., 2010; Hepworth et al., 2011). The present 
study findings also support the roles of anxiety and worry in delusion maintenance: 
both were found to significantly predict the persistence of paranoia over time. The 
main focus, however, was on processes linked with depression.  
 
Freeman et al.’s account proposed that emotional concerns can drive the content of 
delusional beliefs directly, and furthermore that the biases in attention and information 
processing that accompany emotional disorder can impair the reality testing of an 
established persecutory belief and increase the probability of its persistence. The 
results of the present research are consistent with this proposal: depression and 
associated cognitive factors were found to significantly predict the persistence of 
persecutory ideation over time. Negative schematic beliefs about the self and deficits 
in social problem solving performance were the cognitive features that showed 
significant predictive effects. Negative schematic beliefs about the self are specifically 
mentioned in Freeman et al.’s (2002) model, as well as in Garety et al.’s (2001) 
broader cognitive model of positive psychotic symptoms, as a factor conferring 
vulnerability to the development of delusions. Previous studies have reported that 
such beliefs can predict subsequent paranoia (Drake et al., 2004; Fowler et al., 2011), 
and the present findings accrue to support the robustness of this effect. The finding 
that deficits in problem solving predict the persistence of persecutory ideation is new, 
and fits into Freeman et al.’s (2002) model of delusion persistence alongside other 
cognitive features that increase the probability of the individual obtaining biased 
evidence to support the delusional threat belief.  
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8.4.2 Problem solving difficulties might mediate the effects of other 
factors 
The role of problem solving deficits in psychopathology has been conceptualised, 
albeit not with specific reference to delusions, as a common process mediating the 
individual’s adaptation to the environment, by interference with which other more 
simple disturbances might exert their effects on symptom persistence (e.g. Platt & 
Spivack, 1972a; Williams, 2006). If the role of problem solving deficits in delusion 
persistence is conceptualised in this way, it could be proposed that more specific 
cognitive biases such as JTC might contribute to delusion persistence by interfering 
with problem solving effectiveness. The present findings suggested an association 
between JTC and problem solving performance (although it may have been explained 
in this case by bilateral associations with IQ). It would be premature to claim a role for 
problem solving performance in mediating the effects of other processes on delusion 
persistence before carrying out formal mediation analysis. Nevertheless, this is a 
plausible and empirically supported component in the cycle of symptom maintenance. 
 
8.4.3 Reflections on other theoretical accounts of the relationship 
between delusions and depression 
Several other conceptualisations of the relationship between delusions and 
depression were outlined in Chapter 2, notably Birchwood and colleagues’ social 
ranking theory account of post-psychotic depression (Birchwood et al., 1993; 
Birchwood et al., 2000) and Bentall and colleagues’ attribution-focused defence model 
of persecutory delusions (Bentall et al., 1994; Bentall et al., 2001). The present study 
was not designed to test specific predictions arising from either of these accounts, but 
results regarding schematic beliefs and avoidance have some relevance. 
 
The finding that among people with persecutory delusions, negative schematic beliefs 
about the self are more prevalent in those with concurrent depression is consistent 
with Birchwood et al.’s proposal that depression arises in people with psychosis as a 
result of the detrimental impact of the content and meaning of the psychotic 
experience on the individual’s subjectively perceived value or social standing. 
Moreover, negative beliefs about the self were found to predict the persistence of 
depression in this group, which would have been predicted by Birchwood et al.’s 
model. However, no test is available here of whether or not the psychotic experience 
contributed to these negative self-beliefs, which might have existed before the onset 
of the disorder.   
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Bentall and colleagues' proposal that problems of self-esteem lie at the heart of 
persecutory delusions is also consistent with the evidence reported here concerning 
the role of schematic self-beliefs. Perspective is limited on the more controversial 
‘defence’ aspects of Bentall and colleagues’ theory, because the present study did not 
include any measures of covert vs. overt self esteem or of attributional style. Perhaps 
if defensive processes were supposed to contribute to the genesis of persecutory 
delusions by protecting the self from covert negative self-appraisals, it might have 
been expected that reports of self-opinion on the BCSS questionnaire (overt) would 
not have shown a direct relationship with the course of paranoia. The proposal that 
paranoia can be subdivided into two types (Trower & Chadwick, 1995): a defensive 
‘poor me’ type and a non-defensive ‘bad me’ type – also cannot be evaluated against 
the present findings, as no measure of deservedness was included. It is possible that 
the PD subgroup (no diagnostic depression) would roughly correspond to the ‘poor 
me’ defensive type, and the PD+D subgroup (meeting criteria for depression) to the 
‘bad me’ non-defensive type, following Trower & Chadwick's (1995) description of the 
two typical presentations. The instrument included in the present study most akin to 
something measuring a defensive process as described by Bentall and colleagues 
would be the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, measuring experiential 
avoidance. The fact that avoidance was significantly higher in the PD+D group than 
the PD group would not be consistent with a proposal that non-depressed people with 
delusions are engaged in a defensive process of avoiding contact with underlying 
negative self-evaluations. No direct evidence has been gathered in the present study 
to evaluate the relative validity of a defensive model of persecutory delusions. It can, 
however, be said that the present pattern of findings is most closely in keeping with 
Freeman et al.’s (2002) theory of direct, non-defensive effects.  
 
8.5 Clinical implications 
The best approach to helping people with concurrent depression and psychosis is not 
known. An international survey of 80 000 consultant psychiatrists (Addington et al., 
2002) found that despite widespread acknowledgement of the prevalence and burden 
of depression in people with schizophrenia, there was little agreement on the best 
treatment strategy. Addington and colleagues suggest that the lack of consensus on 
management reflects clinicians’ differing beliefs about the ontological status of the 
depressive symptoms observed. For example, if seen as an inherent part of the 
psychosis symptom profile, depression might be expected to respond to antipsychotic 
drugs, whereas if the clinician perceives a ‘superimposed’ depressive episode, 
antidepressants might appear appropriate. The most common treatment approach 
reported by respondents of the survey was augmenting neuroleptics with 
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antidepressant medications, a practice for which empirical support is weak 
(Whitehead, Moss, Cardno, & Lewis, 2003; Micallef, Fakra, & Blin, 2006).  
 
Psychological therapies, including CBT, have demonstrated concurrent efficacy in the 
reduction of depression and psychotic symptoms, which suggests that this is a good 
treatment option for people experiencing psychosis with depression. In Chapter 2, the 
findings were systematically reviewed of treatment trials that reported significantly 
reducing depression in people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Of these, 12 
were medication trials and 14 were trials of psychological therapy. Four of 12 
medication trials and 11 of 14 psychological therapy trials reported therapeutic 
benefits for psychotic symptoms as well as for depression. Psychological therapies 
such as CBT usually involve the development of an idiosyncratic formulation that 
makes sense of the individual’s presenting set of difficulties, upon which treatment is 
then based. This might make it conceptually easier for practitioners of psychological 
therapies to deal clinically with comorbidity, especially as psychological models of 
various disorders are often adapted from one to another, while pharmacists and 
prescribers must contend with the interactions of chemically diverse drug compounds. 
 
8.5.1 Depression-related interventions for people with psychosis 
Indications that depression, negative self-schematic beliefs and problem solving 
difficulties might contribute to the persistence of persecutory delusions in people with 
psychosis suggest that targeting these factors therapeutically might improve the 
recovery of affected individuals. CBT for psychosis was adapted from Beck’s original 
protocol targeting depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), and the diagnosis-
differentiated packages continue to share a number of techniques, such as exploring 
alternative interpretations of experience and targeting negative core beliefs (Morrison 
& Barratt, 2010). Given that 14 psychological therapy trials reviewed in Chapter 2 
significantly reduced participants’ depression levels, it is likely that depression is 
already targeted to some degree in the psychological therapies for psychosis that are 
currently in use. The results of the present study support the inclusion of depression 
as an explicit treatment target in these therapies. 
 
Reports of the efficacy of self-esteem interventions for people with psychosis support 
the utility of addressing negative beliefs about the self (Lecomte et al., 1999; 
Laithwaite et al., 2007; Hall & Tarrier, 2003; Knight et al., 2006). The results of the 
present study, in line with Fowler et al.’s (2011) findings, suggest specifically that high 
levels of negative schematic beliefs about the self are predictive of symptom 
persistence, not low levels of positive beliefs. The clinical implication is that reducing 
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negative beliefs about the self might be a more specific and helpful therapeutic target 
than increasing positive beliefs. Most self esteem therapy packages focus on building 
positive beliefs (e.g. Hall & Tarrier, 2003; Laithwaite et al., 2007; Lecomte et al., 
1999), and fewer explicitly tackle negative beliefs (e.g. Laithwaite et al., 2007). It is 
likely that increasing positive beliefs about the self has an indirect effect on negative 
beliefs, but the implication of the present findings is that explicitly targeting negative 
beliefs might bring about symptom benefits more directly. One example of a 
psychological intervention that might achieve therapeutic effects by breaking down 
negative self-evaluations is Compassionate Mind Training (Gilbert & Procter, 2006). 
This was developed specially to address self-attacking and self-blame in individuals 
with long-standing mental health problems, who might be affected by drastically 
disturbed attachment experiences. A compassion-focussed intervention has 
demonstrated significant beneficial effects on depression levels and self-esteem in a 
group of high-security inpatients with psychotic disorders (Laithwaite et al., 2009). No 
significant changes in positive symptoms were found, but this may represent a floor 
effect, as positive symptoms were minimal on entry to the trial.  
 
Not all empirically-supported depression treatments have been investigated in 
application to psychosis. For example, behavioural activation (BA), whereby activity 
scheduling is used to increase the individual’s exposure to rewarding stimuli in order 
to lift mood, has well-established efficacy in the treatment of depression (Cuijpers, van 
Straten, & Warmerdam, 2007; Ekers, Richards, & Gilbody, 2008; Mazzucchelli, Kane, 
& Rees, 2009), and may be just as effective as more complex CBT interventions 
(Jacobson et al., 1996). A pilot study trialling BA for psychosis (Mairs, Lovell, 
Campbell, & Keeley, 2011) reported promising results from 8 patients indicating 
feasibility, treatment adherence and initial outcomes: non-significant improvements in 
depression, positive symptoms and negative symptoms. No controlled trials are yet 
known to have been published of BA for people with psychosis. Given the body of 
evidence for the therapeutic effect of this approach for major depressive disorder, 
trialling BA as an intervention for comorbid depression in people with psychosis could 
also be of benefit. 
 
8.5.2 Problem solving training 
Of the cognitive factors showing significant predictive effects in the present 
investigation, problem solving appears to have received the least interventionist 
empirical attention in relation to delusions, with one notable exception. Tarrier et al. 
(1993) implemented a problem solving intervention as part of an early comparative 
trial of cognitive behavioural treatments for people with drug-resistant psychosis. The 
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main intervention being investigated here was Coping Strategy Enhancement (CSE; 
Tarrier, Harwood, Yusopoff, Beckett, & Baker, 1990); problem solving (PS) was 
chosen for the active control condition, as "a credible treatment which may well result 
in benefits to the patient but would not be expected to directly address psychotic 
symptoms." The six-week PS intervention was based on D’Zurilla & Goldfried’s (1971) 
formulation of problem solving. Participants were encouraged to identify their current 
personal problems, and then they were trained in an iterative systematic process of 
alternative solution generation, selection, implementation, evaluation and self-
reinforcement. After training, the strategy was applied to abstract problems such as 
board games, then to realistic social scenarios like making friends or finding a job. 
Finally, the systematic problem solving approach was applied to participants’ own 
previously generated personal problems. CSE, unlike PS, specifically concerned the 
self-management of residual psychotic symptoms. It was predicted that CSE would 
improve psychotic symptoms and also thereby have a secondary effect on social 
functioning, while PS would only improve social functioning without changing 
symptom levels. On the contrary, both interventions had the effect of improving 
psychotic symptoms (which did not change over a waiting list control period), but no 
significant changes in social functioning were observed under either condition. 
Specific treatment effects were observed on delusions, as well as anxiety. Symptom 
improvements were greater in the CSE group, but this group had entered the trial (as 
an unintended effect of randomisation) with a mean total symptom score more than 
double the PS group’s, which makes the differential changes difficult to interpret. 
Nevertheless, the suggestion that these two types of psychological therapy led to 
significant improvements in medication-resistant delusions is intriguing. 
 
An earlier study (Falloon et al., 1985) had also used an individual problem solving 
intervention as a control treatment for a group with psychosis, this time against family 
CBT. Here, like in Tarrier et al.’s (1993) study, the emphasis on the superiority of the 
more complex intervention overshadowed the apparent benefits of problem solving 
training. Problem solving has continued in use as a component of cognitive 
behavioural interventions for psychosis, but received little further attention as a stand-
alone treatment for some time, until a resurgence of interest by researchers in Italy. 
Falloon and colleagues (Falloon, Barbieri, Boggian, & Lamonaca, 2007) laid out a 
theoretical framework of pathways by which PS might benefit people with psychosis, 
which includes stress management, increasing interpersonal competence, containing 
emotional hypersensitivity, remediating neurocognitive deficits and even functionally 
restructuring neural circuitry. The same article presents a summary of promising 
findings from four pilot studies, which showed improvements in positive symptoms, 
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negative symptoms, cognitive and occupational functioning of people with psychosis 
who completed problem solving interventions. A problem solving training (PST) 
course is described, based on the same core systematic problem solving technique 
taught by Tarrier et al. (1993), but delivered in a group format, extended to 12 months 
and incorporating worksheets and guidebooks, in a deliberate analogy to the 
mainstream teaching of mathematics or foreign languages. A multicenter randomised 
controlled trial of this training programme is said to be underway, which aims to 
include 120 patients. This would be the largest known study of problem solving 
therapy for people with psychosis.  
 
Tarrier et al.'s (1993) study is the only one known to have examined the effects of PS 
on delusions specifically, and it is encouraging that positive findings were obtained 
with an intervention as short as six weeks, but replication will be necessary to 
demonstrate the reliability of any such effects. No other studies are known to have 
examined the effects of PS on individual positive symptoms, perhaps because the 
content of the intervention does not immediately appear relevant to symptom 
reduction. The present study’s finding that problem solving deficits predict the 
persistence of persecutory delusions in people with psychosis is certainly consistent 
with a causal role for problem solving skill in the resolution of psychotic symptoms, 
and the allied possibility that problem solving training can create "some kind of 
cognitive change that inhibits delusions or hallucinations" (Tarrier et al., 1993, p. 530). 
An analogy can be drawn with interventions targeting worry (Foster et al., 2010) self 
esteem (Hall & Tarrier, 2003; Knight, Wykes, & Hayward, 2006; Laithwaite et al., 
2007) and insomnia (Myers et al., 2011), which have also achieved reductions in 
positive psychotic symptoms without challenging these symptoms directly. The 
accessibility and face validity, from the point of view of the participant, of problem 
solving training add to its appeal as a cognitive treatment approach, and its potential 
efficacy in treating positive symptoms such as persecutory delusions merits further 
exploration.  
 
8.6  Limitations of the present investigation 
The present investigation set out to examine the case for a role of depression in the 
persistence of paranoia, and efforts were made to measure and account for a range of 
relevant factors from the literature on depression and on persecutory delusions. The 
selection of study measures was theory-driven, and based on instruments used in 
previous studies, so that the findings might be comparable. Nevertheless, some of the 
measures yielded inconsistent findings, and the design of the investigation was 
necessarily associated with some limitations. 
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8.6.1 The scope of the investigation 
A focus on the hypothesised effect of depression on persecutory delusions, and on 
theory-driven hypothesis testing, precluded the examination of other factors and 
causal connections that might have been relevant. For example, the primary finding of 
the present study concerned depression predicting the persistence of paranoia, but 
the causes of this depression were not addressed. If depression accompanying 
psychosis can represent several distinct aetiologies (Birchwood, 2003), then the 
trajectories and consequences of these cases might also separate into groups with 
different profiles. The present study concerned the prospective main effect of 
depression, and aetiology was not investigated. The inclusion of more measures 
might have allowed further theoretical implications to be examined, as mentioned in 
section 8.4.3, but it was deemed important to limit the duration of the assessments in 
order not to overload participants who might have difficulty concentrating for extended 
periods of time.  
 
A basis in multifactorial theory drove the investigation of a number of cognitive factors 
whose involvement was of interest, and, correspondingly, a number of statistical tests 
were carried out on data gathered from the same participants, which can increase the 
study-wide probability of Type 1 error occurring. To mitigate this risk, omnibus tests 
like MANOVA were used where possible. These aim to control the probability of Type 
1 error occurring by adopting a conservative null hypothesis rejection criterion, scaled 
by the number of possible comparisons. The study analyses emphasised testing one 
primary cross-sectional hypothesis and one primary longitudinal hypothesis, and 
auxiliary tests were used to help contextualise the findings alongside those of 
previously published research.  
 
8.6.2 The role of anxiety 
The results of the present investigation indicated that anxiety, as well as depression, 
was a significant predictor of the persistence of paranoia over time. This is in line with 
the findings of previous research (e.g. Startup et al., 2007), and with Freeman et al.’s 
(2002) model. Anxiety was not controlled for in the longitudinal regression analyses, 
because it was expected that this could obscure the significant effect of depression, 
with which anxiety shows considerable overlap (Kaufman & Charney, 2000; Brady & 
Kendall, 1992). The present study was not powered to detect a predictive effect of 
depression on paranoia persistence while controlling for anxiety, and the present 
results do not indicate whether or not depression is still a significant predictor when 
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the effect of anxiety is taken into account. This could be examined in future research 
with a greater number of participants. 
 
8.6.3 Measurement of experiential avoidance using the Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire (AAQ) 
This instrument, included in Appendix C, has been criticised for having poor 
comprehensibility and psychometric properties (Bond et al., 2011). None of the items 
explicitly mention avoidance or acceptance, and some were difficult to understand for 
some of the participants of the present study, for example item 6: “When I evaluate 
something negatively, I usually recognize that this is just a reaction, not an objective 
fact.” Bond et al. (2011) suggested that the AAQ, which has often been used in the 
context of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), may not be adequately 
comprehensible to people not exposed to contextual CBT approaches such as ACT. 
These authors also highlighted that particularly poor reliability has been reported 
when the AAQ has been used with people who are not very highly educated or who 
have English as a second language. Both of these were true for a considerable 
proportion of the present study participants. It is possible that a different approach to 
measuring avoidance could yield significant findings in this population where the AAQ 
has not.  
 
8.6.4 Ambiguous group differences in problem solving 
performance 
A novel finding of the present study concerned problem solving performance as a 
predictor of symptom persistence. Poor performance on the MEPS significantly 
predicted the persistence of both paranoia and depression over time, but the cross-
sectional group comparison results were unexpected. It had been hypothesised that 
deficits in problem solving would be associated with both depression and delusions, 
and that the group with both types of symptom would perform worst of all. Instead, 
both groups with delusions demonstrated equivalent deficits in comparison to those 
without delusions. In this sense, problem solving performance did not behave as a 
"depression-related" factor in this group, as it had been originally conceived. It was 
never intended that the depression-related cognitive factors included in this study be 
thought of as exclusively associated with depression, but the absence of an 
association with depression makes it harder to interpret what MEPS deficits might 
serve as a marker of, or which other patient groups might be expected to demonstrate 
them. The participants with delusions in the present study had significantly lower 
MEPS scores than those without delusions, but this cannot be said to indicate that 
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MEPS performance is associated with delusions, because there were a number of 
other uncontrolled differences confounding the comparison. The delusions group 
differed from those without delusions not only on the basis of psychotic symptoms, but 
also in demographic characteristics, IQ estimates and verbal fluency.  
 
8.6.5 Socio-demographic group differences 
The demographic characteristics of the participant groups were not matched, and 
significant differences were evident in ethnicity, employment status and levels of 
education. Efforts had been made to select representative samples of each 
population. Socio-demographic disadvantages are thought to characterise populations 
with psychosis compared to those without (e.g. Kendler, Gallagher, Abelson, & 
Kessler, 1996), and the present study samples reflected this. It might have been 
possible to artificially select samples matched for certain demographic characteristics, 
and thus control for these in a comparative analysis, but the participant samples 
would have given skewed representations of the characteristics of the broader 
populations of interest, reducing the generalisability of the findings.  
 
8.6.6 Limitations of the participant sample and observational 
design 
All clinical participants of the study were outpatients, so that more severe acute 
presentations of psychosis may have been under-represented. The recruitment 
materials described the aims of the study, so even though the psychosis group was 
selected for persecutory delusions irrespective of depression, the study description 
might have skewed referring clinicians to suggest individuals who were depressed. 
Efforts were made to follow up individuals in the delusions group six months after first 
assessment, but participants were not always available when contacted, and in one 
extreme case the second assessment took place 12 months after the first. If any 
conclusions were to be drawn about the time-frame of predictive effects, the 
heterogeneity of follow-up intervals should be taken into account. 
 
Observational research is ultimately unable to provide evidence of the directions of 
causal associations between constructs. The longitudinal design of the present study 
allowed some evidence of temporal relationships to be gathered, which is a step in the 
right direction. For example, the finding that for every given level of baseline paranoia, 
poorer baseline problem solving performance predicted higher follow-up paranoia 
constitutes stronger evidence for a causal effect of problem solving on paranoia 
persistence than a cross-sectional correlation could have provided, but it is still 
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possible that a third factor might have influenced both predictor and outcome. 
Manipulating variables in a randomised design can help to demonstrate causal 
relationships.  An interventionist-causal model (Freeman, 2011; Kendler & Campbell, 
2009) suggests a pragmatic research framework where each individual putative 
causal factor, once identified, can be manipulated therapeutically. If symptom benefit 
is demonstrated relative to a control condition, then sufficient causality is said to have 
been established for practical purposes.  
 
8.7  Directions for future research 
The limitations of the present results can be addressed through replication in other 
samples and triangulation using different methodological approaches. This study was 
not the first to find that negative schematic beliefs and worry predict the persistence of 
persecutory beliefs (Fowler et al., 2011; Startup et al., 2007), and intervention studies 
targeting these factors have already shown beneficial effects on delusions (Laithwaite 
et al., 2007; Foster et al., 2010). It may be possible to trace the origin of these 
unhelpful cognitive processes further back, for example to traumatic life experiences 
and disrupted early attachments. A reliable association has been indicated by several 
reviews of the literature between psychosis and trauma, particularly childhood trauma 
(Varese et al., 2012; Read, Van Os, Morrison, & Ross, 2005; Morrison, Frame, & 
Larkin, 2003). High rates of insecure attachment styles have also been reported in 
people with psychosis (e.g. Couture et al., 2007; Ponizovsky, Nechamkin, & Rosca, 
2007; MacBeth, Gumley, Schwannauer, & Fisher, 2011). Investigation of the 
mechanisms, such as attachment and affect regulation, by which early adversity can 
lead to psychiatric symptoms, will bring us closer to a complete psychological 
understanding of psychosis. 
 
It might also be possible to clarify, in future studies with more sophisticated measures, 
the inconsistent effects found here for certain cognitive processes. For example, the 
present results do not suggest a relationship between memory specificity and delusion 
persistence, but future investigations might obtain more interesting results if 
participants’ trauma history and any post-traumatic symptoms are assessed, as these 
have shown a relationship with AMT performance (Williams et al., 2007).  
 
8.7.1 Replication and elaboration of problem solving effects 
The finding here that social problem solving deficits predict the persistence of 
persecutory delusions and depression in people with psychosis is novel and intriguing, 
but, because of its novelty and the context of multiple testing, must be taken as 
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preliminary. It would be of value to replicate this effect, because if it could be 
established reliably that problem solving deficits predict the persistence of symptoms 
then immediate clinical implications could be addressed, as discussed in section 
8.5.2.  
 
The significant correlations of problem solving performance with verbal fluency and IQ 
estimates highlight the associations of ‘higher’ cognitive performance parameters, like 
social problem solving, with more general characteristics of processing capacity, 
speed or even vocabulary. No comprehensive neuropsychological examination was 
included in the present protocol, and the basic cognitive measures used – the WTAR 
and the verbal fluency test – can say little about the qualitative nature of any deficits 
recorded. Neuropsychological assessment batteries can be highly taxing and time-
consuming: unfeasible for the present study, which aimed to look at the interlocking 
effects of a broad array of measures in a sample of people with psychosis who often 
experience difficulties concentrating for extended periods of time. Given that social 
problem solving performance has here demonstrated significant associations with 
symptom persistence and with other cognitive markers, it might ultimately be desirable 
to break down the effect of this construct into simpler components. There may be 
certain relevant aspects of cognition which are more amenable to training than others, 
and some that may have particularly strong links with symptom prognosis. From a 
clinical point of view, a more nuanced understanding of the roles of problem solving 
components could enable optimally helpful therapeutic strategies to be developed. 
    
8.7.2 Negative repetitive thinking 
It is thought that rumination and worry share the same process of negative repetitive 
thought (Segerstrom et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2005), differing in content according 
to their principal associations with depression and anxiety, respectively (McLaughlin et 
al., 2007). Ehring and Watkins (2008) proposed that negative repetitive thinking is a 
transdiagnostic process that perpetuates a large range of Axis 1 disorders.  
 
In the present study, worry significantly predicted the persistence of paranoia over 
time, as found previously (Startup et al., 2007), but the predictive effect of rumination 
did not reach significance. Worry has been argued to maintain persecutory delusions 
by keeping the belief content in mind through repetition and by impeding full emotional 
processing of the content (Freeman, 2007; Hepworth et al., 2011). It would follow that 
rumination, as another form of negative repetitive thought, should have a similar 
effect. The present differential findings suggest that some kinds of negative repetitive 
thought might be more strongly associated with symptom persistence than others. 
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Further gains in disentangling the relative effects of the process and the content of 
negative repetitive thinking might be possible with the use of measures developed to 
be content-independent (e.g. Ehring et al., 2011). 
 
8.7.3 Psychotic symptoms beyond persecutory delusions 
The present investigation focused on persecutory delusions as a very common and 
debilitating psychotic symptom (Sartorius, Jablensky, & Korten, 1986; Appelbaum et 
al., 1999), but depression may be involved in the persistence of different delusion 
subtypes and other psychotic symptoms. Depression is likely to have different 
relationships with various psychotic phenomena, such as different delusion types (e.g. 
Garety et al., 2012), which systematic investigation could reveal. Cross-sectional 
associations have been found of depression with aspects of hallucinated voices such 
as malevolence, derogatory content and intrusiveness (Soppitt & Birchwood, 1997; 
Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997). An integrated theory of psychosis would benefit from 
an understanding of how emotional disturbance can contribute to the range of 
different hallucinations and delusions. 
 
8.7.4 Other diagnostic categories 
The present investigation selected samples of diagnostically-defined participants with 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and with non-psychotic major depressive disorder, 
in order that the findings would be comparable to those of previous research using the 
same standard diagnostic criteria. However, the symptoms of interest – persecutory 
delusions and the symptoms of depression – do not occur exclusively in these well-
defined groups, and it will be important to understand to what extent the same effects 
apply to each symptom transdiagnostically. People with persecutory beliefs in the 
context of psychotic depression, and those with bipolar disorders, would be of 
particular interest. 
 
8.8  Overall conclusion 
Depression is common in people with persecutory delusions, and is associated with a 
number of cognitive features seen in major depressive disorder. Levels of depression 
predict the persistence of persecutory delusions over six months. Evidence of 
depression-related cognitive features in people whose low mood accompanies a 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorder suggests mechanisms that might connect emotional 
disturbance with psychosis.  
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Negative schematic beliefs about the self and social problem solving difficulties 
predict the persistence of both persecutory delusions and depression over time. The 
finding that shared prognostic processes significantly predict the persistence of both 
depression and paranoia provides empirical support for the application of similar 
therapeutic approaches to the treatment of these problems. The present findings 
support the relevance of current clinical research trials targeting beliefs about the self 
and worry in people with delusions. Translation of further techniques from depression 
treatment for use with people experiencing psychosis may be indicated. 
 
The significance that negative beliefs about the self can have for the manifestation of 
psychotic experiences is illustrated by the following quote, from a man who wanted to 
participate in this study, but was excluded because he no longer held a persecutory 
delusion. He had previously believed that members of the community, who could all 
read his mind, were attacking him psychically and exerting control over his actions. 
Over the course of treatment, which included a course of CBT, his beliefs about his 
own faultiness and vulnerability were identified and addressed, and incrementally he 
came to think less negatively of himself. By the time that he volunteered to take part in 
this study, the attacks had completely stopped, because the people – who 
nevertheless could still read his mind – could tell that he was no longer an easy target. 
 
"[I was] vulnerable, confused, lost, scared, frightened. People could see what stage I 
was at. I felt I was like an open book. Everyone around me could hear what I was 
thinking about in my mind. They wanted me to be a sex slave... Looking back now, it 
used to worry me so much back then, but it doesn't bother me now, because people 
know they can't do that now. They don't even try to do that now, because they roughly 
know what stage I'm at, and they know that there's no way they can take control of me 
now, because they know I'm my own boss, and I'm doing my own thing." 
 
It is hoped that the work presented in this thesis will contribute to the further 
development of understanding and treatment for people who have similar 
experiences.
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Moorfields & Whittington Research Ethics Committee 





Telephone: 020 7794 0552  
Miss Natasha Vorontsova 
PhD student 
Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London 
Department of Psychology, PO Box 78 
ASB, 4 Windsor Walk, Institute of 
Psychiatry, King's College London 
SE5 8AF 
 
04 November 2009 
 
Dear Miss Vorontsova 
 
Study Title: Cognitive factors maintaining persecutory 
delusions in psychosis: the contribution of 
depression. 
REC reference number: 09/H0721/61 
Protocol number: 1 
 
The Research Ethics Committee reviewed the above application at the meeting held 




The Committee welcomed the opportunity to ask you further clarification on the 
following points: 
   
There should be a GP letter informing that the participants are taking part in 
the study.   
    
You asked whether the GPs for the non-clinical control group should be informed as 
well and the Committee confirmed that would not be necessary.  
   
In the section, ‘Why have I been invited to take part?' in the Delusions Group 
and the Depression Group Information Sheets, the Committee thought that 
the wording, ‘we have been told…' suggests that confidential issues have 
been discussed between the clinical team and the researchers.  It would be 
better to rephrase the sentence, ‘you may have worries' (Delusions Group) or 
‘you may be experiencing depression' (Depression Group).   
    
You stated that should be possible.  You said that you would only ask for 
permission of the consultants of the clinical teams to approach patients within their 
care and then ask the clinical team how to approach suitable patients.  
   
How long will the participants have to decide and how will they be 
approached?   
   
You said that the study would be discussed with the participants and the Information 
Sheet would be given to them.  They would be given at least 24 hours to make a 
decision before she called to see if they were interested.  
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It was noted that only participants with persecutory delusions would 
complete the assessments of the severity of their symptoms twice, once with 
the initial assessments and then six months later.  The Committee thought 
that all the groups could be assessed a second time to see if there were any 
changes with the other groups as well.  This could provide a baseline and 
check on the repeatability of the measures.   
    
You said that the aim of the study would be to test the hypothesis that cognitive 
features predict delusion and so only the delusion groups (with or without 
depression) would be followed up.  You also said that she did not think it would be 
worth following up each group.  
   
Will you be asking what treatment the participants will be on?   
    
You said that the participants will give consent for her to access their medical 
records to check diagnosis and medical treatment.  
   
It was noted that in the Participant Information Sheet for the Delusions Group, 
the last two paragraphs in the section, ‘What will happen to the information I 
give in the study?' did not appear in the other Information Sheets.  The 
Committee thought that the last paragraph (should the participant lose 
capacity during the study) should appear in all the Information Sheets and the 
second from last paragraph (sharing important information with clinical team) 
should also be in the Information Sheet for the Depression Group but not in 
the Non-clinical Controls Information Sheet.   
    
You said that was a good point.  
   
We noted that one Peer Review asks how you would control for the effects of 
treatment over time.  How would you propose to do this?   
    
You said that she did not think she would be able to do this. If a difference became 
apparent she would follow it up.  
   
There are quite a lot of valid questionnaires being used. Have they been 
validated to use together?   
    
You stated that there are two clusters of measures being used.  The questionnaires 
investigating delusion and psychosis have been used together and so have the 
depression measures been used together.  
   
Will there be anyone else with you when you conduct the interviews and what 
would you do if someone did get upset during the interviews?   
    
You said that she would be sensitive to participants who may become upset and 
allow breaks if necessary.  All the interviews will be conducted on the NHS site or 
the Institute of Psychiatry where your supervisors or clinical psychologists would be 
available if the need arose.  
   
Do you expect to see a change in the cognitive behaviour of participants with 
delusions?   
    
You stated that these patients are relatively stable.  Hopefully the sample size 
should be large enough to show any change.  
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We noted that should undiagnosed depression be revealed, the researcher 
would seek the participant's permission to inform the clinical team.  We 
thought that permission should not be sought from the participant as it would 
be better if the clinician was told so that the patient could be treated for 
depression as soon as possible if necessary.  This could be made more 
explicit in the Information Sheets and Consent Form and if a patient does not 
agree to the clinician being informed, they should not be included in the 
study.   
    
You agreed to the statement.  
    
There may be some difficulties in distinguishing between feelings caused by 
depression or some negative schizophrenic feelings such as lack of 
motivation.  How would you deal with this problem?   
   
You agreed that distinguishing between the two conditions could be difficult, but the 
clinicians would have already made the diagnosis. 
   
One of the Peer Reviews has suggested that you should recruit more 
participants.  Has this been done?   
    
You said that the numbers of participants has been increased in response to the 
Peer Review.  
   
Ethical Opinion 
 
Decision: Favourable Opinion (with additional conditions) 
 
The members of the Committee present gave a favourable ethical opinion (with 
additional conditions) of the above research on the basis described in the 
application form, protocol and supporting documentation, subject to the conditions 
specified below. 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
 
The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject to 
management permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior to the 
start of the study (see “Conditions of the favourable opinion” below). 
 
Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the 
start of the study. 
 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host organisation 
prior to the start of the study at the site concerned. 
 
For NHS research sites only, management permission for research (“R&D 
approval”) should be obtained from the relevant care organisation(s) in accordance 
with NHS research governance arrangements.  Guidance on applying for NHS 
permission for research is available in the Integrated Research Application System 
or at http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk. Where the only involvement of the NHS 
organisation is as a Participant Identification Centre, management permission for 
research is not required but the R&D office should be notified of the study. 
Guidance should be sought from the R&D office where necessary. 
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Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of approvals from host 
organisations. 
 
Other conditions specified by the REC.  Final versions of documents should be 
provided to the committee for information, e.g. information sheet 
 
1. Please include a GP letter for the patient groups.  This should explain that 
one of the GP's patients has agreed to take part and inform of the aims of the study 
and the patient's involvement. 
 
2. There should be a section in the Confidentiality sections of the Delusion's 
and Depression's Group Information Sheets informing the participant that the GP 
will be informed.  
 
3. Please ensure that the second from last paragraph in the section, ‘What will 
happen to the information I give in the study? in the Delusions group Information 
Sheet, is also included in the Depression Group Information Sheet.  Also, the last 
paragraph of the same section should be included in both the Depression Group 
and Non-Clinical Group Information Sheets.   
 
4. In the section, ‘Why have I been invited to take part?' of both the Delusions 
Group and the Depression Group Information Sheets, the Committee thought that 
the wording, ‘we have been told…' should be rephrased to ‘you may have worries' 
(Delusion Group) or ‘you may be experiencing depression' (Depression Group).    
 
5. There should be two Consent Forms, one for the Patient Groups and one for 
the Non-clinical Group.  All statements (even 1-3) should have boxes for the 
participant to acknowledge.  Please see Guidance on Patient Information Sheets 
and Consent forms on the website www.nres.npsa.nhs.uk    
 
6. The Consent Form for the Patient Groups should have a section stating that 
the participant agrees to the GP being informed of their participation in the study.   
 
7. Also in the Consent Form for the Patient Groups, there should be a section 
stating that the participant agrees to the clinical team being informed of important 
medical information that may arise during the study.   
 
8. Both Consent Forms should have a statement, ‘I understand that relevant 
sections of my (medical notes and) data collected during the study, may be looked 
at by individuals from the research team, regulatory authorities, or from the NHS 
Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research.  I give permission for 
these individuals to have access to my records.  In the Non-clinical Consent Form, 
the words, ‘medical notes' may not be necessary.   
 
The REC nominated the Co-ordinator, Mrs K Clark, to be point of contact should 
further clarification be sought from the applicant upon receipt of the decision letter.  
   
It is responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are 





The documents reviewed and approved at the meeting were: 
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Document    Version    Date    
Covering Letter    30 September 2009  
REC application  1  30 September 2009  
Protocol  1  30 September 2009  
Investigator CV    30 September 2009  
Participant Information Sheet: Delusions Group  1  30 September 2009  
Participant Information Sheet: Depression Group  1  30 September 2009  
Participant Information Sheet: Non Clinical Group  1  30 September 2009  
Participant Consent Form  1  30 September 2009  
Evidence of insurance or indemnity    31 July 2009  
Summary/Synopsis  1  30 September 2009  
Questionnaire: Validated: Paranoid Thoughts Scale       
Questionnaire: Validated: Beck Depression Inventory       
Questionnaire: Validated: Beck Anxiety Inventory       
Questionnaire: Validated: Brief Core Schema Scales       
Questionnaire: Validated: Ruminative Response Scale       
Advertisement  1  30 September 2009  
Two Supervisor CVs    30 September 2009  
Four Referee' or Other Scientific Reports       
Scan Depression Schedule  1  30 September 2009  
PSYRATS Delusions Scale  1  30 September 2009  
Questionnaire: Validated: Penn State Worry       
Questionnaire: Validated: Avoidance and Acceptance       
Questionnaire: Non - Validated: Demographic 
Information Form  
     
Questionnaire: Non - Validated: Visual Analogue Scales 
of Mood  
     
 
Membership of the Committee 
 
The members of the Ethics Committee who were present at the meeting are listed 
on the attached sheet. 
 
Statement of compliance  
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard 
Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
After ethical review 
 
Now that you have completed the application process please visit the National 
Research Ethics Service website > After Review 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the 
National Research Ethics Service and the application procedure. If you wish to 
make your views known please use the feedback form available on the website. 
The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives 
detailed guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, 
including: 
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• Notifying substantial amendments 
• Adding new sites and investigators 
• Progress and safety reports 
• Notifying the end of the study 
 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the 
light of changes in reporting requirements or procedures. 
We would also like to inform you that we consult regularly with stakeholders to 
improve our service. If you would like to join our Reference Group please email 
referencegroup@nres.npsa.nhs.uk. 
 
09/H0721/61 Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 












Enclosures: List of names and professions of members who were 
present at the meeting and those who submitted written 
comments 
“After ethical review – guidance for researchers”  
 
Copy to: Jennifer Liebscher, King's College London, R&D office  
  Appendix A 
  Page 212 
Moorfields & Whittington Research Ethics Committee 
 
Attendance at Committee meeting on 28 October 2009 
 
  
Committee Members:  
 
Name   Profession   Present    Notes    
Dr Waheeb Atia  Retired Consultant  Yes    
Mr David Barr  Retired Magistrate  Yes    
Ms Jill Bloom  Drug Information 
Pharmacist  
Yes    
Dr Elizabeth Carrey  MSc Programme 
Director in Clinical 
Paediatrics  
Yes    
Mr Dan Ehrlich  Head of Optometry  Yes    
Mrs Ros Goldfarb  Retired Immigration 
Judge  
No    
Mr  Robert  Goldstein  Retired Economist  Yes    
Mr Hari Jayaram  Clinical Scientist in 
Ophthalmology  
Yes    
Dr Stella Kingett  Consultant Psychiatrist  Yes    
Professor Diana Kornbrot  Professor of 
Mathematical 
Psychology  
Yes    
Ms Mary Ryan  Personnel Manager  Yes    
Dr David Slovick  Consultant Physician  Yes    
  
Also in attendance:  
 
Name   Position (or reason for attending)   
Mrs Kathy Clark  REC Co-ordinator  
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Moorfields & Whittington Research Ethics Committee 
South House, Block A 





 Telephone: 020 7794 0552  
Facsimile: 020 7794 0714 
06 November 2009 
 
Miss Natasha Vorontsova 
PhD student 
Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London 
Department of Psychology, PO Box 78 
ASB, 4 Windsor Walk, Institute of 
Psychiatry, King's College London 
SE5 8AF 
 
Dear Miss Vorontsova 
 
Full title of study: Cognitive factors maintaining persecutory 
delusions in psychosis: the contribution of 
depression. 
REC reference number: 09/H0721/61 
Protocol number: 1 
 
Thank you for your email of 06 November 2009. I can confirm the REC has received 
the documents listed below as evidence of compliance with the approval conditions 
detailed in our letter dated 28 October 2009. Please note these documents are for 




The documents received were as follows: 
  
Document    Version    Date    
GP Letter Depression Group  1  05 November 2009  
Participant Information Sheet: Non-Clinical Group  2  05 November 2009  
Participant Consent Form: Non-Clinical Controls  2  05 November 2009  
Participant Information Sheet: Delusion Group  2  05 November 2009  
Participant Information Sheet: Depression Group  2  05 November 2009  
Participant Consent Form: Patients  2  05 November 2009  
GP Letter Delusions Group  1  05 November 2009  
 
You should ensure that the sponsor has a copy of the final documentation for the 
study.  It is the sponsor's responsibility to ensure that the documentation is made 
available to R&D offices at all participating sites. 
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Appendix B. Participant information sheets and consent 
forms  
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Department of Psychology 
Institute of Psychiatry 
Kings College London 
De Crespigny Park 





PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET: PERSECUTION AND DEPRESSION 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a research study. Before you decide, you 
need to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for 
you. Please tell us if anything is unclear or if you would like more information. Talk to 




• This study is about the fear of other people trying to harm you, and how 
depression might make this fear worse.  
• You would have two meetings with the researcher, six months apart. Each 
meeting would last about two hours. 
• We will ask you about what you usually do to cope with being sad or worried. 
There will also be some tasks of memory and problem solving. 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Many people will experience the fear of being hurt by others at some point. But for 
some people, worries like this can become very strong and long-lasting. We want to 
find out what makes the fear persist. In a similar way, we all experience sadness 
sometimes, but some people become depressed for long periods of time. We think 
that there might be similar reasons for the persistence of sadness and for the 
persistence of fear. Then similar approaches could be used to help people with these 
problems. 
 
Different people react differently to feeling worried or sad. For example, some people 
might spend a lot of time thinking about why they feel upset and what this means. 
Other people might try to avoid thinking about it at all. Our style of thinking can affect 
how we remember the past, and our memories of the past affect how we approach 
the future. Spending too much time focusing on problems might make them more 
upsetting. On the other hand, if we avoid thinking about our problems altogether then 
we might not be able to solve them. The right approach to problem solving might help 
us to feel calmer and happier. We want to look at how people’s moods and concerns 
change over time and how these changes relate to the person’s thinking style.  
 
This project is part of a PhD thesis. The outcome of the research will be published in 
a scientific journal, but individual participants will not be identified. We hope that a 
better understanding of these processes will help us to improve psychological talking 
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Why have I been invited to take part? 
120 people will take part in the study. All will be adults (aged 18+) who can speak 
and read English well enough to complete the assessments. You have been asked to 
participate because you may sometimes have worries about being harmed by others. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, you do not have to take part. It is up to you to decide. We will explain the study 
and go through this information sheet, which is yours to keep. We will then give you a 
consent form to sign if you agree to take part. You are free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving a reason. This would not affect your care. 
 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
If you agree to take part, you will have two meetings with the researcher. Each 
meeting will take approximately two hours. The researcher will ask you about your 
mood and any worries you might have about being harmed by others. You will also 
be asked to fill in seven multiple-choice questionnaires. These will ask about what 
you usually do when you feel sad or worried, for example whether you spend a lot of 
time analysing the reasons for being upset. Then there will be five verbal tasks which 
are about memory and problem solving. These are designed to be brief. The second 
meeting will be six months after the first meeting and the assessments will be the 
same.  
 
We would like to record your meetings with the researcher using a digital voice 
recorder. This is so that we can check that the tasks are presented in the same way 
to all participants. It also makes the meetings shorter because we do not have to 
write your answers down as you say them. The meetings do not have to be recorded 
if you do not want them to be. 
 
We would also be very interested to know about your experiences of persecution and 
depression, and what you thought about taking part in the study. We might want to 
publish a direct quote from you. Your name would not be published. We will not 
publish any quotes from you if you do not want us to. 
 
We would like to send a letter to your GP to let him/her know that you are taking part 
in our research. We will not do this if you do not want us to. 
  
If you agree to take part in the study, we will look at your medical notes to find out 
about what medication you take and any diagnosis that has been given to you. We 
will not use your notes for any other purpose. 
 
 
Expenses and payment 
You will be paid £40 in total to cover your expenses and to reimburse you for the 
time you spend in the study. We will give you £20 after the first meeting and another 
£20 after the second.  
 
 
What are the potential risks of taking part? 
It is not expected that participation in the study has any risks. However, if you find 
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What will happen to the information I give in the study? 
All your answers to the questionnaires and the tasks will be kept on paper and in files 
on our computer for ten years, and will then be destroyed. Paper questionnaires will 
be kept in a locked cabinet in a locked office. Computer files containing personal 
information about you will be encrypted so that nobody except for the researcher can 
open them. The recordings will be kept as electronic files. They will be kept securely 
and anonymously and will be identifiable only by a number instead of your name.   
 
The information you give will usually be available only to the research team. 
However, the researcher will share with your clinical team any important information 
that is relevant to the care you receive. 
 
In the unlikely event that you become unable to continue to take part in the study, the 
information that you had given up to that point would continue to be used 
confidentially for the purposes described. If you requested that your data be 
withdrawn from the study completely and destroyed, then we would do this.  
 
 
If you have a concern about the study 
If you have a concern about this study, you should speak to us or a member of your 
clinical team. If you remain unhappy and would like to complain formally, you can do 
this through the NHS Complaints Procedure. Details can be obtained from the 
hospital. 
 
All research in the NHS is reviewed by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity. This 
study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Moorfields and 
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Dr Daniel Freeman 
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King’s College London 
SE5 8AF 
 




Professor Philippa Garety 
Professor of Clinical Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
PO Box 77 
Institute of Psychiatry 
King’s College London 
SE5 8AF 
 




  Appendix B 
  Page 220 













Department of Psychology 
Institute of Psychiatry 
Kings College London 
De Crespigny Park 





PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET: PERSECUTION AND DEPRESSION 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a research study. Before you decide, you 
need to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for 
you. Please tell us if anything is unclear or if you would like more information. Talk to 




• This study is about how depression might contribute to a fear of being 
harmed by other people.  
• You would meet with the researcher for about two hours. 
• We will ask you about what you usually do to cope with being sad or worried. 
There will also be some tasks of memory and problem solving. 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Many people will experience the fear of being hurt by others at some point. But for 
some people, worries like this can become very strong and long-lasting. We want to 
find out what makes the fear persist. In a similar way, we all experience sadness 
sometimes, but some people become depressed for long periods of time. We think 
that there might be similar reasons for the persistence of sadness and for the 
persistence of fear. Then similar approaches could be used to help people with these 
problems. 
 
Different people react differently to feeling worried or sad. For example, some people 
might spend a lot of time thinking about why they feel upset and what this means. 
Other people might try to avoid thinking about it at all. Our style of thinking can affect 
how we remember the past, and our memories of the past affect how we approach 
the future. Spending too much time focusing on problems might make them more 
upsetting. On the other hand, if we avoid thinking about our problems altogether then 
we might not be able to solve them. The right approach to problem solving might help 
us to feel calmer and happier. We want to look at how people’s moods and concerns 
change over time and how these changes relate to the person’s thinking style.  
 
This project is part of a PhD thesis. The outcome of the research will be published in 
a scientific journal, but individual participants will not be identified. We hope that a 
better understanding of these processes will help us to improve psychological talking 
treatments for people who have depression and distressing worries about other 
people. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
120 people will take part in the study. All will be adults (aged 18+) who can speak 
and read English well enough to complete the assessments. Some of the participants 
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in the study have distressing fears about being harmed by other people. You have 
been asked to participate because you may be experiencing depression. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, you do not have to take part. It is up to you to decide. We will explain the study 
and go through this information sheet, which is yours to keep. We will then give you a 
consent form to sign if you agree to take part. You are free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving a reason. This would not affect your care. 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
If you agree to take part, you will meet with the researcher for around two hours. The 
researcher will ask you about your mood and any worries you might have about 
being harmed by others. You will also be asked to fill in seven multiple-choice 
questionnaires. These will ask about what you usually do when you feel sad or 
worried, for example whether you spend a lot of time analysing the reasons for being 
upset. Then there will be five verbal tasks which are about memory and problem 
solving. These are designed to be brief. 
 
We would like to record your meetings with the researcher using a digital voice 
recorder. This is so that we can check that the tasks are presented in the same way 
to all participants. It also makes the meetings shorter because we do not have to 
write your answers down as you say them. The meetings do not have to be recorded 
if you do not want them to be. 
 
We would also be very interested to know about your experiences of persecution and 
depression, and what you thought about taking part in the study. We might want to 
publish a direct quote from you. Your name would not be published. We will not 
publish any quotes from you if you do not want us to. 
  
We would like to send a letter to your GP to let him/her know that you are taking part 
in our research. We will not do this if you do not want us to. 
 
If you agree to take part in the study, we will look at your medical notes to find out 
about what medication you take and any diagnosis that has been given to you. We 
will not use your notes for any other purpose. 
 
Expenses and payment 
You will be paid £20 to cover your expenses and to reimburse you for the time you 
spend in the study. 
 
What are the potential risks of taking part? 
It is not expected that participation in the study has any risks. However, if you find 
any of the questions asked upsetting, and would like to talk about this, please tell the 
researcher. 
 
What will happen to the information I give in the study? 
All your answers to the questionnaires and the tasks will be kept on paper and in files 
on our computer for ten years, and will then be destroyed. Paper questionnaires will 
be kept in a locked cabinet in a locked office. Computer files containing personal 
information about you will be encrypted so that nobody except for the researcher can 
open them. The recordings will be kept as electronic files. They will be kept securely 
and anonymously and will be identifiable only by a number instead of your name.   
 
The information you give will usually be available only to the research team. 
However, the researcher will share with your clinical team any important information 
that is relevant to the care you receive. 
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In the unlikely event that you become unable to continue to take part in the study, the 
information that you had given up to that point would continue to be used 
confidentially for the purposes described. If you requested that your data be 
withdrawn from the study completely and destroyed, then we would do this.  
 
If you have a concern about the study 
If you have a concern about this study, you should speak to us about it. If you remain 
unhappy and would like to complain formally, you can do this through the NHS 
Complaints Procedure. Details can be obtained from the hospital. 
 
All research in the NHS is reviewed by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity. This 
study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Moorfields and 
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Department of Psychology 
Institute of Psychiatry 
Kings College London 
De Crespigny Park 





PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET: PERSECUTION AND DEPRESSION 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a research study. Before you decide, you 
need to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for 
you. Please tell us if anything is unclear or if you would like more information. Talk to 




• This study is about how depression might contribute to a fear of being 
harmed by other people.  
• You would meet with the researcher for about two hours. 
• We will ask you about what you usually do to cope with being sad or worried. 
There will also be some tasks of memory and problem solving. 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Many people will experience the fear of being hurt by others at some point. But for 
some people, worries like this can become very strong and long-lasting. We want to 
find out what makes the fear persist. In a similar way, we all experience sadness 
sometimes, but some people become depressed for long periods of time. We think 
that there might be similar reasons for the persistence of sadness and for the 
persistence of fear. Then similar approaches could be used to help people with these 
problems. 
 
Different people react differently to feeling worried or sad. For example, some people 
might spend a lot of time thinking about why they feel upset and what this means. 
Other people might try to avoid thinking about it at all. Our style of thinking can affect 
how we remember the past, and our memories of the past affect how we approach 
the future. Spending too much time focusing on problems might make them more 
upsetting. On the other hand, if we avoid thinking about our problems altogether then 
we might not be able to solve them. The right approach to problem solving might help 
us to feel calmer and happier. We want to look at how people’s moods and concerns 
change over time and how these changes relate to the person’s thinking style.  
 
This project is part of a PhD thesis. The outcome of the research will be published in 
a scientific journal, but individual participants will not be identified. We hope that a 
better understanding of these processes will help us to improve psychological talking 
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Why have I been invited to take part? 
120 people will take part in the study. All will be adults (aged 18+) who can speak 
and read English well enough to complete the assessments. Some of the participants 
in the study experience depression and some have distressing fears about being 




Do I have to take part? 
No, you do not have to take part. It is up to you to decide. We will explain the study 
and go through this information sheet, which is yours to keep. We will then give you a 
consent form to sign if you agree to take part. You are free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving a reason. This would not affect your care. 
 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
If you agree to take part, you will meet with the researcher for around two hours. The 
researcher will ask you about your mood and any worries you might have about 
being harmed by others. You will also be asked to fill in seven multiple-choice 
questionnaires. These will ask about what you usually do when you feel sad or 
worried, for example whether you spend a lot of time analysing the reasons for being 
upset. Then there will be five verbal tasks which are about memory and problem 
solving. These are designed to be brief. 
 
We would like to record your meetings with the researcher using a digital voice 
recorder. This is so that we can check that the tasks are presented in the same way 
to all participants. It also makes the meetings shorter because we do not have to 
write your answers down as you say them. The meetings do not have to be recorded 
if you do not want them to be. 
 
We would also be very interested to know about your experiences of persecution and 
depression, and what you thought about taking part in the study. We might want to 
publish a direct quote from you. Your name would not be published. We will not 
publish any quotes from you if you do not want us to. 
 
 
Expenses and payment 
You will be paid £20 to cover your expenses and to reimburse you for the time you 
spend in the study. 
 
 
What are the potential risks of taking part? 
It is not expected that participation in the study has any risks. However, if you find 




What will happen to the information I give in the study? 
All your answers to the questionnaires and the tasks will be kept on paper and in files 
on our computer for ten years, and will then be destroyed. Paper questionnaires will 
be kept in a locked cabinet in a locked office. Computer files containing personal 
information about you will be encrypted so that nobody except for the researcher can 
open them. The recordings will be kept as electronic files. They will be kept securely 
and anonymously and will be identifiable only by a number instead of your name. 
 
In the unlikely event that you become unable to continue to take part in the study, the 
information that you had given up to that point would continue to be used 
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confidentially for the purposes described. If you requested that your data be 
withdrawn from the study completely and destroyed, then we would do this.  
 
 
If you have a concern about the study 
If you have a concern about this study, you should speak to us about it. If you remain 
unhappy and would like to complain formally, you can do this through the NHS 
Complaints Procedure. Details can be obtained from the hospital. 
 
All research in the NHS is reviewed by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity. This 
study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Moorfields and 
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PLEASE TICK IF YOU AGREE: 
 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information and to ask questions. 
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights 
being affected. 
 
 I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected 
during the study may be looked at by members of the research team, 
regulatory authorities, or the NHS Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in 
this research. I give permission for these individuals to have access to my 
records. 
 
 I understand that my clinical team will be informed of any important medical 
information that might arise during the study. 
 
 I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  I agree to have my meeting(s) with the researcher recorded with a digital voice 
recorder. 
 
  I agree to the researcher publishing direct quotes from me, which will not mention 
my name. 
 





--------------------------------------------------      -------------------    ---------------------------------- 







--------------------------------------------------      -------------------     --------------------------------- 
Name of researcher          Date  Signature 
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PLEASE TICK IF YOU AGREE: 
 
 
  I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information and to ask questions. 
 
  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights 
being affected. 
 
  I understand that relevant sections of the data collected during the study may be 
looked at by members of the research team or regulatory authorities, where it is 
relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals 
to have access to my records. 
 
  I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  I agree to have my meeting(s) with the researcher recorded with a digital voice 
recorder. 
 
  I agree to the researcher publishing direct quotes from me, which will not 








--------------------------------------------------      -------------------    ---------------------------------- 








--------------------------------------------------      -------------------     --------------------------------- 
Name of researcher          Date  Signature 
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Appendix C. Study measures 
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Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (Green et al., 2008) 
 
Please read each of the statements carefully. 
They refer to thoughts and feelings you may have had about others over the last 
month.  
Think about the last month and indicate the extent of these feelings from 1 (Not at 
all) to 5 (Totally).  Please complete both Part A and Part B.   
 
N.B. Please do not rate items according to any experiences you may have had 





1.  I spent time thinking about friends gossiping 
about me 
1 2 3 4 5 
2.  I often heard people referring to me 1 2 3 4 5 
3.  I have been upset by friends and colleagues 
judging me critically 1 2 3 4 5 
4.  People definitely laughed at me behind my 
back   
1 2 3 4 5 
5.  I have been thinking a lot about people 
avoiding me   
1 2 3 4 5 
6.  People have been dropping hints for me 1 2 3 4 5 
7.  I believed that certain people were not what 
they seemed 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.  People talking about me behind my back 
upset me   
1 2 3 4 5 
9.  I was convinced that people were singling me 
out   
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I was certain that people have followed me 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Certain people were hostile towards me 
personally   
1 2 3 4 5 
12. People have been checking up on me 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I was stressed out by people watching me 1 2 3 4 5 
14. I was frustrated by people laughing at me 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I was worried by people’s undue interest in 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. It was hard to stop thinking about people 
talking about me behind my back 
1 2 3 4 5 
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1.  Certain individuals have had it in for me 1 2 3 4 5 
2.  I have definitely been persecuted 1 2 3 4 5 
3.  People have intended me harm 1 2 3 4 5 
4.  People wanted me to feel threatened, so they 
stared at me   
1 2 3 4 5 
5.  I was sure certain people did things in order to 
annoy me  
1 2 3 4 5 
6.  I was convinced there was a conspiracy 
against me 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.  I was sure someone wanted to hurt me 1 2 3 4 5 
8.  I was distressed by people wanting to harm 
me in some way   
1 2 3 4 5 
9.  I was preoccupied with thoughts of people 
trying to upset me deliberately  
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I couldn’t stop thinking about people wanting 
to confuse me 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I was distressed by being persecuted   1 2 3 4 5 
12. I was annoyed because others wanted to 
deliberately upset me 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The thought that people were persecuting me 
played on my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. It was difficult to stop thinking about people 
wanting to make me feel bad 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. People have been hostile towards me on 
purpose 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I was angry that someone wanted to hurt me 1 2 3 4 5 
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Beck Depression Inventory II  
 
Image not included for copyright reasons 
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Image not included for copyright reasons 
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Beck Anxiety Inventory     
 
Image not included for copyright reasons  
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PSYRATS: Delusions Scale (Haddock et al., 1999)  
 






1. Amount of preoccupation 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Duration of preoccupation 0 1 2 3 4 
Avoidance effort  Avoidance success  
3. Conviction  0 1 2 3 4 
4. Amount of distress 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Intensity of distress  0 1 2 3 4 
6. Disruption 0 1 2 3 4 
 
Questions and Scoring Criteria 
 
1. Amount of preoccupation with delusions 
 
How much time do you spend thinking about ……….? 
 - all the time / daily / weekly etc.? 
 
0 - No delusions, or beliefs which the subject thinks about less than once a week 
1 - Subject thinks about beliefs at least once a week 
2 - Subject thinks about beliefs at least once a day 
3 - Subject thinks about beliefs at least once an hour 
4 - Subject thinks about delusions continuously or almost continuously. Subject can only think 
of other things for a few seconds or minutes. 
 
2. Duration of preoccupation with delusions 
 
When the beliefs come to your mind, how long do they persist? 
 - few seconds / minutes / hours, etc.? 
 
0 - No delusions 
1 - Thoughts about beliefs last for a few seconds, fleeting thoughts 
2 - Thoughts about beliefs last for several minutes 
3 - Thoughts about beliefs last for at least 1 hour 
4 - Thoughts about beliefs usually last for hours at a time 
 
Do you try to avoid thinking about it? How hard do you try (0-100 scale)? 
 
How much do you succeed avoiding it (0 – 100 scale)?
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3 Conviction (at the time of interview) 
 
At the present time, how convinced are you that your beliefs are true? Can you 
estimate this on a scale from 0 – 100, where 100 means that you are totally convinced 
by your beliefs and 0 means that you are not convinced at all? 
 
0 - No conviction at all 
1 - Very little conviction in reality of beliefs, less than 10% 
2 - Some doubts relating to conviction in beliefs, between 10 and 49% 
3 - Conviction in belief is very strong, between 50 and 99% 
4 - Conviction is 100% 
 
4 Amount of distress 
 
Do your beliefs cause you distress?  
How much of the time do they cause you distress? 
 
0 - Beliefs never cause distress 
1 - Beliefs cause distress on the minority of occasions 
2 - Beliefs cause distress on less than 50% of occasions 
3 - Beliefs cause distress on the majority of occasions when they occur between 50 and 99% 
of the time 
4 - Beliefs always cause distress when they occur 
 
5 Intensity of distress 
 
When your beliefs distress you, how severe does this feel?  
How distressing would you say it is on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is not at all 
distressing and 100 is so bad it couldn’t be any worse? 
 
0 - No distress 
1 - Beliefs cause slight distress 
2 - Beliefs cause moderate distress 
3 - Beliefs cause marked distress 
4 - Beliefs cause extreme distress, could not be worse 
 
 
6 Disruption to life caused by beliefs 
 
How much disruption do your beliefs cause you? 
 - Do they prevent you working or carrying out a day-time activity? 
 - Do they interfere with your relationships with family or friends? 
 - Do they interfere with your ability to lok after yourself, e.g. washing, changing clothes, etc.? 
 
0 - No disruption to life: able to maintain independent living with no problems in daily living skills. 
Able to maintain social and family relationships (if present) 
 
1 - Beliefs cause minimal amount of disruption to life, e.g. interferes with concentration although 
able to maintain daytime activity and social and family relationships and be able to maintain 
independent living without support 
 
2 - Beliefs cause moderate amount of disruption to life, causing some disturbance to daytime 
activity and/or family or social activities. The patient is not in hospital, although may live in 
supported accommodation or receive additional help with daily living skills 
 
3 - Beliefs cause severe disruption to life, so that hospitalisation is usually necessary. The patient 
is able to maintain some daily activities, self-care and relationships while in hospital. The 
patient may be also be in supported accommodation, but experiencing severe disruption of life 
in terms of activities, daily living skills and/or relationships 
 
4 - Beliefs cause complete disruption of daily life, requiring hospitalization. The patient is unable 
to maintain any daily activities and social relationships. Self-care is also severely disrupted. 
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Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et al., 2006) 
 
This questionnaire lists beliefs that people can hold about themselves and other 
people. Please indicate whether you hold each belief by circling either NO or YES. 
If you hold the belief (YES), then please indicate how strongly you hold it by circling 
a number 1- 4, i.e. you “believe it slightly” (1), you “believe it moderately” (2), 
you “believe it very much” (3) or you “believe it totally” (4). 
 
Try to judge the beliefs on how you have generally viewed yourself and others over 
time. Do not spend too long on each belief. There are no right or wrong answers and 





















I am unloved NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am worthless NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am weak NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am vulnerable NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am bad NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am a failure NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am respected NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am valuable NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am talented NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am successful NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
I am good NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 



















Other people are hostile NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are harsh NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are unforgiving NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are bad NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are devious NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are nasty NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are fair NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are good NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are trustworthy NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are accepting NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are supportive NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
Other people are truthful NO YES    →    1              2               3             4 
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Ruminative Response Scale (Treynor et al., 2003) 
 
People think and do many different things when they feel down, sad or depressed. 
Please read each of the items below and indicate whether you never, sometimes, 
often, or always think or do each one when you feel down, sad or depressed. Please 




Almost           Almost  
Never     Sometimes    Often       Always 
 
1. Think about how alone you feel. 
 
2. Think “I won’t be able to do my 
job/work because I feel so bad” 
 
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue 
and achiness 
 
4. Think about how hard it is to 
concentrate 
 
5. Think about how passive and 
unmotivated you feel 
 
6. Analyse recent events to try and 
understand why you are depressed. 
 
7. Think about how you don’t seem to 
feel anything anymore 
 
8. Think “Why can’t I get going?” 
 
9. Think “Why do I always react this 
way?” 
 
10. Go away by yourself and think about 
why you feel this way 
 
11. Write down what you are thinking 
about and analyse it 
 
12. Think about a recent situation, 
wishing it would have gone better 
 
13. Think “Why do I have problems other 
people don’t have?” 
 
14. Think about how sad you feel 
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Almost            Almost  
Never     Sometimes   Often         Always 
 
15. Think about all your shortcomings, 
failings, faults and mistakes 
 
16. Think about how you don’t feel up to 
doing anything 
 
17. Analyse your personality to try and 
understand why you are depressed 
 
18. Go someplace alone to think about 
your feelings 
 
19. Think about how angry you are with 
yourself 
 
20. Listen to sad music 
 
21. Isolate yourself and think about the 
reasons why you feel sad 
 
22. Try to understand yourself by 
focusing on your depressed mood 
 
23. Think “What am I doing to deserve 
this?” 
 
24. Think “I won’t be able to concentrate 
if I keep feeling this way”.  
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Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al., 1990) 
 
 
Please read each statement and circle an appropriate number: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, 
which indicates how much the statement applies to you.  
 





  Not at all                           Very typical                                             
typical of me                             of me                          
1.  If I do not have enough time to do  
     everything, I do not worry about it 1 2 3 4 5 
2.  My worries overwhelm me 1 2 3 4 5 
3.  I do not tend to worry about things 1 2 3 4 5 
4.  Many situations make me worry 1 2 3 4 5 
5.  I know I should not worry about things, but I  
     just cannot help it 1 2 3 4 5 
6.  When I am under pressure I worry a lot 1 2 3 4 5 
7.  I am always worrying about something 1 2 3 4 5 
8.  I find it easy to dismiss worrisome  
      thoughts 1 2 3 4 5 
9.  As soon as I finish one task, I start to  
     worry about everything else I have to do 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I never worry about anything 1 2 3 4 5 
11. When there is nothing more I can do about a  
      concern, I do not worry about it any more 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I have been a worrier all my life 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I notice that I have been worrying about  
      things 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I worry all the time 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I worry about projects until they are all                
      done 1 2 3 4 5 
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Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate the truth of each statement as it 
applies to you. Use the following scale to make your choice. 
 
 




















1.  I am able to take action on a problem 
even if I am uncertain what is the right 
thing to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.  I often catch myself daydreaming 
about things I’ve done and what I 
would do differently next time. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.  When I feel depressed or anxious, I 
am unable to take care of my 
responsibilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  I rarely worry about getting my 
anxieties, worries, and feelings under 
control. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  I’m not afraid of my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.  When I evaluate something negatively, 
I usually recognize that this is just a 
reaction, not an objective fact. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.  When I compare myself to other 
people, it seems that most of them are 
handling their lives better than I do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8.  Anxiety is bad. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9.  If I could magically remove all the 
painful experiences I’ve had in my life, I 
would do so. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Autobiographical Memory Test (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) 
 
 
I am interested in your memory for events that have happened in your life.  I am 
going to read to you some words.  For each word I want you to think of an event that 
happened to you which the word reminds you of.  The event could have happened 
recently (yesterday, last week) or a long time ago.  It might be an important event, or 
trivial event. 
 
Just one mor  thing : the memory you recall should be a specific event – an event 
that lasted  less than a day, and occurred at a particular time and place.  So if I 
said the word “good” – it would not be OK to say, “I always enjoy a good party”, 
because that does not mention a specific event.  But it would be OK to say “I had a 
good time at Jane’s party” (because that is a specific event).   It is important to try 







                     60 SECONDS PER ITEM 
 




Form A was given in the first assessment session, and Form B was given at follow-
up to participants with delusions, to avoid practice effects. Positive and negative 
words were alternated, with a negative word first and a positive word last. 
 
Form A  Form B  
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
friendly tired happy failure 
pleasant weakness excited hurt 
proud guilty relieved bored 
lucky ugly peaceful hopeless 
carefree sad sunny rejected 
calm mistake hopeful blame 
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“In this procedure we are interested in how you solve problems. You will be given a 
number of stories to complete. For each story you will be given the beginning of the 
story and how the story ends. We’d like you to provide the ideal strategy that will 
allow the beginning and end of the story to become connected. We would like you to 
describe this strategy in very specific terms so that it would be possible for anyone to 
follow your plan of action.” 
 
Situations (male form for male participants) 
 
1. H. loved his girlfriend very much, but they had many arguments. One day she 
left him. H. wanted things to be better. The story ends with everything fine 
between him and his girlfriend. You begin the story with his girlfriend leaving 
him after an argument. 
 
2. Mr. C. had just moved in that day and didn’t know anyone. Mr. C. wanted to 
have friends in the neighbourhood. The story ends with Mr. C. having many 
good friends and feeling at home in the neighbourhood. You begin the story 
with Mr. C. in his room immediately after arriving in the neighbourhood. 
 
3. Joe is having trouble getting along with the foreman on his job. Joe is very 
unhappy about this. The story ends with Joe’s foreman liking him. You begin 
the story where Joe isn’t getting along with his foreman. 
 
  
The female form (for female participants) is identical except for the sex of the 
protagonist and the love interest. 
 
 
Alternate form for re-assessment 
 
4. One day Al saw a beautiful girl he had never seen before while eating in a 
restaurant. He was immediately attracted to her. The story ends when they get 
married. You begin when Al first notices the girl in the restaurant. 
 
5. John noticed that his friends seemed to be avoiding him. John wanted to have 
friends and be liked. The story ends when John’s friends like him again. You 
begin where he first notices his friends avoiding him. 
 
6. Mr. P. came home after shopping and found that he had lost his watch. He was 
very upset about it. The story ends with Mr. P. finding his watch and feeling 
good about it. You begin the story where Mr. P. found that he had lost his 
watch. 
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Beads Task (Garety et al., 1991) 
 
 
Here we have 2 jars: a mainly red jar containing 60 red beads and 40 white beads, 
and a mainly white jar containing 60 white beads and 40 red beads.  
 
As you can see, the beads have been mixed up in the jars. 
 
I am going to choose one of the jars at random.  Beads will be drawn from the 
selected jar and shown to you one by one.  The beads will always come from the 
same jar and they will be replaced afterwards so that the proportions stay the same. 
 
It is your job to decide which jar the beads have come from, the Mainly White Jar or 
the Mainly Red Jar. There is a diagram here to remind you of what they look like. 
You may see as many beads as you like before making a decision.  After a bead has 
been shown to you, you can either ask to see another bead or you can tell me that 
you know which jar has been chosen, and you can tell me whether it is the Mainly 
Red Jar or the Mainly White Jar. 
 
Remember, you can see as many beads as you like before you decide which jar the 
beads are from.  Only decide when you are certain. 
 
You will now see the first bead.  
 
White 
It is a White bead. 





















You must decide now 
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Beads you have previously seen: 
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Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Ginsberg, 2003) 
 
 Image not included for copyright reasons 
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I'm going to say a letter of the alphabet and I want you to give me as many words 
that begin with that letter as quickly as you can.  For example if I say 'B' you might 
give me bad, bed. 
 
There are only two rules. I don’t want you to give me words that are proper names or 
places, such as 'Bob' or 'Blackpool'.  Also, do not use the same word again with a 
different ending such as ‘eat, eating, eaten,’ as that would be cheating. 
 
Begin when I say the letter.  
 





Alternate version for re-assessment: 
 
The letter is A. 
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Appendix D. Delusional beliefs of the participants with 
persecutory delusions 
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Persecutory delusions without depression: PD group 
 
The Greek gang are messing with my mind to make me a drug dealer and a 
prostitute.                                                                                                                                                                                               
The voices are trying to upset me and get me in trouble.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
They are putting me to pain to punish me and make me commit suicide.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
They are trying to upset me, confuse me, make it look like I'm having a breakdown.                                                                                                                                                                                                                
The people from earlier in life intend to kill me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
If I go out, someone will attack me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
My boyfriend and my family are trying to upset me so they can control me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The people in the street will try to kill me (all of them).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
People in the street react to me aggressively and it intimidates me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Danny Eichman Cohen & Noel are coming in at night and injecting me with HIV 
blood, and kicking me in the back.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The Turkish community are gossiping about me and being disrespectful.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The devil and the hospital people are trying to kill me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The police are hassling me, trying to exploit me and destroy me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
My neighbour is harassing me with noise to upset me and provoke me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Mark & his friends are persecuting me, trying to steal my ID and rob me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Certain members of society are impeding my progress, possibly through confusion 
and sabotage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The African people are persecuting me to take advantage of me for money.                                                      
T.O.R. is persecuting me to try to make my life a misery.                                                                           
The bad spirits are persecuting me to upset me.                                                                                         
My family are stealing my identity to take my wealth.                                                                                          
The people in the street are persecuting me, and I don't know whether it's because of 
iniquity.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
My neighbour is persecuting me to make me move out.                                                                                                          
The devil is using people to interfere with my objectives.                                                                                                          
Colleagues are talking about me negatively to undermine me.                                                                                                                
The Hindus are torturing me with the voices.                                                                                                                                      
People will make false allegations against me to get me in trouble.                                                                                                                         
Nicoletta is persecuting me with police surveillance.                                                                                                                                              
Certain people want to upset me to bring me down.                                                                                                                                                         
The devil is persecuting me with voices.                                                                                                                                                                         
John is persecuting me with surveillance and bringing me down.                 
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Persecutory delusions with depression: PD+D group 
 
Nigel is trying to make my life so unbearable that I have to move out and become 
homeless.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
PC is hurting me (not physically, but mentally), stressing me out and making me 
angry.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
The neighbours are poisoning me, breaking stuff, taking my things, trying to make 
me go crazy.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The spirits are trying to make me commit crimes and lead a bad life.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
My mum is trying to ruin my life and bring me down.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
They [old neighbours] are persecuting me and trying to make me kill myself.                                                
They are going to kill me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
They are trying to kill me and threaten me with black magic.                                                                           
The people are interfering with my mind and trying to hurt me.                                                                                
If I go back to the flat, someone will come and kill me.                                                                                             
The voices are hurting me physically and trying to get me in trouble.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Bandek is torturing me, hurting my body.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
My two neighbours are trying to make my life a misery.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Mr N and his gang will come and kill me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
The funky people and the regular people are plotting to kill me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
My brother is persecuting me and trying to kill me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
There is a conspiracy to make me have another breakdown.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
The people in the street are singling me out to hurt me, physically and mentally.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
People will stop me achieving what I want in life.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
My neighbours are trying to get rid of me and they might attack me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The gang are attacking me somatically and psychosomatically.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
The men in the BT vans will hurt me.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
The gunman will come into my house at night and kill me.                                                                        
The voices are trying to upset me to bring me down.                                                                                    
The people in the street will attack me.                                                                                                      
People in the street will attack me.                                                                                                                 
My neighbours are trying to piss me off, to get me in trouble.                                                                                              
The people from the ward would hurt me if they could.                                                                                                              
The people in the street will attack me.                                                                                                                                 
  
 
